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Preface 
During 1988, the IIASA Risk Task Force invited a group of experts 
to form a collaborating network for a study on national and 
international responses to the accident at Chernobrl. This study 
dealt with responses of society to traumatic events which are 
able to change social structures for an extended time period. 
Specific issues included were: HOW do authorities react, what is 
the role and behavior of the media system, what are the decisioii 
making structures, how do international coordination systems 
function. The documentation of this activity will be publistled by 
a commercial publisher. 
During this work a need arose to broaden IIASA'r exposure to 
opinions and results from experts in the field of risk research. 
For this reason a Conference on "Policy Responses to Large Acci- 
dents" was held.at IIASA from 16-17 January, 1989. The papers 
presented at this conference have been compiled into this v.olume. 
They are included as delivered by the authors without additional 
editing. 
Boris ~ e ~ e r s t g h l  
Gerhard Kromer 
IIASA Task Force on Risk 
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Introduction 
Boris ~egerst$hl 
Research Institute of Northern Finland (RINF) 
The phrase 'policy response' is by no means well defined or 
commonly used. 
The whole pattern of reactions and responses to a large accident 
is society's policy response to the accident. A policy response 
is the reaction by society as a whole to an incident or accident 
which cannot be confined to a narrow sector or closed region, but 
which has a broad and often uncontrollable national or interna- 
tional scope. Purely technical responses to contl-01 the conseque- 
nces on the site of an accident fall outside of what we mean with 
a policy response. Policy responses have three rational goals 
which in order of importance and urgency are to 
- implement measures to minimize harm to the pop~~lation; 
- limit economic impact of accident; 
- revise procedure to avoid future similar accidents and improve 
response mechanisms if an accident occurs. 
The lasting impact of a policy response is in manv cases a 
lasting but not necessarily big change in the way society 
operates and the way society and its technological systems are 
perceived by the public. The group of societal alternati,,es when 
the system responds to an accident is quite largc. Society can 
- take care of the crisis and forget i t  ("we cannot afford a 
change") ; 
- localize responses and apply new policy only on a local 
level ("it cannot happen here"); 
- modify societal strategy through rules, regulations and 
legislation; 
- overreact. Change strategy disregarding side effects and 
cost . 
It is natural that society as a whole does not react to every 
accident. Certain characteristics are required. of an accident 
before it can create a policy response. It is not enough that you 
have a great number of fatalities. Traffic can be seen as a tech- 
nological system which in 1987 in Europe caused 2 million 
injuries and 70.000 deaths. Traffic is however part of a 
lifestyle and is consequently treated as a natural risk which 
everybody shares. Only a few spectacular accidents have created 
new rules and regulations. Some of the characteristics required 
of an accident capable of generating a policy response are: 
- concentration in time and space1 
- many casualties (not always necessary. Seveso didn't cause 
any immediate deaths); 
- media attraction. fin accident with no potential for dramatic 
reporting will not generate broad responses: 
- substantial economic impact; 
- ability to scare people; 
- the accident has an international (or envi ronmenta l ) aspect . 
This list is in no way complete and some of the characteristics 
listed will be present or absent from an accident depending on 
the specific circumstances. The main conclusion of the list is, 
however, that there is no simple way to classify accidents which 
create lasting changes in the way society operates. 
This list gives a too simple view of reality. In a real situation 
like Europe after Chernobyl, there is a lot of confusion with 
many stakeholders and conflicting interests making consistent 
decisionmaking extremely difficult. To this confusion was added 
the problems caused by lacking information. During the first days 
and weeks after the accident nobody knew exactly what had hap- 
pened. Predictions based on what was known were mere a matter of 
guessing than of knowing as there was a complete lack of pr~vious 
experience. 
Much of what can be found out ~cientificall~, about hot* society 
responds to accidents has more to do with the dynamics of society 
than with the technicalities of a specific technological subsys- 
tem. The structure of a policy response is quite complex. It 
involves political, societal, economic and technical issues. One 
important aspect is the fact that responses are implemented thro- 
ugh national and international political processes. As a conse- 
quence side issues and political ambitions and confrontations 
have a tendency to 'muddle the issues' until the original cause 
of a response has almost totally been forgotten. 
Science plays a limited role in these activities. Facts are often 
used only when they support predetermined political positions or 
destroy arguments of opposing factions. It is, however, of fun- 
damental importance that scientists pay more attention to the 
societal framework in which economic and technical systems opera- 
te. This knowledge is essential in all efforts to create a deeper 
understanding of the real deep structures and characteristics of 
these societal subsystems. 
THE EUROPEAN COUUUNITY POLICY TO CONTROL MAJOR HAZARDS 
Aniello Amendola 
Harry Otway 
Institute for Systems Engineering 
Commission of the European Communities 
Ispra, Italy 
Paola Testori-Coggi 
Directorate General XI 
Commission of the European Communities 
Brussels, Belgium 
Abstract 
The European Community has had an effective policy in place 
since 1984 for the control of maJor hazards. This policy is 
based on an EC Council Directive, commonly known as the Seveso 
Directive, which defines an information network and requires 
the generation and transmission of information as the basis for 
accident prevention and risk management. The Directive resulted 
from a series of maJor accidents which occurred in the EC in the 
mid-1970s. demonstrating the need for a harmonised policy for 
the control of potentially hazardous installations. These 
accidents, and their common characteristics, are reviewed in 
the paper and the requirements of the Directive are summarised. 
The Directive has been periodically amended as experience has 
been gained of maJor accidents around the world, eg, Bhopal, 
Mexico City, Basel. The content of these amendments is pre- 
rented and the status of the Directive's implementation is dis- 
cussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Community D i r e c t i v e  on t h e  Major Accident  
Hazards of C e r t a i n  I n d u s t r i a l  A c t i v i t i e s ,  more commonly known 
a s  t h e  Seveso  D i r e c t i v e  / I / ,  s p e c i f i e s  i n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e t a i l  
t h e  i n fo rma t ion  t h a t  must be gene ra t ed  about  major haza rds  i n  
t h e  E C .  I t  c a l l s  f o r  t h e  formal  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and a n a l y s i s  
of major a c c i d e n t  h a z a r d s  and s p e c i f i e s  t o  uhom t h i s  i n fo rma-  
t i o n  i s  t o  be p r o v i d e d .  The i n t e n t  of t h e  D i r e c t i v e  i s  both  
t o  p r even t  maJor haza rds  from o c c u r r i n g  and t o  minimise t h e i r  
e f f e c t s  i f  they  should  o c c u r .  
Th i s  paper  o u t l i n e s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s  by which 
d i r e c t i v e s  of t h i s  t ype  a r e  evolved and r e v i e u s  t h e  s p e c i f i c  
a c c i d e n t s  t h a t  c r e a t e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  momentum t h a t  r e s u l t e d  
i n  t h e  Seveso  D i r e c t i v e  and shaped i t s  c o n t e n t .  The c o n t e n t s  
of t h e  D i r e c t i v e  and t h e  s t a t u s  of i t s  implementa t ion  a r e  
summarised . 
C O U N C I L  DIRECTIVES 
Counci l  D i r e c t i v e s  of t h i s  t ype  have t u o  maJor g o a l s :  t o  
p r o t e c t  u o r k e r s ,  t h e  p u b l i c  and t h e  environment  by t h e  p r e -  
v e n t i o n  and management of i n d u s t r i a l  h a z a r d s ;  and t o  harmonise 
t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  of manufac tu re r s  i n  Member S t a t e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  
avoid  t h e  d i s t o r t i o n  of compe t i t i on  w i t h i n  t h e  Community. 
D i r e c t i v e s  a r e  proposed by t h e  Commission and f o r m a l l y  
adopted  by t h e  EEC Counci l  of M l n l s t e r s .  t a k i n g  i n t o  accoun t  
t h e  o p i n i o n s  of t h e  European Pa r l i amen t  and t h e  Economic and 
S o c i a l  Committee (ECOSOC). The European P a r l i a m e n t  i s  t h e  
d i r e c t l y - e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  p e o p l e ,  u h i l e  t h e  
ECOSOC r e p r e s e n t s  a l l  c a t e g o r i e s  of economic and s o c i a l  l i f e .  
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  worke r s ,  f a r m e r s ,  consumers 
and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of o t h e r  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t s .  
D i r e c t i v e s  s e t  ou t  o b j e c t i v e s  t o  be complied w i th  by a l l  
Member S t a t e s ,  and must be t r ansposed  by each  Member S t a t e  
i n t o  n a t i o n a l  l e g i s l a t i o n ;  t h i s  a l l o w s  v a r i o u s  c u l t u r a l  t r a -  
d i t i o n s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  and r e g u l a t o r y  s t y l e s  t o  be 
cons ide red  (O 'R io rdan ,  1985) . 
B A C K G R O U N D  OF THE SEVESO DIRECTIVE 
The Seveso  D i r e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t s  " l e s s o n s  l e a r n t "  from a  
s e r i e s  of a c c i d e n t s  a t  F l i xbo rough ,  Beek, Seveso  and Manfre- 
donia  which happened w i th in  a  per iod  of 28 months i n  t h e  
1974-76 t ime p e r i o d .  The most impor t an t  were F l ixborough and 
Seveso ,  t h e  former an exp los ion  of cyc lohexane ,  t h e  l a t t e r  
a  r e l e a s e  of d i o x i n  i n  a  runaway chemica l  r e a c t i o n .  Ue u i l l  
summarise t h e  main f e a t u r e s  of t h e  two major a c c i d e n t s .  
F l i xbo roueh  
The F l i xbo rough  a c c i d e n t  happened i n  June 1974,  an 
exp los ion  of cyc lohexane  which k i l l e d  28 u o r k e r s  and i n j u r e d  
36 .  F i f t y  t h r e e  members of t h e  p u b l i c  were r eco rded  a s  "casu-  
a l t i e s "  by t h e  p o l i c e  wh i l e  hundreds more s u s t a i n e d  minor 
i n j u r i e s .  Almost 2000 homes and b u s i n e s s e s  s u f f e r e d  p r o p e r t y  
damage ( L e e s ,  1980 ) .  The a c c i d e n t  occu r r ed  on a  S a t u r d a y  
a f t e r n o o n  and i t  seems c e r t a i n  t h a t ,  had i t  happened on a  
normal work day w i t h  o f f i c e  s t a f f  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  o n - s i t e  d e a t h  
t o l l  would have been much h i g h e r .  The p l a n t  i s  sur rounded  by 
open f i e l d s  s o  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  d e n s i t y  i n  t h e  s u r r o u n d i n g  a r e a  
i s  ve ry  low,  o t h e r w i s e  p u b l i c  c a s u a l t i e s  would a l s o  have been 
g r e a t e r .  
The post-accident investigation revealed that the plant 
operator was storing 43 times the amount of flammable fluids 
licensed by local authorities and that cyclohexane was not 
among them at all. There apparently was not a disaster plan 
for the Flixborough plant. 
Seveso 
The Seveso accident took place in July 1976 when an 
exothermic reaction raised the temperature and pressure 
inside a vessel used to produce trichlorphenol (TCP, an 
intermediate product used in the production of bactericides 
and herbicides) beyond limits, causing a safety valve to 
vent. Dioxin (or TCDD) is normally formed in trace amounts as 
an unwanted by-product of this process, however, due to the 
high temperatures reached in the runaway reaction, it was 
formed in large quantities and perhaps as much as 2 kg were 
included in the release. Dioxin is one of the most toxic 
materials known and can be taken into the body by ingestion. 
inhalation, or skin contact. Chloracne is a well known symp- 
tom, but it can also damage liver, kidneys and the central 
nervous system. 
An important aspect of the Seveso emergency was the lack 
of information about what chemicals were involved. their 
health effects and what emergency measures ahould be taken. 
Company officials notified local authorities, 29 hours after 
the accident, that herbicide vapours containing TCP had been 
released, although it should have been know, from a aimilar 
accident at Bolsover in 1968, that TCDD could have been 
formed. Consequently, local authorities didn't immediately 
r e a l i s e  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of the  accident  /2/, and c r i s i s  man- 
agement was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  a  s e r i e s  of e s c a l a t i n g  measures 
a s  i t s  s e v e r i t y  was slowly revealed ( P o c c h i a r i .  S i l a n o  and 
Zapponi, 1987).  
No a c t i o n  was taken u n t i l  the  f i f t h  day when ch i ld ren  
su f fe red  skin  e r u p t i o n s  and small  animals began t o  d i e ;  the  
p lan t  was then marked off  and the  consumption of l o c a l l y -  
groun produce fo rb idden .  On the  t e n t h  day,  a  l abora to ry  
belonging t o  the  p l a n t  owner "admitted t h a t  d ioxin  had been 
found i n  the  samples" ( P o c c h i a r i ,  e t  a l ,  1987) of s o i l  and 
vegeta t ion ana lysed ,  s e t t i n g  off  a  search f o r  information 
about the  hea l th  e f f e c t s  of d i o x i n .  Eighty ch i ld ren  uere  eva- 
cuated t h r e e  days l a t e r .  On day 17,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  emer- 
gency measures was given t o  t h e  reg iona l  publ ic  h e a l t h  minis-  
t e r  and,  i n  the  days t h a t  fo l lowed,  evacuat ions  uere  c o n t i -  
nued and t h e  zone of h ighes t  po l lu t ion  extended s e v e r a l  
t imes .  
The f i r s t  complete map of d ioxin  concen t ra t ions  was 
re leased  on day 37. The acc lden t  f i n a l l y  lnvolved about 1800 
ha of densely populated a r e a  and a  t o t a l  of 220.000 people 
uere  placed under medlcal and epidemiologlcal  s u r v e i l l a n c e .  
THE CONTENT OF THE SEVESO DIRECTIVE 
The Seveso acc lden t  had In common u l t h  Fllxborough t h e  
f e a t u r e s  t h a t  l o c a l  a u t h o r l t l e s  d l d  not knou uhat  chemicals 
ue re  lnvolved and In uhat p u a n t l t l e s ,  they d l d  not knou 
enough about t h e  processes  t o  understand what chemlcals could 
be produced o r  r e l e a s e d  under acc iden t  conditions, and t h e r e  
was a  lack of p lannlng f o r  emergencies. Also. I n  both c a s e s ,  
changes had been made i n  plant  or  processes  uhich compromised 
the  s a f e t y  of the  f a c i l i t i e s  but uere not communicated t o  
a u t h o r i t i e s  r e spons ib le  f o r  publ ic  hea l th  and s a f e t y .  
With t h i s  background, the  Seveso Di rec t ive  i s  l a r g e l y  
concerned u i t h  the  genera t ion and t ransmiss ion of information 
a s  the  b a s i s  f o r  acc iden t  prevention and r i s k  management. I t  
ob l iges  each Member S t a t e  t o  genera te  the  same information 
and then s p e c i f i e s  t h e  f l o u  of t h i s  in fo rmat ion ,  i e ,  uho i s  
t o  supply uhat informat ion t o  uhom, and when. The D i r e c t i v e  
e s s e n t i a l l y  d e f i n e s  an information network, i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  
Figure 1 ,  uhich i s  managed by the  Commission. The f o l l o u i n g  
paragraphs give  the  f l avour  of i t s  information requirements 
by paraphras ing the  more important  p o i n t s :  
I n  A r t i c l e  5 ,  t h a t  the  manufacturer s h a l l  be required t o  
n o t i f y  the  competent a u t h o r i t i e s  a  complete s a f e t y  r e p o r t  of 
the  i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  inc lud ing  uhich dangerous substances  a r e  
( o r  could be) involved.  i n  uhat q u a n t i t i e s ,  t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s ,  
uhere t h e  f a c i l i t y  i s  l o c a t e d ,  hou many people a r e  employed, 
uhat processes  a r e  used,  t h e  sources  of hazard .  uhat a r range-  
ments have been made f o r  s a f e  o p e r a t i o n ,  the  o n - s i t e  emer- 
gency p lans  and information necessary f o r  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  
prepare  o f f  - s i t e  emergency p l a n s ;  
I n  A r t i c l e  6 ,  t h a t  t h e  manufacturer inform the  a u t h o r i -  
t i e s  i f  t h e  opera t ion  i s  modified i n  a  way t h a t  changes t h e  
information above and,  i n  A r t i c l e  7 .  t h a t  t h e  Member S t a t e s  
appoint  t h e  competent a u t h o r i t y  uho should rece ive  and a c t  on 
t h i s  in fo rmat ion ,  t h a t  t h e  manufacturer be informed a s  t o  t h e  
i d e n t i t y  of t h i s  a u t h o r i t y .  t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  ensure  t h a t  an 
emergency plan i s  drawn u p  f o r  a c t i o n  o u t s i d e  the  e s t a b l i s h -  
ment and t h a t  the  a u t h o r i t y  o rgan i se  i n s p e c t i o n s ;  
A r t i c l e  8 s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  the  Member S t a t e s  s h a l l  ensure 
t h a t  people l i a b l e  t o  be a f f e c t e d  b y  an acc iden t  be informed 
of the  s a f e t y  measures and how t o  behave i n  t he  event  of an 
acc iden t  ( i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  USA, d i r e c t  communication of 
hazard informat ion between i n d u s t r y  and t h e  pub l i c  i s  not 
s p e c i f i e d ,  a l though t h i s  may happen i n  p r a c t i c e  because t h e  
d e t a i l s  of how r i s k  information i s  provided a r e  determined b y  
t he  p0liCieS adopted by the  Member S t a t e s ) ;  A r t i c l e  8 a l s o  
r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h i s  informat ion be made a v a i l a b l e  t o  o t h e r  
Member S t a t e s  t h a t  could be concerned so  t h a t  i t  can a l s o  be 
given t o  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l s ;  
A r t i c l e  10 r e q u i r e s  the  manufacturer  t o  r e p o r t  t o  the  
competent a u t h o r i t y  any acc iden t  which o c c u r s ,  how i t s  
e f f e c t s  a r e  being a l l e v i a t e d  and what i s  being done t o  p re -  
vent  r e c u r r e n c e ,  while A r t i c l e  11 asks  t h a t  the  Member S t a t e s  
inform the  Commission of any such a c c i d e n t s  and A r t i c l e  12 
r e q u i r e s  the  Commission t o  keep a  r e g i s t e r  of them so  t h a t  
Member S t a t e s  can b e n e f i t  from t h i s  exper ience  f o r  prevent ion 
purposes ; 
A r t i c l e  1 3 ,  i n  c o n t r a s t .  l i m i t s  the  exchange of informa- 
t i o n  t o  p r o t e c t  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ,  r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  
0 f f i ~ i a l s  of t h e  Commission and t h e  competent a u t h o r i t i e s  do 
not d ivu lge  s p e c i f i c s  of t h e  informat ion obta ined under 
A r t i c l e s  5 , 6 , 7 , 9 . 1 0  and 12 t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ;  
A r t i c l e  18 d i r e c t s  the  Member S t a t e s  and the  Commission 
t o  exchange informat ion on t h e  exper ience  of acc iden t  preven- 
tion and consequence limitation, while Article 20 requires 
that the Member States inform the Commlsslon of the national 
laws adopted to implement the Directive. 
The Commlsslon organlses quarterly meetings of the Com- 
mittee of Competent Authorities during which questions con- 
cerning the Directive and its lmplementatlon are discussed s o  
that common approaches can be adopted. This Committee serves 
as a forum for the exchanges of information foreseen by the 
Directive and can also be convened in the case of a major 
accldent to give advice and to offer assistance, as required. 
to the country in question. 
AHENDHENTS TO THE SEVESO DIRECTIVE 
The First Amendment 
Events like Bhopal and Mexico City demonstrated that the 
Directive did not require major revision, however, these 
accidents did bring attention to the need to have more strln- 
gent requirements for some particularly dangerous substances, 
especially uith regard t o  safety report notification. 
Thus a first amendment of the Directive uas adopted, in 
Harch 1987 3 to tighten the provisions for certain very 
dangerous chemicals, including chlorlne, HIC, phosgene and 
sulphur trloxlde. It also provided an opportunlty t o  correct 
some technlcal lnaccuracles In the Annexes s o  that a more 
balanced and effective lmplementation could be assured. 
The Second Amendment 
The Base1 accldent In 1986, and some other accidents 
lnvolvlng lsolated storage, demonstrated the need to streng- 
then the requirements of the Directive ulth respect to the 
s to rage  of dangerous substances  not a c t u a l l y  connected u i t h  
i n d u s t r i a l  o p e r a t i o n s .  The Di rec t ive  was amended f o r  the  sec-  
ond time i n  November 1988 / 4 /  on the  b a s i s  of the  l e s s o n s  
l e a r n t  from these  a c c i d e n t s .  The aim was not only t o  extend 
the  scope of the  Di rec t ive  t o  the s to rage  of dangerous chemi- 
c a l s ,  but a l s o  t o  s t r eng then  i t s  p rov i s ions  regarding i n f o r -  
mation t o  the  p u b l i c .  This amendment w i l l  come i n t o  f o r c e  i n  
June 1990 f o r  new i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  u i t h  a  l a t e r  a p p l i c a t i o n  
d a t e  f o r  e x i s t i n g  p l a n t s .  
Before being amended, the  Di rec t ive  covered only some 
kinds  of dangerous chemical s t o r a g e ,  the  Second amendment now 
extends  the  scope t o  s to rage  of dangerous substances  and/or 
p repara t ions  a t  any p l a c e ,  i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  premises ,  bu i ld ing  
or a r e a  of l a n d ,  i s o l a t e d  or within an es tab l i shment .  
I n  order  t o  i d e n t i f y  what, i n  f a c t ,  c o n s t i t u t e s  danger- 
ous s t o r a g e ,  an approach based on a  l i s t  of named substances  
and a  l i s t  of c a t e g o r i e s  of danger i s  used,  together  u i t h  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  threshold  q u a n t i t i e s .  The l i s t  of 28 s u b -  
s t a n c e s  enables  the  i d e n t i f i c a t l o n  of s to rage  where the  most 
dangerous and widely used substances  a r e  h e l d .  The l l s t  of 
c a t e g o r i e s  ensures  t h a t  a l l  o the r  s to rage  involving dangerous 
substances  or p r e p a r a t l o n s .  uhlch a r e  c l a s s i f l e d  a s  t o x i c ,  
very t o x i c ,  explos lVe,  oxidizing, extremely flammable or 
h lgh ly  Flammable under o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  Communlty Directive a r e  
a l s o  covered.  
The second amendment a l s o  added a  new paragraph t o  
A r t i c l e  0 . 1  t o  require t h a t  information be communicated t o  
the  concerned p a r t l e s  on an a c t i v e  b a s l s .  through pub l l c  
information media such as leaflets or information boards. It 
also defined a new Annex VII which specifies the content of 
the information to be provided to the public: for example, a 
simple explanation of the activity carried out at the site, 
the names and harmful characteristics of the substances 
involved, potential effects of maJor accidents, details of 
warning systems and how information would be provided during 
the course of an accident, how to behave should an accident 
occur, assurance that suitable on-site arrangements for acci- 
dent management have been made, reference to off-site emer- 
gency plans, and details of how further information can be 
obtained within the limits of commercial confidentiality pro- 
vided for in national legislation. 
IHPLEHENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE 
Member States have the responsibility to implement the 
Directive in their own countries and, once the necessary leg- 
islation has been draun up, it is then sent to the Commission 
which checks the provisions to see that they comply with the 
Directive. The treaty establishing the Community foresees 
that the Commission may bring proceedings against Hember 
States uhich do not meet their obligations under Directives. 
The various stages of these proceedings are a letter serving 
notice, folloued by a "reasoned opinion" by the Commission 
and, finally, bringing the matter before the European Court 
of Justice / 5 / .  
The Commission plays a leading role in helping Hember 
States implement the Directive in a harmonlsed way. The most 
important activity is the organisation of regular meetings of 
the Committee of Competent Authorities for the Implementation 
of the Directive, which is chaired by the Commission. At 
these meetings various questions concerning the technical 
implementation of the Directive are discussed, providing a 
forum for the exchange of information, advice and experience 
gained from implementation in the different Member States. 
The Committee has also been convened to discuss the lessons 
to be learnt from recent industrial accidents, which led t o  
the Amendments discussed earlier. 
Some examples of the Committee's work include the formu- 
lation of guidelines to help interpret the concept of a maJor 
accident, drawing up a standardised notification form for 
reporting maJor accidents. developing a gravity scale to mea- 
sure the seriousness of a maJor accident, and comparing in a 
structured way the different approaches existing in the Hem- 
ber States for meeting the requirements of Article 5 for 
safety reports. 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
The Commission organises workshops for national inspec- 
tors on the technical aspects of the implementation of the 
Directive. In addition, the Commission sponsored a confer- 
ence. in 1987, on emergency planning and will sponsor one on 
particular problem of communicating with the public about 
major hazards in May of 1989 (see Otuay, 1988). These con- 
ferences are intended to provide a forum for the exchange of 
information amongst the various actors involved, eg, govern- 
ment, industry, public groups and scientists. 
The Commission has also recently established a Community 
Documentation Centre on industrial risk uhich collects, clas- 
sifies and summarises technical guidelines, safety rules, 
accident reports and similar materials and edits them into a 
form suitable for use by the actors mentioned above. 
Finally, the Commission has established the MARS data 
bank. at the JRC-ISE Ispra, in uhich the accident reports 
supplied by the Member States under Articles 10, 1 1  and 12 of 
the Directive are stored for retrieval. The content of the 
information is analysed uith focus on the causes of accidents 
in order to improve accident prevention. MARS is presently 
only at the disposal of the national authorities. but Proce- 
dures are being developed for a wider distribution of statis- 
tical information on accidents, consistent uith the secrecy 
obligations of Article 13. 
CONCLUSION 
The Directive has only been in force since July 1984 and 
experience continues to accumulate. The Commission will con- 
tinue to monitor the implementation of the Directive and to 
explore ways in uhich it might be improved, especially uith 
regard to deriving balanced and uniform risk criteria for the 
management of different hazardous activities. 
NOTES 
1. Council Directive of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident 
hazards of certain industrial activities, 82/501/EEC. Offi- 
cial Journal of the European Communities L230, Volume 25, 5 
August 1982. The Directive does not apply to nuclear facili- 
ties, military installations, explosives factories, mining 
operations, or facilities for hazardous wastes uhich are cov- 
ered by other Community regulations. 
2. The Seveso decontamination was the largest in the world 
involving TCDD and these complicated procedures had to be 
devised under extreme time pressures. Most previous experi- 
ence had lnvolved much smaller quantltles and contamination 
had been confined to the lndustrlal sltes. Examples of the 
decontamlnatlon problem can be seen In the 1963 Duphar accl- 
dent, after uhlch the plant uas sealed for ten years, dis- 
mantled, encased In concrete and sunk In the Atlantlc, and 
Bolsover (1963), uhere the plant uas dismantled and a TCDD 
release and burled In a deep hole (Lees, 1980). 
3. Councll Dlrectlve 87/216/EEC of 19 March 1987, Offlclal 
Journal of the European Communltles. L 85/36. 28 March 1987. 
4. Council Dlrectlve 88/610/EEC of 24 November 1988, Offlclal 
Journal of the European Communltles, L336/14. 7 December 
1988. 
5. See: Report on the appllcatlon In the member states of 
dlrectlve 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major-accldent 
hazards of certain lndustrlal faclllties, Commlsslon of the 
European Communltles, COH (88) 261, Brussels, 18 May 1988. 
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Development of an Austrian Data Management Syrtem 
for the Cleanup of Contaminated Areas 
Caused by Chemical or Industrial Accidents 
Dan W. Mc Cam, Guest Scientist 
Joanneum Research Association 
Mineral Resoums Research Divbwn 
Leoben, Awtria 
ABSTRACT: 
Seriow accidents at chemical and other indwtrial facilities present a l ave  potential tiak in  
an increasingly urbonkd society. These accidents can involve ihe transport of eztremely 
totic materials over areas of many square kilometers i n  ihe form of a m s o h  causing severe 
contamination of valuable land and potentially the injury or death of many people. Because 
of ihe many uncertainties which can ezist, action plam for ihe containment and cleanup 
of the accident site are not as well defined as for a smaller accident. 
To support the rapid planning and coordination of ihe cleanup of such an accident, an 
Accident Site Data Management System (ASDMS) and an ASDMS Support Team is being 
developed by the MRRD in  support of Civil Defense progrummes by the State government 
of Styria and the Fedeml Government of Awtria which can significantly reduce ihe impact 
of such accidents by providing timely information for planning and cleanup auihorities. 
The ASDM system consists of computerired aids, already developed by ihe MRRD for 
geochemical ezploration progrummes and land-we planning, and reapplied to emergency 
management planning for an ASDMS. These computerized aids can be wed in  ihe pre- 
accident phase at a state or national level for the maintanance of information such as 
geologic maps, soil maps, topogruphic relicf; cultural features, demographic data and bnd- 
w e  maps which would be of significant value in prepamtion for a man-made or natural 
dismter. 
The ASDMS Support Team, formed by ezisting staff at ihe MRRD, is responsible for the 
data management and analysis of incoming information in a zone of contamination caused 
by a indwtrial or major chemical accident. The ASDMS supporia all hardware and soflware 
necessary to support an accident site cleanup. The team is composed of all personnel 
necessary to perform data capture and anaysis of data collected at ihe site. The system gives 
State and Fedeml Auihorities and international oqanizatwns involved in such emeqencies 
immediate access to computing faditier which could, to a great degree, assist i n  ihe rapid 
planning for a major cleanup. 
Pmpamtion for a major cleanup opetotion procede8 in two phases: 1) preliminary planning 
before an accident occur8 and 2) detailed planning at ihe time of the accident. Boih of ihese 
phases involve ihe w e  of computer systems, & t a k e  and dotistical technique8 ihat have 
been developed for geoscience &to. The re-application of ihese quiw and techniques as 
an ASDMS siqnifiantly enhances the eziating praqramme of the MRRD and p m d e  a new 
direction for research i n  ihe years to come. 
CONCEPT AND OVERALL GOALS: 
Introduction - 
The Mineral Resources Research Division (MRFlD) of the Joanneum Research Association 
haa undertaken a review of the computer systems that have been developed exclusively for 
geological and geochemical applications to identify alternate uses for these systems. Thanks 
largely to the continuing contact with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
it haa become apparent that the systems which were developed for geological applications 
are the same systems that are currently being recommended for the cleanup planning of 
large nuclear accidents involving hundreds of square kilometers (IAEA, in preparation). 
Presently the MRIlD is involved with the IAEA in the preparation of a document for the 
overall operational planning for accident site management for nuclear facilities. The author 
nerved as chairman of a working group dealing with data mananagement systems for this 
IAEA report. 
Specialized Systems May Not Be an Answer - 
An important principle in accident and disaster management is that systems which are in 
daily use tend to be the systems that can be used most effectively during an emergency 
because they tend to be more reliable. Existing personnel, who are already familiar with 
the use of such systems, can be employed as part of a larger, decentralized, system. This 
larger system would include components of normal civil services such as police, fire brigade, 
rescue and ambulance services as well aa the possibility of using military to interdict and 
evacuate an area aa required. 
Horizontally Integrated Systems - 
Ideally, the system being used during the course of an emergency should be part of a 
larger, horizontally integrated system providing ad hoc avenues of communication between 
the various goups in the system such as described by Jaake (1986). One specific part of 
this overall planning system that the MRIlD is taking part in is the implementation of an 
Accident Site Data Management System (ASDMS) and support team whose responsibilities 
are to: 
Recommend optimal sample collection techniques; 
Manage information being collected from the accident site; 
Control the quality of the data and; 
Analyze these data in order to assist in planning the most efficient cleanup of the 
accident site. 
The ASDM system and Support Team would be used after the initial release of toxic 
substances has been brought under control and the accident scene has been stabilized. 
Pre-Accident Planning - 
Pre-accident planning is an important objective in any accident response system. Hazards 
and potential toxicity must be taken into account by fire and rescue workers from any 
accident site at the very early phase of an accident. This implies prior training not only 
on the part of the fire department in dealing with potentially hazardous materials but also 
first-aid rescue workers and police who may be put at risk and who constitute a first-line 
response in the community. 
One major goal of pre-accident planning is to establish not only clear channels of command 
and control but also to inventory the potential accident sites identifying the nature of the 
hazards and individuals whose expertise might be required. 
Pre-accident planning for the purpose of returning contaminated soils and buildings to 
acceptable lev& requires an extensive and comprehensive evaluation of geological, geo- 
chemical and hydrological conditions as well as detailed information regarding population 
density and demographic data before the accident. Additionally, cleanup techniques which 
would be suitable for a particular type of accident must be identified. It is the objective of 
this type of pre-accident planning to establish priorities on the cleanup such as the protec- 
tion of drinking water supplies, the identification of waste disposal sites, the establishment 
of guidelines for acceptible levels of a toxic substance and the overall approach philosophy 
to the problem of accident site management. 
Computerized Aids - 
The computerized aids that are available for an ASDM system are those that have been 
developed over the past few years by the MRRD for geological and geochemical data 
handling. Packages such as the extensive Geographic Information System (GIs) based 
on ARC/INFO, the Geochemical Package (GCP), the Laboratory Control Package (LCP) 
and the Geostatistics Package (GeoStat) are all directly applicable without change to an 
ASDMS both in the pre-accident phase as well as post-accident management and cleanup. 
Also, the geophysics package (MAGPAC) which performs line-levelling and calculations on 
airborne geophysical data is suitable for both magnetic and gamma-spectrometric data. 
Multidiciplinury Staff - 
In order to effectively implement an ASDM system, a trained, multidiciplinary staff must 
be available on short notice who can deal with large quantities of data effectively. From 
the ongoing work in exploration geology, the MRRD has a number of individuals who have 
experience and training in the field of geology, geochemistry, geography, classical statis- 
tics as well as geostatistics, sampling theory, laboratory control systems and information 
science. 
Technical Support for Emergency Planners - 
These systems are available to emergency planners as follow-up support for accidents which 
may require intervention in the form of large-scale cleanup. Preparation on the part of 
the staff of the MRRD is minimal because of the similarity of data types. The tactical 
planning and recommendations required to field an ASDMS Support Team with a complete 
computer system on short (1 week) notice is in progress for areas outside of Austria. 
This includes recommendations for different hardware which would be more portable as 
well as independent power supplies, backups and spares. Table I is the current computer 
configuration of the MRRD. Table II reflects some recommendatione for a portable system. 
Geoscience Data Analysis Techniques - 
The reason that the MRRD is able to participate in depth with a project of this nature is 
that the same procedures that are followed for geological exploration are very similar to the 
procedures that should be used during the follow-up of an accident site. These are listed in 
Table ID. Chief among the similarities are the problems associated with the measurement 
and statistical analysis of data arrising &om geochemical surveys and is especially true as 
it relates to the spatial (geostatistical) analysis of the data. 
Information for Policy Makers - 
The use of an ASDMS is a considered action following a major accident. After the accident 
site has been brought under control, a preliminary accessment is made to determine the 
aerial extent of contamination. Based on this accessment, a decision is made either to 
study the impacted area in detail (ASDMS option) or perform a direct cleanup action if 
the extent is limited. 
If the ASDMS option is selected, plans must be in place to support the system remotely or 
to relocate the system near the accident site. If the system is relocated, tactical support 
must be available to pack and transport the system; provide housing and office space for 
up to 20 team members; and provide technical support in the form of power supplies, 
telephone lines, etc. for the system itself. 
These considerations must be discussed by policy makers so that the concept can be effec- 
tively included in the overall catastrophe action plan. 
Benefits - 
The primary benefit of the ASDMS concept would be the immediate availability of a 
computer system and response team which could rapidly process information from an 
accident site and assist in planning the appropriate clean-up action in the case of a civil 
emergency caused by a chemical or industrial accident. The quickness of such response 
could significantly reduce the direct impact of the accident by providing rapid site clean- 
up planning. 
Timely response at a very early phase of the accident could prevent contamination of wa- 
ter supplies, the recovery of valuable land before deep infiltration of the contaminant, the 
reduction of the total quantity of toxic material entering the food cycle and significantly 
reduce the overall cost of the operation by minimizing the total quantity of contaminated 
material that would require disposal. Information gathered in a pre-accident phase would 




It is important to recognize the advantages gained in pre-accident planning for the even- 
tuality of an accident and the advantages gained at the post-accident phase. Pre-planning 
consists of the identification of all industrial or waste management sites that constitute a 
long-term threat to public health and safety, the nature of the potential accident and its 
possible consequences, a detailed command and control structure for each potential acci- 
dent utilizing civil and, as required, military services to control the accident site as well as 
the estalishment of cleanup criteria. Formal pre-planning for a complex cleanup operation 
is necessary to achieve a high degree of efficiency and speed and to mitigate the effects of 
the accident. 
Development of CIS Information - 
The information requirements for an effective ASDMS system consists of detailed geo- 
graphic overlays from each site to allow for the identification of the most important fac- 
tors. These include land-use, cultural features, population centers, roads systems, water 
supplies, watersheds, soils types, geology, surface hydrology, geohydrology and topography. 
The use of a GIs is essential in the preparation of this kind of detail and in order to ma- 
nipulate these data along with the distribution of resulting contaminants for post-accident 
planning. These data permit the rapid establishment of priorities in the event of an acci- 
dent. Table IV dencribes the information that must be available for preliminary planning 
after an accident; Many of these data types can be effectively included into a GIs. 
The development of an extensive GIs for the purpone of pre-accident planning and post- 
accident management can be achieved through the same software currently running at the 
MRRD. Similar nyntems nuch an the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
nyntem unen as a core for the renponne nystem a geographic underlay for the input and 
organization of thin type of information. Proposals net forth by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency for the cleanup of nuclesr accident nites underncore the need of an extennive 
GIs for accident planning. 
Inventory of Industrial Sites and Hazards - 
An inventory of industrial sites posing a potential hazard and a summary of the hazardous 
materials ntored at the site in necessary to determine the response to an accident and the 
appropriate countermeasures. Thene data can be maintained on a GIs. 
Tnansport of Hazardous Materials on Roadways - 
A entimation of hazsrdous materials on roadway8 including rail nhould be made in order 
to optimize the location of tactical materials and equipment which would be used in case 
of an accident. These data may also be maintained on the GIs. 
Second, more ntringent method8 nhould be adopted to control (not necesarily rentrict) 
the trannport of hazardous materials both internationally and within Austria. An example 
would be to inntall a computer network tracking hazardous materials and verification meth- 
ods for compliance. Trannport accidentn involving incorrectly labelled vehiclen nuch as the 
phenol accident in Karinthia (Widetschek, 1983) renulted in the injury of seven fire brigade 
member8 before the substance wae correctly identified. For international transport, this 
point would require at each customs office a data entry terminal recording the material, 
route and dentination. 
Recommendatione have been made in Auntria (Widetschek, pern. comm.) for the voluntary 
registration of vehiclen within Auntria containing hazardous materials enpecially regarding 
transport through roadway tunnels, but thin effort has failed. 
Identification of Emergency Waste Depositories - 
Emergency waste depositories should be identified or constructed to service higher risk 
areas. These deporitorien nhould be designed with appropriate sampling channels and 
monitoring nynterrm. Relatively small accident8 nuch as the above cited phenol accident 
resulted in 1,000 cu. metern of contaminated noil which had to be ntored in an interim 
deponitory. Accident8 nuch as in Gbiana, Brazil (IAEA, 1988) resulted in 3,600 cu. metern 
of material requiring storage. In any case, virtually every minor accident involving the 
spillage of petroleum product8 on roadways require8 the une of absorbants which must be 
properly dinponed of. These emergency depositories should stock sufficient containment in 
the form of drums to handle roadway spills. Accident8 involving extremely toxic pesticide8 
such as in Spielfeld (Widetschek, 1979) required the disposal of absorbants use to control 
the spill. At the present time, no emergency wante disposal sites have been identified for 
Austria although provisions in the law permit authorities to confiscate sites if required. 
POST-ACCIDENT RESPONSE: 
Notification - 
The first phase of post-accident response follows the notification of probable need. At this 
time, the team members are alerted and initial preparations are made for the accident 
follow-up. These preparations include a review of the toxicity of the material, physical 
properties that would influence transport and dispersion and briefings on naftey and pro- 
cedures. 
Initial Response - 
The initial renponse in for the ASDMS manager to meet with the Emergency Director and 
his team and review the accident scene itnelf, control and command headquarters and to 
make known the phynical requirements for the ASDMS. The nystems analy nts meet with the 
members of the Emergency Director's n t d t o  review npeciiicn of the nituation and to identify 
problem areas. Tentative recommendationn regarding nampling of the contaminated area 
and the identification of topics of high priority (protection of domentic watersheds, etc.) 
are made. 
Tactical Planning - 
After the initial review on-site of the ASDMS manager and the system analysts, tactical 
plans for the relocation (if required) of the ASDMS are made. Much depends on where 
the sampled material will be analyzed; either on-site or in a laboratory and the nature and 
size of the accident. 
Plans for packing and transporting the hardware are confirmed as well as the preparation 
of suitable quarters, power supplies and telephone links at the remote site. Planning of 
this nature would be done in cooperation with military authorities. 
Implementation - 
The ASDMS and Support Team are relocated to the command and control center for the 
accident and the hardware configured. Office space and living quarters are established. 
The ASDMS becomes operational. 
ASDMS SUPPORT TEAM: 
General Condiderationd - 
The personnel required to support the ASDMS concept are fundamental to the successful 
outcome of the cleanup operation. It is essential that the core group be in existence prior to 
the accident and familiar with the hardware and software and that the various specialists 
be available. The management and function of this group is the a component to a successful 
renponse syntem. 
The ASDMS Support Team must communicate rapidly and effectively with the Emergency 
Director and his s t d  explaining not only the existing capabilities of the ASDMS but also 
be able to adapt quickly to changing needs and prioritie~ during the course of the cleanup 
planning. The composition of the group must reflect, in depth, the working requirements 
with suflicient redundancy and expertise to provide a sound support team. 
The ASDMS support team advises the Emergency Director and his staff on the techniques 
and sampling procedures required to evaluate the distribution of the toxic substance with 
the help of specialists in geochemistry, geophysics or geostatistics. 
Prior Ezistence - 
This team must be in existence prior to the accident because of the difficulties in assembling 
an effective group of scientists on short notice. With the basic group already in existence, 
specialists such as biologists, chemists, health physicists, toxicologists or other scientists 
may be rapidly integrated into a working team. 
Identification of Team Members - 
Identification of individuals who would serve on an ASDMS Support Team has been dealt 
with in a straightforward way. In most cases, the nature of the work itself as applied to 
geological exploration is very similar to the tasks involved in accident site management. 
In general, the team consists of systems analysts, geochemists, statisticians, programmers, 
data entry staff and various specialists required to assist in the cleanup planning. Because 
many different types of accidents could occur with many different types of toxic substances, 
it is assumed that specialist information will become available at the time of the accident, or 
that the specialists will be designated prior to the accident for support in the pre-accident 
planning phase. 
Communicatioru - 
Communication structures within the ASDMS Support Team are both vertical and hor- 
izontal. The core of the system is the group of geochemists and systems analysts who 
communicate horizontally to members of the Emergency Director staff to solve specific 
problems related to the planning of the cleanup operation. Problems regarding the alloca- 
tion of various hardware components and the overall system integrity is the responsibility 
of the Systems Manager and his staff. 
Organization and Team Structure - 
The team consists of between 14 and 18 core staff into which various specialists outside 
the group may be incorporated. The core group is organized as follows: 
System Manager 
The Systems Manager is responsible for the overall operation of the ASDM system 
and support team and uses the services of the systems programmer, systems engineer 
and database manager to establish the ASDMS at a remote site with the initial 
help of the other members of the support team. After operation has commenced, he 
maintains communications with the authorities as well as the geochemists, statistician 
and other systems analysts to provide them hardware support as they require. 
Systems Programmer 
The systems programmer is responsible for the initial installation of all systems and 
user software and works with the systems engineer and database manager to maintain 
operational integrity of the systems. 
Systems Engineer 
The systems engineer is responsible for the physical installation and integrity of all 
hardware and and hardware links in the system during the course of the cleanup 
operation. With the systems programmer, he reports to the systems manager on the 
operational integrity of the system. 
Database Manager 
The database manager is responsible for database security, protection and backup. 
He maintains liason with the systems programmer and the statistician and especially 
the geochemists and systems analysts for the periodic backup of all essential data in 
the system. 
Communications/Secretary 
The secretary is responsible for receiving all telephone communications and relaying 
them to the appropriate party and is responsible for establishing all files related to 
the cleanup programme including copies of all products supplied. He maintains a log 
of all communications and types reports as required. 
Statistician 
The statistician is responsible for the overview of all statistical analyses being con- 
ducted and advises the geochemists/systems analysts as well as members of the Emer- 
gency Director's staff on the appropriateness of various techniques. He also works in 
the same way as the geochemists/systems analysts on the preparation and analysis 
of data. 
Geochemists/System Analysts (2-3 or more) 
The geochemists/systems analysts along with the statistician are to maintain direct 
communications with the Emergency Director's staff and work jointly with them 
on the preparation and analysis of data resulting in the cleanup plan itself. They 
communicate pricipally horizontally and inform the systems manager of their needs 
and problems. They inform the database manager of the datasets that are being 
developed and that require periodic backup. 
Programmers (2-3) 
The primary purpose of the programmers is to provide direct assistance to other 
experts at the accident site in the use of the computer system. The secondary 
objective is to deal with specific tasks as directed by the system manager to assist 
the system programmer, database manager, statistician and geochemists in solving 
specific programming problems. 
Digitizer Staff (2-3) 
The digitizer staff support the work of the geochemists and systems analysts and are 
responsible for the data entry of geographic data and the preparation of various maps 
utilizing the GIs. 
Data Entry Staff (2-3) 
The data entry staff is responaible to the geochemists and analysts for the entry and 
checking of all data not in machine readable form. 
The composition of the team reflects the nee& for rest during the course of the accident 
as well as considerable overlapping of expertise to assure integrity of the implemented sys- 
t e m .  
ASDMS COMPUTERIZED AIDS: 
Background - 
The MRRD began development of a series of software packages in 1983 in order to fill 
a series of contracts in geochemical exploration in Austria. One of the major problem 
with the existing packages then available was that conventional statistics and especially 
conventional multivariate statistics based on normal populations were often not appropriate 
in the environments being analyzed. Concepts in robust statistics as applied in Exploratory 
Data Analysis (Tukey, 1977; Huber, 1980) were used to develop these packages. The 
packages extensively use graphical techniques to display the results of analyses and produce 
results which can be directly used by the GIS. 
Acivitiea by the MRRD have included not only geological but also geochemical and geo- 
statistical analyses of multididplinary data including studies on forestry, agricultural, air 
pollution and ground water studies. 
Hardware Graphics Support - 
The software that has been developed makes extensive use of the capabilities of Tektronix 
hardware, especially the models 41xx and 4 2 u ,  as well as the VMS operating system on 
the VAX computer system. Currently, work is underway to convert these packages for 
use by IBM compatible microcomputers; However, the utility of these software system as 
an ASDMS can only be accomplished through the use of a moderately powerful mini- or 
microcomputer such as the VAX series in which a multiuser and multitasking environment 
is required. 
The software systems themselves must be used by highly trained and specialized profes- 
sionals who are not only familiar with the computer and software environment, but are 
experienced with problems of geochemical sampling and the measurement of spatial data. 
This group fonns the core of the ASDM system. In the following discussion of the various 
computerized aids, this fact should be kept in mind. 
Geographic Information System (CIS) - 
The GIS that has been in use by the MRRD is the ARCJINFO system developed in the 
USA. It currently has about 50% of the world-wide market for software systems of this 
type. Geographic data can be treated as thematic layera in the the GIS which may be 
functionally combined and analyzed in complex ways. 
The GIS for use in accident site management has been documented elsewhere (Jaske, 
1986). The data includes much of the basic information from pre-accident planning which 
has been described in previous sections. Table IV sumarizes the information that the IAEA 
(in preparation) required for preliminary planning after a nuclear accident. A considerable 
amount of this information is available for pre-accident planning. 
Data Bose System (DBS) - 
The DBS module is the basic data and file management system for the other analytical 
software systems such as the Geochemical Package (GCP) and the Geostatistical package 
(GeoStat). The main features of the DBS are an interactive data entry and editing facility 
and simple report generation. The intermediate or final results of all programs operating 
from the GCP and Geostat environment may be saved in files for use by the DBS. Normal 
ASCII files may be created at any point from the DBS files. 
Geostatisticd System (GeoStat) - 
The GeoStat system was developed by the MRRD to analyze problems related to spatially 
oriented data of all types in two or three dimensions. Its chief use has been in the kriging 
analysis of geochemical as well as environmental data (such as forestry, pollution and agri- 
cultural studies). Besides classical variography and geostatistical modeling, the structural 
analysis of spatial data is facilitated by various and newly developed graphical tooln. 
Geostatistical analysis is essential in post-accident planning because it provides very specific 
tools to understand the probabilistic nature of sampled spatial variables. For instance, 
geostatistics may be used to determine an optimal sampling grid to achieve a pre-specified 
confidence or to recognize portions of a sampled area where a high variability is present. 
These are key issues in understanding the distribution of a contaminant. 
Variography is used to investigate the spatial behavior of data and to make certain critical 
decisions regarding measurement reliability. Sources of variation of the data may be split 
in the geostatistical model into random, local and regional structures. Also, anisotropic 
behavior can be taken into account in, for example, wind propogated contamination. Var- 
iography may also be used to investigate the statistical behavior of the depth of penetra- 
tion of a contaminant in soils. After kriging, the estimates of depth of penetration form a 
three-dimensional model from which the total volumes of contaminated materials may be 
calculated. 
Certain geostatistical techniques such as probability kriging are especially suited for the 
estimation of cutoff concentrations of contaminants where remidial action in the form of 
cleanup must be accomplished. 
Graphical output may be saved in "metafiles" and later combined through windowing tech- 
niques for the preparation of more detailed graphics for further interpretation. Synthetic 
contouring of kriged surfaces may be quickly prepared using the GCP or UNIRAS graphics 
packages. Alternately, a contouring package (CONTOUR) may be used in the preparation 
of maps. 
Geophysics Package (MACPAC) - 
The geophysics package was developed for the interpretation of airborne maguetic data 
and the preparation of resultant maps. For use with any airborne data including gamma 
clpectrometric, it facilitates line levelling and interactive data verification, noise reduction 
through Fourier tran~forms or moving average (spline) algorithms, and orthogonal grid- 
ding u8ing bicubic ~plines. The gridded data may then be contoured u8ing the CONTOUR 
program and customized using the MCAD package. The MAGPAC was used in the prepa- 
ration of about 200 aeromagnetic map8 for the eastern provinces of Austria. 
CONTOUR progmm - 
Utilizing the GSPP (General Surface Prediction Program) nubroutine library developed by 
the Technical University in Graz, CONTOUR in an automatic contouring program which 
plots isolines and line labling. Output in directed to a "metafile" from gridded data input 
which in turn may be edited by the MCAD package in order to provide an interpreted 
result. 
Geochemical Package (CCP) - 
The GCP package is a generalized set of etatintical and graphical routine8 which permit 
interactive evaluation of geochemical and other data bases wing concept8 developed in 
Exploratory Data Analysis. Results from the GCP may be converted for use by the GIs in 
the preparation of map8 which include geographical data. Likewise, information contained 
in the GIs may be converted for we by the GCP for analy8is. 
The GCP also has five atandalone module8 which indudes the Laboratory Control Padt- 
age, Stati~tical Graphic8 Package, Multivariate Graphics Package, Multivariate Statistics 
Package and a Data Base System. The8e permit a great range of data analyclis techniques 
including basic univariate statistics, multiple regression analysis, correlation analysis, factor 
and principle components analynis as well as correspondence analysie all utilizing graphical 
techniques developed by the MRRD. Graphical output may be directed to device indepen- 
dent "metafiles" and saved for later processing. Windows may be created during plotting 
and any arrangement of graphics is possible in a single plot. All procedures in the GCP 
are command driven with help menus utilizing features in the VMS operating system. Al- 
though not part of the GCP system, the geostatistics package (GeoStat) makes use of the 
same design philosophy and may be used to process data from the GCP and to create 
graphics which may be combined with the other systems. These systems are described in 
the following sections. 
Labomtory Control Package (LCP) - 
The LCP was developed to assure adequate quality control for samples submitted for 
analysis as a result of extensive geochemical sampling during the exploration programmes 
by the MRRD. Utilizing robust and resistant statistics, the LCP is an extremely sensitive 
quality control tool utilizing duplicates and control samples to track laboratory precision 
and accuracy. Practical laboratory quality standards may be established much earlier as a 
result of the robust techniques as compared with normal statistics. 
Laboratory control is essential from the earliest phases of an accident cleanup to insure 
that the analytical results are both accurate and precise because of the consequences of 
the decisions based on the results. Analysis of replicate samples can establish the effective 
precision of the analytical result but not the accuracy. Consideration should be given to 
the prior preparation on control samples to establish accuracy. 
Statistical Graphics Package (SGP) - 
The SGP is a part of the GCP and utilizes a graphical-statistical analysis of data using 
Exploratory Data Analysis and includes resistant and robust statistics. The SGP permits 
the following graphical and tabular data display techniques: Histogram; Density Trace; 
One dimensional Scattergram; Boxplot; Cummulative Density; X-Y Plot with interactive 
identification of sample numbers; Scattergram with interactive grouping function; Ternary 
Diagrams; Draftman's Display for graphical display of the correlation matrix; Streamplot 
to allow profiles of selected variables; Geographical display of data; Univariate statistics 
including robust mean and rpread and outlier detection; Correlation matrix of selected 
variables (optionally as a robust technique); and Covariance matrix (optionally as a robust 
technique). 
Multivariate Statistics Package (MS) - 
Multivariate statistics using n o d  and robust techniques is a key part of the GCP. P r e  
cedures include analysis of variance, multiple regression and correlation, factor and princi- 
ple components analysis, cluster analysis, canonical correlation and discriminant analysis. 
Most reuslt may be displayed graphically. 
Multivariate Graphics Package (MVG) - 
The MVG package facilitates the graphical presentation of multivariate data in the form 
of multiple code symboh such as barcharts, profiles, glyphs, diamonds, rtarr, suns, castles, 
trees, boxes and Andrew's curves. The MVG is especially useful in visually discriminating 
various patterns of multivariate data in a single graphical presentation. Like the other parts 
of the GCP, it is command oriented and graphics may be combined with other Urnetafiles" 
created by the GCP and used in combination with data from the GIs. 
Computer Assisted Drafiing Package (MCAD) - 
An MCAD package was developed as a rtandalone rystem but for which output from 
"metafiles" created by the GCP, LCP, GeoStat and MAGPAC may be edited to produce 
a tomized graphics. Like the other graphical packages, it uses the hardware features of 
the Tektronix 41xx and 42xx graphics stations for the creation and editing of the graphics. 
The MCAD program is heavily used in the preparation of borders and legends for GCP 
and GIS graphics an well an the MAGPAC and GeoStat package. 
The MCAD package may be used to customize the results of any of the graphics output from 
the systems currently running at the MRRD. Utilizing the capabilities of the Tektronix 
41xx and 42xx graphical display stations, modifications may be made directly to contoured 
maps to customize the result or to any of the graphics prepared by the GeoStat, GCP and 
other packages. This facility provides an important capability for the analyst to quickly 
prepare carefully interpretted results. 
UNIRAS Graphics Package and Library - 
UNIRAS is a commercially available software package consisting of an easy to use and 
powerful program library. It features interactive modules which use the library routines 
and offer menu driven user services. UNIRAS is currently being wed by the MRRD in 
problems such as contouring as well as three and four dimensional viewing of data. UNIRAS 
uses ASCII files converted &om GCP and GeoStat DBS files. 
The VAX Computing Environment - 
The VAX computing environment includes several very important factors for a successful 
ASDMS. These are: 
VAX Family 
The VAX computing family guarantees total compatibility of user applications from 
desk-top machine to large mainframes. This factor along the fact that several of 
the other systems for accident site management have been designed utilizing VAX 
hardware (e.g. FEMA) permits rapid installation of an ASDMS on any available 
VAX. 
Long-Term Planning 
Because of the internal compatibility within the VAX family, it guarantees long-term 
planning for the development of software. 
Rapid Upgrade 
In the event that a smaller VAX system is saturated, a larger VAX may be rapidly 
installed without major interruption of any of the systems. 
32 Bit Architecture 
The VAX family of computers are fully addressable 32 bit machines. 
Networking Facilities 
Networking facilities are fully developed including the 20 Mbaud local area Ether- 
net and including communications facilities with other microcomputers such as other 
VAX computers or IBM microcomputers. Telephone networking with other comput- 
ers are supported. 
Backup Facilities 
The VMS operating system supports convenient backup facilities for the entire sys- 
tem or may be cutomized to backup critical files automatically on a predetermined 
schedule such as by the hour as an incremental backup. 
DISCUSSION: 
Computing Capabilities - 
A considerable amount of computing capability is required, both in trained manpower as 
well as in computing speed and storage capability for a ASDMS to operate efficiently in 
a multiuser environment. In addition, other applications requiring a significant amount 
of graphics such as the GIs will be running concurrently. Examples of other applications 
are processing of analytical data such as soil, water and sediment samples by statistical 
techniques, a laboratory control system and geostatistical processing of data. The mix is 
not sigdicantly different than what is currently present at the MRRD. 
Professional Requirements - 
The statistician, geochemists and other systems analysts are at the heart of the ASDM 
system and provide the analysis of the data supplied to the support team. The analysts 
and programmers in the ASDMS Support Team will be required to  carry-out the requeets 
of the Emergency Director after analysie and explanation of the problem. Likewise, they 
will be required to explain the capabilities of the system and to provide specific support in 
design of the sampling campaign and the analysis of the data. 
The ASDMS Support Team must have good communications skills and be able to work 
directly with other experts at the accident site. The systems manager will have the re- 
sponeibility of selecting suitable stalf and committing various pieces of hardware for the 
various tasks. The database manager will have the responsibility of ensuring that result- 
ing database structures are compatible with the various applications and for ensuring the 
hourly backup of all information of importance on the system. 
Ad Hoc User Support - 
In the event of an accident scenario, there will most likely be a number of other ad hoe users 
requiring significant computing capability from a VAX environment. An example of this 
would be if software developed for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
which also runs in a VAX environment, were imtalled on the existing machine configuration. 
As can be seen in Table I, sdEcient empty porte exist to handle any additional hardware 
as might be required or available in an accident situation. The systems manager muet 
decide what applications have priority in the event of hardware saturation in cooperation 
with the Emergency Director. In any case, they can be rapidly integrated into the ASDMS 
Support Team. 
Hatdware Cornideratiorn for a Mob& System - 
Three other points of concern should be raised regarding hardware and apply if components 
of our system were installed in a remote location: First, certain components such as the 
electrostatic plotter are relatively sensitive and would require an air-conitioned environment 
to operate effectively. The second point is that the VAX itself should be a ruggedized 
version, as self-contained as possible and be able to operate in extremes of temperature, 
humidity and physical shock. The present VAX 8300 environment is not such a mobile 
piece of hardware. As proposed in Table II, a ruggedized micoVAX 3600 might be one 
solution. 
It would be a serious problem if the CPU were not able to survive transport and operation 
in a less than ideal environment. Finally, an independent power supply utilizing surge 
protectors, an alternate battery supply and a standby generator should be matched to the 
power requirements of the computer system and be available on short notice. Most of these 
requirements could be met with military and in some case fire brigade support. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The development of an ASDM system and support team based on hardware, software and 
manpower currently being used for geological investigations is not only a desireable goal 
but also a very low cost alternative to having a similar system on standby solely for accident 
site management. The major advantages are: 
The systems have been well tested using data very similar to data resulting from an 
accident; 
The manpower using these systems are expert in the handling of geochemical data, 
statistics and geostatistics necessary for the proper analysis and handling of the 
accident data and; 
The ASDM system and support team are available on immediate notice. 
An ASDM system will be used at some point in the future whether to reduce the impact 
of a major accident or to gather data in a concise way to prepare for the eventuality of 
an accident. Many intermediate products may be obtained from such a system during the 
systematic collection of geographical data. These include land-use planning maps, tactical 
planning maps for fire brigades and rescue units, identification of watersheds and hydrologic 
units as well as ecologically sensitive regions, transport corridor hazard maps and other 
services. The systematic development and update of information of this type will become 
increasingly valuable in the future. 
Finally, an essential conaideration for the implementation of an ASDMS is the policy 
maker. Without proper clarification to the policy maker of how such a system can be 
implemented and its purpose, function and requirements, the system cannot be included 
into the catastrophe action plans. This is aproblem of the scientist and engineer presenting 
effective arguments to explain the necessity of the system and the benefits in the political 
arena. 
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TABLE I 
PRESENT HARDWARE CONFIGURATION OF MRRD 
Computer: DEC-VAX 8300, 24 MB Memory, dual procewor, components 
for Hardware System Cluster (HSC) installed. 
Hardiac: 4 x DEC RA8l (4 x 456 MB); 
2 x DEC RA82 (2 x 622 MB). 
(Controlled by an HSC controller 
connected to the VAX backplane.) 
Tape Drivea: DEC TUB1 (25-75 ipa, 1600/6250 bpi); 
DEC T S l l  (45 ips, 1600 bpi). 
Graphics Terminals: 1 x Tektronix 4115B (1280 x 1024) + 4957 Tablet; 
3 x Tektronix 4207 (640 x 480) + 4957 Tablet; 
2 x Tektronix 4107 (640 x 480) + 4957 Tablet; 
3 x M68 Workatations (640 x 480) (Inhouse designed hardware 
for Tektronix 4107-4207, DEC VT125 emulation). 
Text Terminals: 
Inkjet Plotters: 




(These Inkjet plotters are configured with the 
Tektronix gaphica terminals for hardcopy.) 
Vector Plotters: HP 5786B/A0/8 colours; 
HP 7550A/A3/8 colours. 
Electrostatic Plotter: Calcomp 5835 colour/AO (1024 coloura). 
Digitizer: GTCO Digi-Pad 5/AO; 
Tektronix 4958/A2. 
(Uaed in conjunction with a Tektronix 
gaphica station.) 
Peraonal Computers: 2 x IBM PS2/60, 1 MB memory, 70 MB harddisc; 
2 x IBM PC/AT, 640 KB memory, 20 MB harddisc; 
1 x IBM PC/XT, 640 KB memory, 32 MB harddisc. 
Printers: DEC LA-120 lineprinter; 
FACIT 24 dot matrix printer; 
2 x DEC LNO3R Laser printer. 
Net working: ETHERNET, 20 Mbaud; 
Leased line, 9600 baud, Joanneum in Graz; 
Leased line, 9600 baud, Leoben Mining University. 
(This line gives acceas t o  BITNET, ARPANET and 
other international networking services.) 
TABLE I1 
ASDMS - ACCIDENT SITE DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
REQUIREMENTS 
PROPOSED HARDWARE 
microVAX 3600 (Ruggedized, if possible) 
Mbyte main memory 
2 x 280 Mbyte RA70 disc storage 
Mbyte RA8l disc storage 
TK-70 streamer tape 296 Mbyte 
TUB1 plus 1600/6250 BPI tape drive 
Terminal Servers (DECserver) (for 32 ports) 
TEC 4215/4107/4115 Graphics Stations with 
TEC lnkJet 46921469314696 hardcopy and 
TEC 4957 digitizers. 
VT320 Stations 
Plotters: HP-7550 (A3 & A4), HP-7586 (AO) & CALCOMP 5835 
Digitizers: GTCO-DIGIPAD 5, TEC 4958 
Communications modems 
IBMIPS2 system (for IBM format data) 
360 kbyte disc for IBMIPS2 
DECNETIETHERNET capability 
Printers 
empty hard ports 
empty multiplexed ports (can be used for other 
terminals or preferably other personal computers) 




Geographic Information System (ARC /INFO) 
Data Base System (DBS) 
Geostatietical System (GeoStat) 
Geophysics Package (MAGPAC) 
CONTOUR Program 
Geochemical Package (GCP) 
Laboratory Control Package (LCP) 
Laboratory Control Package (LCP) 
Statistical Graphics Package (SGP) 
Multivariate Statistics Package (MS) 
Multivariate Graphics Package (MGP) 
Computer Assisted Drafting Package (MCAD) 
Standard system utilities 
Communications software (Kermit or DECNETIDOS) 
= Currently proposed for a mobile demonstration system 
= Available from outside sources 
TABLE I11 
ACCIDENT SITE DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Geological Exploration Techniques Tha t  
C a n  Be  Applied t o  Accident Management 






f)  Cultural features 
g) Demographic data 
h) Topography (Digital Terraine Model) 
2) Orientation sampling of the target 
3) Sample preparation and submission to laboratory 
4) Variogram to estimate zone of iduence of data 
5) Selection of geostatistical model 
6) Optimal grid spacing based on geostatistical model and required confidence level 
7) Detailed grid sampling of target 
8) Sample preparation and submission to laboratory 
9) Laboratory control systems to control accuracy & precision 
10) Variogram to check chosen geostatistical model 
11) Kriging to estimate concentration 
12) Block-by-block calculation of grades - tonnages 
* 13) Decision for removal (mining) 
** 14) Optimized removal (mining) plan of area 
* *  15) Preparation of waste disposal sites 
** 16) Block-by-block removal (mining) control for area 
17) Follow-up of localized high-grade areas 
In parallel, other types of environmental information may also be processed in a similar way: 
Statistical analysis of any type of data 
Presentation of multivariate maps of the target 
Contour mapping of any form of data 
Geostatistical analysis of geophysical data 
Correction and evaluation of airborne geophysical data 
Modification of flightline spacing 
Correction and evaluation of carborne geophysical data 
Modification of carborne spacing 
* =In mining, an economic decision; In waste management, a saftey decision. 
** =Presently, these functionn can be performed by the GIs alone. 
*** =Performed by the governmental agency 
TABLE IV 
Data  Required To Be Contained in a n  ASDMS 
for Preliminary Planning After a n  Accident 
(Modifled after the  IAEA Report)  
Demographic data - population size and distribution; 
Layout of cities/towns including identification of areas/facilities requiring special 
attention or priority cleanup; 
Land classes and land use; 
Geology and geohydrology of the affected area; Soil types and permeability; Ground- 
water depth and direction; Topography; 
Meteorological data including airshed topographic data; 
Cleanup criteria for different cones and other relevant regulatory (radiation protec- 
tion, etc.) information; 
Data on toxic materials in a facility and likely accident release sources for likely 
scenarios; 
Organizational aspects for managing the cleanup plan for various sub-zones as forseen 
in the pre-accident planning; 
Background environmental monitoring data base for the area; 
Grid layout of area; 
Location of critical areas of river/lake systems which could be susceptible to inflow 
of large volumes of contaminated water from the accident or cleanup; 
Location of critical downstream drinking water supplies which could be affected; 
Actions which may have to be taken shortly after an accident, for example: the 
installation of in-ground hydraulic bypasses to reduce groundwater flow though the 
contaminated area; Diversion ditches or dams to prevent contaminated water from 
reaching clean water systems; 
A statistical sampling plan for different Eones; 
A confirmatory monitoring plan to validate that cleanup meets the required criteria; 
Analysis of best cleanup options for each area based on assessment of soil type, land 
use, equipment available, etc. and the quality control programmes associated with 
each option; 
A list of equipment and facilities required for cleanup and the location of available 
items (including potential disposal sites); 
Assessment of personnel requirements for various scenarios including a list and tele- 
phone numbers of key staff members and details of the notification system; 
International contacts (as required) on all phases of the cleanup. 
This  paper was o r i g i n a l l y  prepared under t h e  t i t l e  "Modelling 
f o r  Management" f o r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  a t  a  Nate r  Research Cent re  
(U.K. ) Conference on "River  P o l l u t i o n  Con t ro l " ,  Oxford, 
9 - 1 1  A s r i l ,  1979. 
Policy Responses to Large Accidents: 
An International Research Perspective 
David W. Fischer 
Professor 
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Introduction 
Accidents may be viewed as aberrations infrequently infecting society's technological 
investment or as normal events linked to a deepening technological commitment - or even 
as something between. Regardless of which view dominates, it is clear that technological 
successes have been accompanied by large accidents that are resisted, ignored or downplayed, 
but rarely accepted as inevitable. 
Examples are numerous. Nuclear energy was pursued as a peaceful use of a new source 
of cheap electricity vith accidents all but ignored. Manufacture of chemicals was based 
on rapid marketability with little thought of accidental environmental contamination 
and human health effects. Offshore oil and gas development has grown rapidly with 
accidents downplayed as one-time, abnormal events. America's space program was launched 
with reaching for the stars overshadowing any discourse on potential accidents. 
Yet time and experience with large accidents involving each of these technological 
programs has led to various policy responses affecting many nations. Indeed, each of the 
government programs and industries surrounding these technologies have come under serious 
public scrutiny with national moritoria, litigation, bankruptcies, disinvestment, and 
Breater constraints and pressures on the employment of these technologies, whether east- 
vest or north-south. 
As Uenk has noted. "One of the more tenacious paradoxes of technology we repeatedly 
encounter is that ve have more choices but less time to choose.'' ( I )  The potential 
accidents from the introduction or continued use of all large technological thrusts 
deserve extensive scrutiny by all stakeholders, particularly those vho may be gravely 
disadvantaged such as operators, workers and regional residents. Yet any study of 
technological accidents and consequences takes an enormous amount of time, resources and 
expertise. Thus, careful and deliberate choice is necessary for potential researchers 
because of the competing demands on international research resources. 
Large accidents may be seen as national or international crises demanding 
instantaneous responses through policy apparatuses normally given to promoting the technolog 
involved, Compacted time horizons and high decision stress tend to restrict focus to the 
recovery and limiting of immediate adverse policy consequences for the organizations 
involved. Their goal is normalcy as soon a6 possible from the surprises created by a 
large accident. (2) Nevertheless, society has a major role to play in technological 
accidents, particularly those deemed large in potential international consequences. The 
national organizations surrounding large accidents are only one set of actors in an 
international technological drama. The mere existence of large accidents proves that even 
the technologies most imbued with a nation's dreams, a6 the space programs, cannot be 
immune from international scrutiny into their technological management. The Challenger 
accident revealed complex inter-organizational relations and restricted information flows 
that vere at the core of these event6 and their consequences, and it vould have benefitted 
from the research perspective of international analysts. (3) 
Some Perspectives Learned from My Accident Research 
My first opportunity to be involved in research on large accidents from an internationa 
systems perspective occurred in 1977 - over a decade ago. this work began with a well 
blowout on a North Sea platform, the first such accident there; it continued with the 
Three Mile Island nuclear accident, the first getting vorld-vide attention. (4) 
This effort also vas the first attempt by IIASA to study large accidents and it 
supplemented the earlier joint IIASA-IAEA risk studies. 
What sparked my attention and subsequent commitment of international research 
resources vas not the size of the accidents per se. Indeed, both accidents had no loss 
of life and minimal adverse impacts. Bather I vas struck vith the discontinuity betveen 
industry and regulator statements on the impossibility of such events and the obvious 
existence of the accidents. As well, the national commitments to these technologies were 
evident in the fundamental role of these programs for the nations involved and by implica- 
tion the rest of the world. Are such accidents to be ignored or dovnplayed in order to 
promote the relevant technologies? And if so, what are the roles of potential impactees - 
those whose lives and fortunes are at risk? What is the effect on international society 
from various national technological commitments with resultant accident profiles? 
Uy research did not touch on these broader theme&. Such was the first lesson learned: 
the extrapolation from one event to broader themes is tenuous. As much as the more basic 
questions were relevant, the research effort remained focused on understanding the syster 
accident response: the actors involved, their organization, information used, communication 
made, and the pre-accident context. One critic of the first study labelled the work as 
"mere informed journalism." Nevertheless, after studying the second accident along similar 
lines, interesting themes began to emerge. (5) Therefore, it seems clear that studying 
a series of large accidents over time can lead to major hypotheses about the impact of 
technology and national commitment for society. I would urge that IIASA continue this 
work. 
Another lesson learned involved the need for close ties to national reticulists to 
act as networkers in the nations involved. (6) Uy earlier North Sea work acquainted me 
with the person later selected to lead the national accident response in Norway. This 
acquaintance gave me access to key informants throughout the country. The level of access 
and overview was considerable and resulted in the first international conference at IIASA 
that involved regulators, industrialists and scientists. Later work with the TUX event 
did not involve a reticulist in advance; however. being from the U.S. gave me knovledge 
of hov to find informants. In addition, my international status was of value in obtain- 
ing this access as well as my being sanctioned by the National Academy. Since IIASA has 
the network in place through its national committees, this arrangement is of ionnense 
value in getting access to those relevant to large accidents. Perhaps designating some- 
one in advance in each country to act as the research reticulist vould be useful. 
Accidents vait for no one, including researchers. Had no surplus of funds been 
available, I vould never have been able to accomplish the first study. The entire North 
Sea effort came from under-spent funds from the Bratsk-Ilimsk Territorial Production 
Complex study, and the M I  study emerged from surplus funds in the Energy Program. It 
seems that if IIASA would engage in primary research on large accidents a contingency 
fund to support this work is necessary. However, a more appropriate role in today's 
financial squeeze may be for IIASA to have standing agreements vith selected researchers 
in each country to investigate large accidents along pre-selected lines. Then IIASA vould 
be in a position to develop comparative studies and conferences based on in-country 
research. 
Nevertheless, one key perspective could be lost vith such an arrangement: the 
international questions brought to bear on a nation's institutional structure for techno- 
logical decision-making. To my amazement certain fundamental questions about the 
accidents I studied went unasked: What if the preventive actions fail? What if the 
impacts exceed that planned for? What if the accident enfolds in a different manner 
than expected? What national features generate "bllnd spots" in accident assessment? 
What planned responses exist for international concerns? All these and similar questions 
are obvious, but they did not form the core of the pre-accident scenarios I studied in 
two countries. Therefore. I conlude that an international systems analyst has much to 
offer to national technological program managers and policy-workers. 
My research also noted a lack of balance between accident anticipation and response. 
The more an accident seemed to be anticipated the less planned the response to the 
accident when it occurred. This imbalance suggests that an organization's capacity for 
response to demands is finite. Douglas and Wild~vsky also have seen this phenomenon: 
"The prcbability that any lcnovn danger will occur declines because of anticipatory 
measures. But the probability that if the unexpected hppens it will prove catastrophic 
increases, because resources required for response have been used up in anticipation." 
(7) Systems analysis generated the perspective to understand this concept, and international 
system analysis led to seeing it aa a universal problem of a11 technological programs. 
Thus, the literature on organizations, bureaucracies and institutions becomes important 
to studying policy responses to large accidents. 
How L a r ~ e  is Large? 
It is clear that no society can enter the domain of zero risk or even ensure a wholly 
rational policy response for each large accident. Resources are too limited, time 
constraints too overwhelming, rewards for quick fixes too high, expertise too thin, and 
social attention spans too short. Equally, some attempt must be made by IIASA to set 
priorities among large accidents competing for scarce international research resources. 
Therefore, I suggest the following to spark discussion: 
o First, large accidents involving new technologies that overwhelmed the regional reponse 
being used to control the accident and its impacts. Here TMI and Chernobyl provide 
examples of accidents where national governments took command from responsible groups. 
o Technologies involving very high impacts both in intensity and extent of effects that 
may or may not go beyond national frontiers. Here chemical and genetic industries 
demonstrate real (Seveso. Bhopal) and potential examples. 
o Technologies involving multi-national organizational elements linked together via 
manufacturing contracts and franchises. Here only one national group may have the 
complete information on the components. Hajor veapon systems and certain chemicals 
provide examples. 
o An accident vith potential impacts spilling over national borders that carry 
high but uncertain effects to several nations. Here chemical and nuclear plants 
along international rivers and borders come to mind. 
o Technologies involving major national investments of resources and prestige that 
are potential vehicles for international technology transfer. Here offshore 
oil, major veapons, nuclear power and space programs provide examples. 
o Technological innovations under considerable national pressure to perform successfully, 
involve a high degree of uncertainty internationally. and involve judgment calls by 
many independent national organizations. Again, veapons systems and genetic manufacturing 
come to mind. 
What may be surprising in this list of six dimensions is that cost per life saved or 
similar measure is not mentioned. No doubt it could be included, but I find that it is 
not a guide to national policy or research. (7) For example, chemical vaste volume and 
disposal is far more potentially lethal than radioactive vaste yet chemicals are discarded 
vith lesser regulatory requirements and hence costs than radioactive vastes. Radon 
exposure in houses may exceed exposure to chemical vastes yet its risk has only begun to 
be considered and costed. Enhancing highvay safety is a relatively cheap investment yet 
it has been subjected to decades of delay. On the other hand, only seven people died in 
the Challenger accident vith billions spent to redesign the shuttle and an entire program 
put on hold for 32 months. Thus, costs do not appear to be a guide to national research 
investment. 
What vas surprising is that only transportation and infrastructure accidents are 
eliminated from applying the above criteria. While large accidents involving air, sea, 
rail and truck transport together kill and maim hundreds of lives annually and are 
international in scope, they involve vell-knovn technologies that do not overvhelm regional 
response capabilities; they already have been transferred throughout the vorld; they do 
not carry high uncertainties in their consequences (except vhen carrying toxic 
material); they do not involve multiple international decision-makers; they are not under 
intense national pressure for operational perfection. Accidents in the transport sector 
are seen as normal events, regrettable and to be avoided but acceptable. No nation imposes 
moritoria on any form of transport after a major accident with large loss of life and 
property. 
As well, large accidents involving dams. bridges and lines involve proven technologies 
and operating conditions. These accidents are more sporadic than transport accidents 
yet share similar characteristics in their lack of straining regional response resources; 
their common use in each nation; their known impacts; the limited number of decision- 
makers; the lack of national operating pressure. Indeed, the day I flew into Wien to 
begin work at IIASA in 1976 was the same day the Reichsbruke collapsed. Other than 
hasty inspections of other Danube bridges and harried remarks of reassurance by the 
Xayor. fev showed concern and traffic intensified over other bridges. 
What is important about these dimensions - the potential devastation of large areas, 
the potential international impacts, the potential technology transfers, the multitude of 
independent international decision-makers. and the national push for superior perfor- 
mance - is their combined international consequences. In combination they carry the 
necessary and sufficient elements to generate accidents large enough to warrant interna- 
tional research response. That even national decision-makers are responding to interna- 
tional pressures to restrain unintended technological impacts is the testimony of the 
recent intermediate missile treaty to ban and destroy these missiles. Use of these new 
missiles would have devastated large parts of Europe, east and west, were being trans- 
ferred to other nations, involved multiple national decision-makers. and involved intense 
national performance assumptions. The missiles fit these criteria and the international 
policy response was for a bananddestruction of existing hardware. This international 
success perhaps varrants an international research initiative in order to learn the 
cheracteristics lerding to an integrated international policy response. Thus, I conclude 
that international research resources should be focueed on actual and potential accidents 
that display the dimensions listed. 
The Institutional lhtrix Surrounding Large Accidents 
Any large accident is an outcome of some breakdown in the institutional infrastructure 
surrounding a major technology. The organizations involved are connected in various vays 
to the technology and are held together by the flov of information and contractual 
obligations, as vell as the future impact of any accident on this organizational milieu. 
However, the central commonality is the system of dominating ideas about the technology that 
link them togetheer. Core beliefs are essential to the success of any organization, and 
especially the metaorganizational form that characterizes large technological programs. 
Some core vision or direction is necessary for guiding the organizations toward sensing 
the need for the technology, devoloping the requisite hardware and infrastructure to fit 
the need, penetrating or creating a niche for it, and extending the technology deeper into 
the nation's institutional fabric. 
This vision is linked in turn to an organizational structure that facilitates it. 
There must be political support for the necessary authority and resources as well as 
practical arrangements enabling each stage of the technological embedding process to go 
forward. Over time as success occurs this vision about the technology and its socio- 
political role become the raison d'etre for the organizations involved, and the technology 
becomes fully integrated throughout the institutional structure of the society. The 
original vision of the technology, its niche and its organizational structure are all 
necessary elements in defining and maintaining its management strategy. Matching these 
three elements over time is the major management concern of the organizations involved. 
( 9 )  
When a large accident occurs a change is introduced into this institutional matrix. 
Accidents do not accord with the original vision as they instantly expose the organizations 
and planning premises involved and how they behave under stress. New political and 
decision pressures confront the organizations' dominating ideas about the technology and 
themselves. The manner in which the organizations respond to these pressures is critical 
to their continued success. The organizations must reconcile a basic conflict in their 
need to balance their on-going technological thrust vith a sudden need to consider 
unanticipated accident impacts. 
To take advantage of this new open climate pressures may arise from several sources 
to include: media, whistle-blowers. affected citizens, customers, suppliers, politicians, 
technological rivals, opposed experts, interested researchers. regulators. contractors, 
operators, unions, and adjacent nations. These potential impactees can be bound 
together into a contravailing meta-organizational form. even though no ties other than 
the accident bind them. Their common vision is the sharing in the accident impacts. 
They in turn bring pressures to bear directly on the technological institutions and the 
sovereign authority for change. 
Such pressure forces the technological organizations to respond. In general, four 
types of response can be distinguished: preemptive, prescriptive, preventive, and 
promotive. (10) 
o The preemptive policy response refers to the attempt to continue the original thrust 
or direction regardless of the existence of an accident; it attempts to preempt or 
ignore the accident in the hope of garnering support for the "bigger picture." 
It is premised on avoiding change to the technological program. 
o The prescriptive policy response includes the effort to pursue the original program 
while simultaneously attending to accident impacts; it attempts to prescribe ad hoc. 
one-time limited shifts in the program without a major change. This stance is 
premised on minimum change to the technology after an accident. 
o The preventive policy response is designed to reduce demands on program change 
through working to prevent accidents; it attempts to prevent them by accepting 
add-on or supplementary changes to the program. This effort is premised on measured 
risk reduction through adopting additional technology before an accident occurs. 
o The promotive policy response is a proactive interplay betveen the technological 
program and a risk management program where accidents are viewed as integral to 
altering the former; it attempts to promote the total technological-risk environment. 
This approach is premised on changing the technology as necessary to minimize 
accidents, even to the extent of eliminating the technology. 
These four organizational responses are summarized in Table 1 along with accident 
examples for each type. While each can be separate responses to large accidents. these 
responses may form an evolutionary path as the organizations involved encounter stronger 
resistance to the accident potential of the technology. An increasing integration of the 
acceptance of large accidents by the organizations within the program directs them toward 
a new equilibrium position incorporating expected accident impacts. Such vould be 
attempted normally through incremental decision-making which is often the norm when facing 
organizational uncertainty. Incrementalists argue that by thinking in small steps they 
can muddle through a problem without recourse to greater knowledge. (11) Hovever, it is 
doubtful that incrementalism would lead to promotive policies; indeed, major incentives 
for promotive thinking seem necessary. As Wilson has noted, the more diversified an 
organization the more changes members will suggest and the fewer will be carried out. (12) 
Any change has spillovers that adversely affect more organizational members than those 
suggesting the change. In other words, the opponents vill outnumber the supporters of any 
change, and a major technological program with a far-flung meta-organizational form will 
face this problem. (See Table 2.) 
Thus, it seems clear that socially responsible policy responses to large accidents 
should begin with the institutional matrix surrounding large technologies. An adequate 
response is a function of not only the state of technological development but of the 
institutional features surrounding and directing it. This institutional capacity to 
obstruct or redirect socially rational policy responses to large accidents is a major 
research area from an international perspective. 
A policy response to potential accidents cannot be deemed adequate vithout the 
participation of those whose relationship to the technology is affected. Successful policy 
formulation necessitates that those involved understand what is happening and why. The 
degree to vhich those potentially affected by large accidents function interrelatedly 
is determined by the degree of their recognition of such interdependence, and any policy 
response by definition stays within the limits of recognized interdependence. 
Therefore, no society can expect promotive policy responses to originate from the 
technological program itself. Systems thinking and international trade-offs will go 
unrecognized, in particular as the degree of national specialization and commitment to a 
technology deepens. (13) This problem will exist in spite of a latent recognition of 
International interdependence, especially during a time of demands for national renewal 
or rallying that a large accident provides. In this sense a principle of minimum dis- 
location may operate so that acceptance of a radical reorientation in technological 
management will be thwarted. Therefore, it is necessary to surmount objections and fears 
of those whose interests lie in an unabashed technological determinism. 
To approach this institutional matrix requires a research vision that views large 
accidents as an integral part of the definition of technological efficiency. In this way 
the technological program is viewed as strengthened whenever an innovative policy response 
oriented to minimizing broad accident potential is attempted. Beliefs, as distinguished 
from knowledge, are the basis for dominating ideas, and beliefs require promotive policy 
thrusts to redirect them. Research that remains below the critical dimension of 
technological beliefs risks ignoring the catalyst that drives national responses to 
large accidents. 
Institutional constraints generating less than promotive policy responses by 
technological programs include a series of intermediate decision-makers or bureaucrats, 
some of whom simply make poor decisions. In this way a decision is either made several 
times over or never explicitly made in order to preserve perceived options. Problem 
definition is hampered since policy-makers are unaware of how the technological program 
may be Influenced by any one policy change. For example, a relevant control eystem may 
not be matched correctly with appropriate rubsystems. This issue is particularly important 
when technological and risk objectives of different nations conflict. Then different 
weights are attached to the different objectives and international policy responses 
fall short of that expected from an international systems view. However, even 
within one nation, different weights can be put on the same information, though all 
would agree to the objective involved. The Challenger accident is evidence of this 
phenomenon. 
Constraints to Large Accident Policy Research 
International applied systems analysis involves well h o r n  steps to include: 
problem definition, objective formulation, establishment of information needs, collection 
of information, generation and assessment of alternatives, and development of a decision 
rule. (14) When attempting to apply this format to large accidents several features emerge 
that constrain the use of this approach. 
o The official problem definition is slanted to both preserve the technological program 
and to blame those deemed responsible for an accident. As Perrow observes, "Once 
there is an accident, one looks for and easily finds the great causes for the great 
event." Any warning signal may go unnoticed by anyone and there always remain 
warnings "available for recall once there is an occasion." Perrow goes on to note. 
"One suspects it would be quite easy to convene a commission of inquiry to 
investigate an accident that had not taken place, and find...failures ... that should 
have produced an accident long ago." (15) Thus. it is clear that the accident itself 
may be incidental to the causal factors inherent in the technological program. It 
is then quite simple to overlook more basic policy veaknesses through concentration 
on the accident itself as well as on certain veaknesses supported by an information 
base. As well, whistleblowers and the media may point blame elsewhere. 
o The objectives formulated for the technological program reflect the disparate goals 
that form the inherent conflict in any meta-organizational form, even without a 
large accident. However, a major accident can cause organizations to reinterpret 
their relationships with one another to fit their new assumed needs. For example, 
new political pressures may emerge that color their interpretation of existing 
information, or one of the organizations may become more willing to risk than 
others. Any accident may hide mismatches between goals as the organizations attempt 
a more solid facade before a public investigation of an accident. In this case a 
premature end may come to the investigation with the more basic organizational factors 
remaining masked. 
o Information more readily available for analysis may not match the underlying accident 
causes. Certainly, a quantitative analysis rarely will be possible. Accident 
information about major national technological programs may be bound in secrecy 
whether from reasons of national security, proprietary or fear of political reprisal. 
Politicians and top civil servants connected to the program will not look kindly 
on the questions of an international analyst and will remain unavailable. Indeed, 
one great difficulty is the temporary commissions of inquiry that are created to 
investigate accidents: they exist for a short time and then disappear. The only 
long-term organization with the requisite knowledge and Information of the accident 
and post-accident risk is the technological program itself--precisely the organization 
which has the least incentive to share its information with the analyst. Its 
overvhelming objective is to return to normalcy as soon as possible and put the 
accident behind it. Questions from outsiders are greeted vith at best a rosy future 
of technological lessons learned. Fundamental questions such as the implicit 
consensus of beliefs surrounding the technology are not open for examination. The 
analyst only can learn best in the brief period of the accident responses vhen all 
organizations involved and their dominating ideas are exposed to the outside. 
o The generation and assessment of alternative accident approaches is hindered through 
lack of knowing significant information concerning the technology and its niche in 
the nations involved. Therefore, the analyst is prone to concentrate on other issues 
with a better information base. As noted above, no continuing accident investigation 
and risk management organization exists for allowing access to any ongoing accident 
policy research and the degree of appropriateness of various alternatives. 
o It is a paradox that the only permanent organization with responsibility for accident 
management policy is local or regional government. even though it has the least 
knowledge and resources available to respond. Local government is supposed to protect 
local citizens and property, yet it too suffers from lack of information about 
technological programs located within its jurisdiction as well as a lack of resources 
from central government. (16) (While in the U.S. a recent law has begun to document 
on-site hazardous materials no information is required about the technological program 
itself.) Indeed, one could expect wrong impressions being given to local governments 
to reduce anxiety of residents. Thus, even though risk is never eliminated, the 
institutions with greatest responsibility for accident impacts are under-prepared. 
The more they act in this way the greater the surprise--and perhaps probability-- 
of large accidents. Thus, severe constraints operate to reduce good information to 
international systems analysts. The consequences of this restricted information mean 
that the analyst is freer to concentrate on the inferred core beliefs and policies 
of the institutions involved and to sketch out the meta-organizational form. From 
this endeavor the set of incentives and disincentives can be developed and a counter- 
vailing policy suggested. Nevertheless, how to approach these constraints remains 
important in order to maintain credibility of analytical results and to ensure 
effective use of the international mantle. 
An International Research Response 
An international research perspective can begin to open the door to the above constraints. 
This effort involves two important tasks. 
o Framing the large accident problem from a trans-disciplinary, multi-national basis 
breaks through lesser dimensioned efforts that "prejudge the problem and prejudice 
the answer." (17) International applied systems analysis can include in its research 
program whatever bounds seem rational from its enhanced perspective. Systems 
generalists and substative experts generate differing voices which can be integrated 
to focus on broader issues of institutional import. This more comprehensive yet 
integrated international approach can lead to the promotive thinking so necessary 
to reduce the international risk embedded within the institutional matrix of national 
technological programs. 
o Use of national reticulists enables international analysts to interface with the 
multi-layered organizations supporting and opposing national technological programs 
or otherwise related to large accidents. Such networking is necessary to gain access 
to all groups relevant to an international perspective on national technological 
management, even though some national core groups may deny this relevance. Choice 
of reticulists is important because of the need to go beyond the superficial, 
conventional wisdom frequenting politically connected inner circles committed to the 
prevailing national view of technological management. As well. connection to neutral 
national authorities such as academyyof science is important for gaining access to 
information a core organization would not willingly provide. The reticulist should 
be as prestigious and neutral as possible toward the technological program. The 
selection of reticulists by international organizations can endow them with 
supplementary credentials to help accomplish the kind of access desired, especially 
if the relationship endures over time. 
Both of these advantages are unique to the international research 
perspective. Focus on the international dimension integral to all major 
national technological programs is enlightening even for the nation supporting 
the technology or experiencing the accident. Both the U.S and the U.S.S.R. 
nuclear accidents generated international fears, confusion, and uncertainty 
of policy response by potential impactee nations. National technologies that 
produce such international crises affect international bonding and trust. 
The mere absence of a large accident is insufficient to generate integrated 
international technological and risk management. Indeed, the absence of an 
accident is no reason to continue any technological program unabated. 
National technological management should promote international unity, and 
international applied systems analysis can go far in promoting this dimension. 
In order to approach this goal international systems analysis should embrace certain 
features: 
o Long-term projects are necessary because of the time required to establish the research 
network among and within the nations included in the project. As well, the 
institutional complexity of each must be studied before an accident occurs in order 
to grasp which organizations are relevant, what the questions are, and how to elicit 
the necessary information. 
o International comparisons of various institutional matrices are important to establish 
h w  policy responses are formed, how the range of acceptable policy is forged, and 
how dissent is integrated into policy responses. In particular, the structure of 
national research supporting the technological programs should be compared to 
determine how the technological problem is defined, vhat resources are available. 
and vhat information netvorks and f o r m  exist. 
o International technology and risk policy attributes can be developed and tested in 
a "second round" of research effort. In this round policy-makers should be included 
and used to assess alternative policy responses included from an earlier international 
research perspective. 
o Joint international-national communication and planning would seem important as a 
key adjunct to this research perspective. Establishing conrmunication linlycould 
carry international researchers into a more proactive stance beyond mere publication; 
however, advocacy of linking international technological and risk profiles should 
prove acceptable over time. Even if such advocacy only is limited to the concept of 
feedback loops to ensure accidents are seen as integral to the technology a step 
forward is assured. 
What policy responses are necessary for large accidents depends upon vhat the problem 
is. Technological programs do not slmply appear; they are conceived, promoted. 
and sustained by an institutional matrix committed to national prosperity. Large 
accidents involve the unthinkable and challenge this precept. International applied 
systems analysis is a means to begin thinking about the acceptance process associated 
with large accidents to redefine the technological program with potential international 
accident impacts as part of its definition. Then international research can begin 
to influence national policy toward the international loss associated with large 
accidents. In helping to create this future ve all are stakeholders. 
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Table 2. Organizational Factors Affecting Accident Response 
Simpler Response 
Narrow scope, little variety 
of functions 
Stable environmental conditions 
Clearly defined functions 
Relatively simple functions 
Indivisible functions 
Consensus about functions 
Operation in one place or 
several similar places 
Trust in science, statistics 
Appeal to authority, expertise 
Use of rules 
Difficult Response 
Broad scope, great variety of functions 
Changing environmental conditions 
Vaguely defined functions 
Highly complex functions 
Separable functions 
Conflict, diversity of opinion about functions 
Operation in many places with varying 
environments 
Trust in democratic process, self-management 
Appeal to responsibility, peer groups 
Use of education 
Petter Wulff 
FOA 
1. What is a larae accident? 
An accident can be large in a number of ways. Largeness may refer 
to geographical extention like in a country-wide power failure. 
It may refer to accident duration like in a severe oil blow-out. 
Largeness may further refer to the number of persons injured in 
an accident - a thing of primary importance to the medical 
sector. Very often largeness refers to the number of dead. 
Beside all of these physical dimensions of large accidents there 
is another dimension of possible interest. That is the extent of 
mass media coverage given to the accidents. 
If we look at a well-defined category of accidents like railway 
accidents (in Sweden) there seems to be a correlation between 
largeness as measured in number of deaths and the extent of mass 
media coverage (fig 1). Coverage is here measured as percentage 
of front page space in newspapers. This measure I will call 
(degree of) spectacularity. 1) 
Private car accidents are more timid guests on the front pages 
seldom reaching above 10-20% in spectacularity. The correlation 
between largeness in number of deaths (above an "every day" level 
of about three dead) and spectacularity is distinctly different 
from in the railway case (fig 2). 
Accidents with small aircraft fall somewhere in between railway 
and car accidents while the very few fatal accidents with large 
aircraft (scheduled and charter traffic) tend to have specta- 
cularity values about. as high as the single highest value for 
railroad accidents (fig 3 ) .  
Two conclusions can be tentatively drawn from the examples given. 
Firstly, different accident categories have different spectacula- 
rity weight, so to speak. Secondly, within an accident category 
there is a rough proportionality between number of deaths above 
an "every day" level and spectacularity. 
The importance of the spectacularity measure is indicated by the 
fact that the mass media image of an accident is the "reality" 
upon which the general public must base its reactions and 
opinions. This "reality" may also be something that decision 
makers are basing decisions on concerning safety regulations and 
safety spendings. 
It may therefore be a not too far-fetched hypothesis that 
spectacular accidents influence risk levels. 
2. 1-arne scale influence 
Three pieces of evidence are put forward in favour of the above 
mentioned hypothesis as applied on a large scale. 
Let us compare first different transportation alternatives. Here 
car accidents dominate the picture in the annual statistics on 
fatalities. In the average fatal car accident only one person 
gets killed. The number of fatalities per year for small aircraft 
accidents is almost two orders of magnitude less than for cars, 
while the number of persons killed per accident is a little 
higher than for cars. 
The more spectacular railroad accidents in the form of collisions 
between trains or derailments show a still lower annual risk 
level. Finally large aircraft accidents with the largest average 
death toll and spectacularity per accident show the lowest annual 
risk level (fig b ) .  
That is: The higher the death toll and spectacularity per 
accident the lower the risk level per year. 
The second piece of evidence concerns the long term perspective. 
Since the 1920s the number of fatalities in all accidents in 
Sweden has increased faster than the population. The number of 
large accident fatalities (with 5 deaths or more), on the other 
hand, seems to have increased slower than the population or not 
at all (fig 5 ) .  
The last piece of evidence concerns safety spendings relating to 
large aircraft. There are rescue forces at all Swedish airports 
with large aircraft traffic. It has been calculated that the 
majority of rescue forces (at 28 of the 34 airports) will be 
called into action to extinguish a fire in a large aircraft about 
once every 000 years or so. 2) That does not seem to be the most 
efficient way of using qualified personnel and equipment. 
One possible explanation of the facts and figures given is that 
the mass media focus attention in such a way that safety measures 
tend to be concentrated on activities with large accident 
profiles. 
3. A model 
The observations made can be fitted into a more general model of 
interaction between accidents and risks. The model is depicted in 
fig 6. Let us follow the models main interaction cycle. 
A large accident occurs and becomes spectacular through the mass 
media. Decision makers of the system concerned are then expected 
to take on responsibility for what has happened. They come under 
pressure to do something to restore the confidence of the general 
public and/or the mass media in the system. 
One way of restoring confidence is by promoting extra safety 
controls; another way is by providing extra means for safety 
spending. Such actions, if succesful, help to bring down risk 
levels. It may then be long before a new large accident starts 
the wheel of interaction over again. 
Other paths of interaction exist and are indicated in the model. 
The people operating a system may become more alert and attentive 
after a large (and spectacular) accident. It is also conceivable 
that post accident investigations lead to recomnendations 
reducing risk levels. 
In Sweden after the Chernobyl accident and the assassination of 
prime minister Palme the need of action from the highest 
political quarters is recognized, as the following quotation 
indicates: 
"In those large accidents or other forms of major crises that may 
take place the government will probably find it necessary to act 
both on factual grounds and with regard to public opinion ..." 3 )  
The mention of an opinion motive for action can be seen a recog- 
nition of the pressure exerted through the mass media on decision 
makers after a major accident. 
This pressure may sometimes lead to unwarranted action. This is 
well illustrated by what happened after the Three Mile Island 
accident, when nuclear plants worldwide were shut down and 
restarted more frequently for safety checks, although these 
phases of operations are by far the riskiest operational stages. 
6 )  
Let us now test the model presented by choosing a specific 
accident to see if there are indications of interactive 
behaviour. 
The example chosen is the most spectacular of the railroad acci- 
dents. It happened at a place called Sya (a three hour railroad 
journey south of Stockholm) in 1975. There a car hit a train and 
caused a derailment leading to the death of 16 persons. The mass 
media did respond with heavy front page coverage (about 60%). 
In the following fiscal year there was an increase in safety 
spendings for road-railroad crossings. This seems to be linked to 
the Sya accident. After that spendings declined again maybe a 
little more slowly than before (fig 7). 
The risk level for train collisions and derailments increases 
after Sya. A risk level increase is also observed for car acci- 
dents at railroad crossings as compared to car accidents in 
general. Whether these changes could be the result of hasty 
and/or unwarranted action due to the Sya accident is not quite 
clear. 
With this let us leave the Sya accident for a sununing up. 
I have tried to point out a few cases where large accidents seem 
to have influenced safety measures and risk levels. 
I have also tried to argue for a view of large accidents not just 
as random events but as parts of a system of interaction. The 
problem of the workings of such a system (if it exists) is a 
matter I propose as a research endeavour. It would be nice if the 
problem merited some consideration. 
Notes and references: 
1) Spectacularity measurements have been made on the two 
swedish newspapers with nation-wide distribution: "Svenska 
Dagbladet" and "Dagens Nyheter". Spectacularity values 
presented are the mean values of spectacularity for these 
two newspapers. 
Some large accidents may have been on the front page for 
more than one day. But spectacularity values are based crnly 
on the day of largest media coverage (Normally the day after 
the accident). 
To be precise "front page" is equal to first page with news 
(Around 1970 and earlier pages 1 and 2 of Svenska Dagbladet 
were devoted to advertisements and formal announcements). 
2) The Swedish Civil Aviation Administration, report 
1985:03/CL, Flygplatsernas Brand- och raddningstjanst (in 
swedish 
3 )  Defence department report DsFo 1987:01, Samhallets atgarder 
mot allvarliga olyckor - ledning och samordning (in swedish) 
4 )  The example is taken from Kasperson et al. The Social 
Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, Risk Analysis 
Vol 8, No. 2. 1988 
Fig 1. Spectacularity of Swedish railroad accidents. 
Accidents during the twenty year period 1968-87. For 
accidents with 4 deaths or less only some examples have 
been included. Two accidents occurring the same day 
(1978-08-10) are not included because of difficulty in 
apportioning spectacularity between them. 13 accidents. 
The number of deaths is given as the number known and 
reported by the newspapers at the time. This number may 
differ somewhat from actual and final death toll. 
(Based on statistics from the State Railways) 
Fig 2. Spectacularity of Swedish car accidents (except level 
crossing accidents car-railroad) 
Accidents during the ten year period 1977-86. Car 
accidents with four deaths are included only for a two 
year period (1985-86). 17 accidents. 
(Based on statistics from the National Road Safety 
Office 
Fig 3. Spectacularity for acidents with large and small 
aircraft . 
Accidents during the twenty year period 1968-87 (with 
five deaths or more) and the ten year period 1978-87 
(with four deaths). Instructional flights and 
helicopter not included. 2 large aircraft and 8 small 
aircraft accidents. 
(Based on statistics from the Civil Aviation 
Administration and lists of accidents in FOA report C 





Fig k .  Risk level seems to be a function of accident size 
in number of deaths. 
0.1 
(Based on swedish official statistics within the last 
twenty years) 
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Fig 5. The risk level for large accidents (with five or more 
deaths) has not increased like the risk level for all 
accidents. 
*om: FOA report A 10008-M2, February 1988. ISSN 0281- 
0208, Stora olyckor. Raddningstjansten i centrum (in 
swedish) 
Fig 6 .  A wheel of interaction 
Fig 7. Safety spendings for level crossings increased after 
the Sya accident. 
(Based on annual safety report from the State Railways) 
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE IMIAGENiIJT OF LARGE ACCIDENTS 
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1. Risk m a n ~ e m e n t  as an obiec t ive  demand of contemporo~~ 
---------- ---------- .................... 
t echnologica l  change 
-------- ------- 
The man-made technosphere o r  "second na tu rew men l i v e s  i n  
proved t o  be dangerously f r a g i l e .  Ef fec ts  of i t s  dis raptures  are 
f e l t  not only n a t i o n a l l y  but  a l s o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  and even globel-  
ly .  Of growing concern a r e  i s sues  r e l a t e d  t o  accidents  i n  indus t ry  
e spec ia l ly  i n  i t s  chemicel and energy sec to r s ,  as well a s  in tr=- 
spor t e t ion  and ag r i cu l tu re .  The sovie t  academician V.A. Legasov 
s t ressed:  ItA s a l i e n t  t rend  of our times i s  t h a t  while the  probabi- 
l i t y  of an ind iv idual  hazardous event (an ai r  crash, railway o r  
sh ip  accident ,  a  dam f  e i l u r e  o r  an accident  at a chemical f a c t o r y  
o r  nuclear  f a c i l i t y )  diminishes the  s c a l e  of its ums?quences, i f  
i t  occurs, increases  as a r u l e  r a t h e r  markedlyn. It can be argued 
t h a t  t h i s  f e a t u r e  is manifested at both  g loba l  and n s t i o n ~ l  e -  
v e l s  and observed i n  the  Soviet Union. 
Despite its r e l a t i v e l y  s m e l l  a m b e r  l a s e  ecc idez ts  resxl-L i-L 
eppr ic iab le  economic and environmental damages as well as i r r e p e i -  
r a b l e  human los ses .  I n  e number of cases t h e  e f f e c t s  of ecc idents  
s p i l l  over o m  na t ion  bounderies. 
Large acc idents  a r e  thouroughly inves t iga t ed  na t iona l ly  
and s tudied  in t e rna t iona l ly .  A.8 a r e s u l t  governmentel decis ions 
a r e  taken and even i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e so lu t ions  o r  conventions a r e  
sometimes adopted t h a t  have repercussions on economic develop- 
ment. There is a growing understanding t h a t  harmful consequences 
of accidents  can and must be reduced while t h e i r  r i s k s  can not  b e  
brought down t o  zero. 
A number of f a c t s  contribute t o  g rea te r  r i s k s  of accidents 
and scope of t h e i r  consequences. Among them are: a )  growing spat i -  
al  urban-industrial concentrations; b )  a sharp increase i n  the  
complexity of technical  systems, t i g h t l y  packed with energy, che- 
mically and biological ly  ac t ive  componentsi c )  a conspicuous quan- 
t i t a t i v e  spread of such systems; d)  t h e i r  declining r e l i a b i l i t y  
due t o  aging; e )  growing human incapab i l i ty  t o  adapt t o  new compli- 
cated technologies; f )  an increasing complexity of control  and mo- 
n i to r ing  f o r  such systems that  cannot ensure timely technological 
chenge over. 
The above selected trends can be traced i n  most countries and 
n e t u ~ a l l y  contribute t o  technological r i s k s  as well as e f f ec t s  of 
accidents including transboundary pol lu t ion and possible mutagenic 
im?lications f o r  fu ture  generations. I n  addit ion,  the indicated 
trends r e s u l t  i n  greater  expenses f o r  r i s k  management a c t i v i t i e s .  
A l l  t h e t  adds t o  externel  or  public cos t s  of manufacturing and ma- 
intenance of i ndus t r i a l  products. 
Re t r o f i t t i ng  wt rad i t ione lw in d u s t r i a l  f a c i l i t i e s  with environ- 
mental controls  has reduced pol lu t ion but enta i led  subs tan t ia l  ex- 
pemes and has not mitigate2 r i s k s  of accident ia l  emmissions of 
pol lu tants  due t o  f a i l u r e s  in pol lu t ion  abatement equipment o r  i n  
indus t r i a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  
It i s  against  this background t h a t  the  following sections of 
the  paper discuss economic a d  s o c i a l  damages incurred by l e rge  ec- 
cidents in t h e  Soviet Union over t h e  recent  years aa well as the  
establishment a s t a t e  r i s k  management policy t o  ant ic ipate  and 
prevent i ndus t r i a l  accidents as well as control  i t s  impacts. Ope- 
r e t i ona l  a c t i v i t i e s  of relevant government services in accident 
management a r e  l e f t  ou ts ide  t h e  scope of t h i s  paper. 
2. Large accidents  and t h e i r  h ~ r m f u l  e f f e c t s  
------ ............................. 
A number of recent  sorrowful developments nave reminded us 
t h a t  t echno log icd  change t h a t  contr ibutes  t o  t h e  p roduc t iv i ty  
growth, improves labour and l i v i n g  conditions, enhances mater ia l  
well-being and i n t e l l e c t u a l  capac i ty  of the  s o c i e t y  a l s o  b r ings  
many dangers connected i n  p a r t i c u l a r  with complex engineering sys- 
tems. One can c i t e  many exemples of suc2 events. Among them a r e  
acc idents  at nuclear  power s t e t i o n s  (172) i n  t h e  US and Europe, 
at  Chernobyl i n  t h e  USSR, at cheaica l  p lan ts  of Bhopal, Ind ia ,  
and Basel,  Switzerland, t h e  exposion of t h e  'tChallengerff space- 
c r a f t  i n  t h e  USA, seve ra l  l a r g e  railway accidents  at  Arzamas and 
Sverdlovsk, Kamenskaya s t a t i o n  and Bologoye in t h e  Soviet  Union, 
t h e  l o s s  of sov ie t  passenger sea-faring sh ips  "Admiral IJ&Aimovw 
=d wLermontovft t h e t  l e d  t o  rni313~ hum= deaths. 
The ebove -6 other  ecc iden t s  t he t  took plece in var ious  loca-  
t i o n s  on t h e  globe and r e s u l t e d  from d i f f e ren t  ceuses have one 
t h i n g  in common. They prove t h e  point  t h a t  t h e  s e t u r a t i o n  of pro- 
duct ion and serv ices  s e c t o r s  with modern technologies without com- 
plementary adequate measures t o  ensure i ts  s a f e  funct ioning  m d  
maintenance leads  t o  a sharp r i s e  of the  "price t a g w  f o r  a t echni -  
c a l  f a i l u r e  o r  e human e r r o r .  But even the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of t h e  
b e s t  equipment r:itli m ~ l t i p l e  redundencl- end o the r  eaf e t y  devices 
does no t  gummtee a 100 percent  r e l i a b i l i t y  of i ts  performance. 
There is t h e  evidence t h a t  even w i t h  growing r e l i e b i l i t y  of 
tec'nnologicel systems t h e  r e a l  number of accidents  keeps r i s i n g .  
The acc idents  at IPPs can s e r v e  as a c h r a c t e r i s t i c  example. 
During th ree  last decades i n  t h e  U53R t h e r e  were r e g i s t e r e 6  
r e l a t i v e l y  i m i g n i f i c a n t  i nc iden t s  a t  NPPs wich d id  not  l ead  t o  
any ser ious  consequences. The Chernobyl acc ident  due t o  i t s  para- 
mount economic and eco log ica l  negative impacts became a na t ional  
dis ,aster .  Melting of t h e  r eac to r ,  t h e  fol lowing crash  ( b l a s t )  and 
r ad ia t ion  out lay  were accompanied by t h e  n e a r l y  immidiate deeth of 
30 persons, h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n  of over 200 and evacuat ion of 115 tho* 
sand of people from t h e  nearby region. The t o t a l  d i r e c t  mater ial  
damage has been est imated t o  be over 8 b i l l i o n  of roubles  o r  
O,7 percent of GNP. 
In recent  years  ra i lway acc idents  has become not  s o  a m r e  evmt 
Despite t h e  decrease i n  r e a l  number of s e r i o u s  acc idents  and vic- 
tims per  t r a s p o r t a t i o n  unit ( o r  mileage) as wel l  as mater ia l  t o s t s  
and losses  i n  t h e  same terms, t h e  r i s k  of various types of techno- 
l o g i c a l  acc idents  and damages r e l a t e d  t o  ca r ry ing  of hazardous ma- 
t e r i a l s  -toxic,  explosives,  etc., increases.  A s  t h e  d i r e c t  r e s u l t  
of only two rei lway acc iden t s  occured while t r anspor t ing  explosi- 
ves et Arzamas and Sverdlovsk s t a t i o n s  i n  1988 near ly  100 persons 
perished andtibout 300 were hospi ta l ized  (some of them were badly 
in jured) .  Material  l o s s e s  of s o l e l y  Arzamas accident  exceeded 100 
mi l l ion  roubles. Even more grave lo s ses  were euf fered  as a r e s u l t  
of l a r g e  railway acc iden t s  took place at Kamenskaya (1987) and Bo- 
logoye (1988) s t a t i o n s  r e s u l t e d  in more than  130 deaths,  not  ta-  
king i n t o  account t h  wounded persons. Severa l  hundreds persons 
parished as a r e s u l t  of shipwreck of "Admiral Nalrhimov" l i n e r .  
The damages cont r ibuted  by l a r g e  acc idents  a r e  no t  l imi t ed  
by dead bodies and heavy ma te r i a l  losses .  Substant ive eocio-ecolo- 
g i c a l  impacts a r e  a l s o  of g r e a t  importance, i n  p a r t i c u l a r  those 
produced by chemical and nuclear  power i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  &:.an e f f e c t  
of Chernobyl lW acc ident  a l a r g e  t e r r i t o r y  embracing 11 regions 
(ob la s t s )  of t h e  Sovie t  Union where now 17 m i l l i o n  people l i v e ,  
inc luding  2.5 m i l l i o n  ch i ldren  up t o  f i v e  yea r s  o ld ,  has been ra-  
d ioac t ive ly  po l lu t ed  t o  eome o r  o ther  degree. According t o  some es- 
t imates ,  a t e r r i t o r y  with the  radius of more than  2000 km c o v e r i r ~  
fiecrly 20 coun t r i e s  hes  been af fec ted  by rad ionucl ides .  
P o t e n t i a l  carcinogenic cosequences of t h e  accident  being dis-  
cussed. a r i s e  p a r t i c u l e r  concern because cancer  mechaniem has not  
been adequately researched. According t o  academician L. A. I l y i n ,  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  pose ib l e  growth of cancer ca ses  among t h e  population 
of t h e  USSR, i n  p a r t i c u l a r  of i ts  european p a r t ,  induced by Cherno- 
by1 accident  may reach  only hundredths of percent  r e l a t e d  t o  ave- 
rage f i g u r e  of cancer  occurance i n  t h e  next  50 years .  S imi la r  d a t a  
have been c i t e d  by professor  R. Geil from C a l i f o r n i a  univers i ty .  
According t o  h i s  ca l cu le t ions ,  next 50 years  would b r ing  15  thou- 
sand deaths (or 0,0255 of a l l  cancer-related dea ths )  adh i t i ona l ly  
due t o  Chernobyl accident .  He be l ieves  a l s o  t h a t  a number of nega- 
t i v e  t e r a togen ic  as wel l  a s  mutagenic e f f e c t s  f o r  t h e  same period 
would be l e s s  t han  700 end 1900 ceses  r e spec t ive ly .  These f i g u r e s  
c o r r e l a t e  we l l  wi th  L.A. I l y i n  ca l cu la t ions  supposing t h e t  t h e  pro- 
b e b i l i t y  of mutagenic e f f e c t s  c o s t i t u t e s  only one t h i r d  of po ten t i -  
al cancer cases.  
In genera l  contex t  of carcinogenic, mutagenic and te ra togenic  
repercussions of contemporary socio-economic development t h e  c i t e d  
d e t a  concerning l o s s e s  r e l e t e d  t o  Chernobyl acc ident  (cozisidered 
by f o r s a s t s '  au tho r s  as maxima). are,  no dout,  f a r  from being consi- 
derable.  Nevertheless,  following humanitarien background i t  should 
not  be f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  even a s i n g l e  case  of human dea th  i s  a t rage-  
dy not  eaying about 15  thousand caeee. It should be a l s o  ~ o t e d  
t h a t  Chernobyl acc iden t  caused psycological  impacts, i n  p a r t i c u l e r  
an i nc rease  of radiophobia. Theee f a c t s  were e t r e s sed  at ec ien t i -  
f i c  conference "Medical a spec t s  of *he Chernobyl acc ident"  took 
place in Kiev l a s t  year  and a t  IAEA and INPC congress (Sidney, 1453 
2: Risk and emergency management 
Variuos grave mnsequences of la rge-sca le  accidents  f o r  t h e  pz-. 
pu la t ion  end economy promote t h e  neoess i ty  of working out  and r e  
pid  r e a l i z a t i o n  of c l u s t e r  of measures aimed a t  mi t iga t ion  of tes:.-- 
no logica l  hazerds, prepara t ion ,  r e a c t i o n  end l i q u i d a t i o n  of t h e i r  
repercussions.  T h i s  kind of measures can be condi t ionel ly  divided 
i n t o  two  groups: preventive end opera t ionel .  
One of them, preventive ac t ions ,  have been developed e n d  intzc- 
duced i n t o  p r a c t i c e  pr imar i ly  by min i s t e i e s  and departments of t f e  
s e  i n d u s t r i e s  which posess technologica l  systems present ing  potez- 
tial r i s k  f o r  humans and enq.rironment (ITPPs, chemicel p l a t s ,  !.Ti_.: 
terminals ,  gas-oil  p ipe l ines ,  dams, e t c .  ) . These ac t ions  a r e  e l s o  
performed by c i v i l  defenee u?Ats, l o c ~ l  s ~ t h o r i t i e e  es wel l  ES t p  
r e l e v ~ q t  departmexte of t r a d e  uaions. 
Tie decrease of s a f e t y  of t h e  objec t ive8  discussed menifests  
t h e  drawbacks and e r r o r s  i n  management process and r equ i re s  i t s  
reorgenieat ion.  These i s s u e s  a r e  going t o  be  ane l i sed  i n  t h e f o l -  
lowing s s c t i o n s  of t h i s  peper end IPPs and railways w i l l  se rve  ES 
cmes .  
A f t e r  Cnernobyl accident  s o v i e t  g o v e m e n t  pro~~ioted s e v e r e l  
regula t ions  o r i en ted  towards l i q u i d a t i o n  of a l l  neget ive cor+seo;re, 
ces as me11 as t o  reform in t h i s  sphere  of energr  production t o  
make it l e s s  r i sky .  In 1986 t h e  new Department of nuclear  power 2 
dus t ry  w e s  es t ab l i shed  and accepted f u l l  r e sponc ib i l i t y  f o r  perfs- 
ming technologice l  p o l i c ~  i n  t h e  industry,  including s e t t i n g  up 
NPPs and t h E i r  deployment over na t iona l  t e r r i t o r y .  E a r l i e r  these  
funct ions  were performed by t h e  Energy depertment of t h e  USSR. The 
new i n i t i a t i v e  display once more t h e  s p e c i f i c  r o l e  nuc lea r  power 
p leys  in f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  needs of sov ie t  economy i n  energy supply. 
A s  t o  t h e  fo rmda t ion  of technologicel  pol icy i n  nuclear  power in-  
dus t ry  this i s s u e  remein t h e  prerogat ive  of t h e  USSR S t e t e  comiit- 
t e e  f o r  nucleer  power as well  as supervision over XPPs eecure  ex- 
p l o i t a t i o n  is  i n  t h e  hands of S t e t e  nucleer  power p l a n t s  con t ro l  
s e r v i c e  (Gosatomenergonadzor) organized from t h e  S t a t e  energy con- 
t r o l  s e r v i c e  (Gosenergonadzor). 
The nevr orgenizetionKL s t r u c t u r e  promote6 a number of immidi- 
e t e  meesures which ccn be subdevidec? i n t o  two m i n  c l u s t e r s .  One 
of then  is eimec t o  cus l~ ion  r e p e r c x s s i o ? ~  ~ 1 1 5  me-intein f u l l  cor t -  
r o l  OT-cr the  elt:y.ztion r e s c l t e d  f r o z  Cherr_ok::l eccident  till t b e  
moment when ell r e h a b i l i t e t i o n  measures i n  t h e  suf fered  reg ion  
would be  f inished.  Y!e reckon i t  may take  p lenty  of time. To reach  
t h e  poin t  t h e  Department of nucleer  power indus t ry  e s t eb l i shed  
s p e c i a l  production complex '?[ombinat" t o  coordinate a c t i v i t i e s  r e -  
l e t e d  t o  .deac t iva t ion  and procurement works at t h i s  place.  A s  t o  
quan t i t a t ive  cheract e r i s t i c s  bf t hese  works by t h e  mid-1 988 21 
2 
m i l l i o n  m of machines and apparatus sur face  was desac t iva ted ,  
3 500 thousand m of r ad ioac t ive  s o i l  was burned, more t h a n  1 m i l -  
3 l i o n  m of s o i l  w a s  used f o r  dams erec t ion  p ro tec t ing  r i v e r s  
Dniepr and Pripyat.  More than  600 v i l l a g e s  mere dezact ivated end 
t h i s  procedure is p r a c t i c a l l y  completed in poss ib le  e c e l e  i n  t h e  
t o m  of Pripyet  which is being prepared aow f o r  concervation. 
Clearing Chernobyl is t a s k  performed nonedeys although t h e  most 
"d i r tyw d i s t r i c t s  of t h e  c i t y  have been elready dezact ivated.  Ra- 
d ioac t ive  debris  t oge the r  with s o i l  have been co l l ec t ed  and s tored .  
Measures t o h a t e  r ad ioac t ive  dust  a r e  taken in the  zone which 
would remain uninhabi tab le  f o r  many years. 
System of thorough r ad ioac t ive  con t ro l  of sur face  an8 under- 
ground waters and wells  loca ted  in s ide  3 0 - h  zone and adjaceat  
a reas  is  developed and introduced i n t o  p rac t i ce .  The whole t e ~ r i -  
t o r y  of t h e  zone and v i c i n i t i e s  a8 well as food products a t  t he  
markets m e  subjected t o  systematic  r ad ioac t ive  monitoring. 
Another c l u s t e r  of measures elaborated and r ea l i eed  by re le -  
vent orgenizat ions a t  t h e  head of sovie t  nuc lea r  power indus t ry  
i s  or iented  towerds r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of R & D end technological  pol i -  
c i e s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  The process goes on s e v e r a l  d i r ec t ions  r e f l ec -  
t i n g  the  d e s i r e  t i  introduce systems epproach t o  secure  menagement 
of NPPs. 
Rethinking of t h e  previouas=hemes of IPP personnel t r a i n k g  
is  among p ivo ta l  s t e p s  being taken now. Involving addi t ional  knov:- 
leage  b a s i s  in t h e  t r a i n i n g  process and more s t r i c t  re-exeminetioz 
of personnel c e p a b i l i t i e s  c a ~  serve  es e good example of these  
meesures. It i s  espec ia l ly  important i n  t h e  view t h e t  melfw-ctio- 
ning of Chernobyl lJPP operators  serve  as a t r i g g e r  of e b l a s t .  By 
t h e  way, it i s  t y p i c e l  no t  only f o r  t h i e  p e r t i c u l a r  accident  o r  
our country alone. According t o  some est imates ,  45% of NPP ecci- 
dents ,  60% of a i r c re shee  ae wel l  es 80% of acc idents  at  s e e  eze 
t h e  r e s u l t  of human e r ro r s ,  mainly msde by opera tors  though theg 
e r e  not  t h e  unique persons t o  be blamed. 
More r i g i d  monitoring a ~ d  cont ro l  of NPP funct ioning  i s  E-o- 
t h e r  meesure taken as a pol icy  responee t o  Chernob;)rl accident .  9e- 
cent comprehensive ana lys i s  of NPP a t  Rovno performed by IAEA ex- 
p e s t s  cen serve  as e n  i l l u e t r a t i o n  of t hese  a c t i v i t i e s .  Af t e r  
Chernobyl acc ident  a l l  experiments not included i n  t h e  pro tocol  
of t e s t s  have been forbidden. Ae f a r  as ~ c h e d u l e d  r eac to r s  t e s t s  
dealing with power changing o r  f i s s i o n  te rminat ion  a re  concerned 
now it  should be performed only i n  t h e  presence of chief engineer 
of t h e  p l an t  and inspec to r  from USSR Gosatomenergonadzor, who 
should s t and  d i r e c t l y  near  TPP cont ro l  panel.  Additional s ta t iona-  
ry rods have been erec ted  i n  all funct ioning  r eac to r s  i n  order  t o  
prevent poss ib le  cha in  of e r ro r s  similar t o  those made by Cherno- 
by1 NPP operators .  
m e  more d i r e c t i o n  of changes i n  R & D and technological  pol i-  
cy i n  nuclear  power indus t ry  concerns r e a c t o r s  design i n  part icu-  
lar  t h e i r  r e l i a b i l i t y  as well as  con t ro l  systems. A s  it  i s  knom, 
drawbacks of RBMK-1000 along with those in pro tec t ion  systems con- 
t r i b u t e d  t o  Chernobyl l a r g e  accident.  Therefore decisions were 
made concerning t h e  perspect ives of RS1.E-1000 explo i ta t ion .  I n  Ju- 
l y  1986 t h e  sov ie t  governnentadopted a s p e c i a l  regule t ion  prescr i -  
bing development of high-rel ietde,  autometed con t ro l  systems desi-  
gnated f o r  NPP technological  processes manipulation. It serves  as 
an impulse t o  dart t h e  work which have r e c e n t l y  r e su l t ed  ir, i., xcre- 
ase  of speed f o  p ro tec t ion  system performance es well es automatei 
regime c o n t r o l  of RBKK. These systems a r e  mul t ip ly  redundant. 3e- 
f o r e  t h e  accident  i t  took 18 seconds t o  put  con t ro l  rods i n t o  t h e  
ec t ive  zone of r eac to r ,  now it  t akes  12  seconds and t h e  system 
permit t ing t o  l a y  down this f igu re  t o  2 seconds is being tes ted .  
In a f em gea r s  coming these  pro tec t ion  systems w i l l  be i n s t a l l e d  
on ell hi?s served by  RBMK-type reac tors .  
Nevertheless,  t ak ing  i n t o  eccount b e t t e r  technological ,  econo- 
mic cnd s a f e t y  c h a r e c t e r i s t i c s  of LTRs USSR S t a t e  committee f o r  
nuclesr  power and Department of nac lea r  power industr; heve cone 
t o  a bec i s io3  t o  bese fu tu re  development of t h i s  brench of inenst-  
r y  on t h e t  pe r fec t  type  of -reactors  an6 n o t  t o  consrtuct  more 
RB1,TIC- type  p l an t s .  Besides,  exper t  systems a r e  planned t o  be in-  
troduced i n  NPP con t ro l  and p r o t e c t i o n  schemes. 
Among pol icy  responses t o  l a r g e  accident  at Chernobyl new 
t h e o r e t i c a l  and p r a c t i c a l  approaches concerning deployment of 
NPPs besed on t h e  premisis  of ' s a f  e t x  dietance between them and 
l a r g e  human se t t l emen t s ,  low se i smi ty  zones, e tc .  ehould be  s t r e s -  
sed es a p i v o t a l  s t e p  promoting l e s s  r i s k y  fu tu re .  These approe- 
ches t o  ' i d e n t i f y  appropr ia te  p l aces  f o r  new ?PPs c o s t ~ c t i o : i  di-  
minisking t k e  r i s k  09 popu le t io r  e-xposure t o  p o t e z t i s l  r eC io lo j i -  
c e l  t h r e e t s  e r e  r e e l i s e d  by two methods. One of them presumes clo- 
s i n g  of lPPs under cons t ruc t ion  i n  case  t h e i r  s a f e t y  c r i t e r i a  a r e  
inadequate. This has been done i n  s p i t e  of r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  inves-• 
tments a l ready  made. Ceasing of NPP e rec t ion  i n  Yzasnodar and 
t h i r d  power block of Ignal inskaya IPP i n  Li thuanie which heve 81- 
ready absorbed 14  mil l ion  and 260 mi l l i on  roubles  respect ive1y;of  
nuc lee r  hee t  p l an t  being cos t ruc t ed  only 37 km from B y e l o r u ~ s i ~  
c e p i t a l  Minsk cen serve  a s  v iv id  exemples of t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  me- 
thod. Another kind of methods suppose t o  r e v i s e  t he  scheme of fu- 
t u r e  PEPS' deployment in accordance with s a f e t y  c r i t e r i a .  
Es t ab l i sh ing  of vas t  and comprehensive medicel con t ro l  of t h e  
populat ion l i v i n g  in t h e  e f f e c t e d  zone along with research  of 
psycological  consequences of l a r g e  acc idents  s imi l a r  t o  t h a t  of 
Chernobyl a r e  one of t h e  pol icy responses which cen ha rd ly  be 
overestimated. Besides cont inuing of medical observetion of t h e  
a f f e c t e d  persons a number of new R & D and cu re t ive  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
have been organized in Ukraine and Byelorussia.  In  t h e  l a t t e r  a 
bank of biomedical de t a  r e l a t h g  t o  155 000 persoas w a s  s e t  up, 
r ad io log ica l  l o a e  on l o c a l  popule t ion  ha re  been sti ldied and t h e i r  
h e e l t h  f o r c a s t  hes  been performed. Analysis covering Yogilev and 
Come1 a reas  of Byelorussia  as wel l  as Ydev a rea  of Ukraine and 
Bryansk area  of Russia diecovere r a t h e r  s t rong c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
cancer increaee r a t e s  i n  t h e s e  regions, e.g. f o r  t h e  former cese 
from 239 pe r  lo5 i nhab i t an t s  i n  1965 t o  267.8 i n  1987, a n d  average 
ne t iona l  (all-union) f igu res .  This supports an important i d e e  
t h a t  f o r  t he  ea r ly  p o s t c r i s i s  phase more o r  l e s s  pronounced t rend  
of increas ing  cercinogenic cases  i s  not typ ica l ,  though such a 
conclusion i n  respect  t o  d i s t a n t  repercussions should be concide- 
r ed  as lacking ground. 
The last but not t h e  l e a s t  a r e e  of pol icy responses t o  Cherno- 
by1 accident  menifests i t s e l f  i n  t he  increasing r o l e  of public ,  
p a r t i c i p s t i n g  in discuss ion  of IJPPs development and deployment i s -  
sues. This t rend  i s  considerably coherent with improvement i n  the  
f i e l d  of r i s k  communication, supply more de ta i leZ deta on Cheno- 
by1 accident  m d  i ts  consequences as well as current  r ad io log ica l  
s i t u a t i o n  inc ide  30-km zone t o  l e y  people though we cm- not  seg 
t h a t  this information is  exhaustive. Along with t h i s  l i n e  goes the  
t rend  of growing a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  public  opinion from t h e  s i d e  of 
republicen and f ede ra l  governments. Refusel t o  continue constr-JC- 
t i o n  of NPPs i n  B:relorussia end Lithua a s  well  es Ukraine, menti- 
oned e e r l i e r ,  serve as a good example of this trend. It can be el- 
s o  added t h a t  shortcomings i n  IPPs deployment were beevi ly  c r i t i -  
s i z e d  by t h e  ~ u b l i c  r ep resen te t ives  at X I X  A1l-Union P a r t y  cocfe- 
rence last summer. The c e n t r a l  government decis ions denouncing e 
number of water-economy r e l a t e d  as well as mineral resources deve- 
lopment p ro jec t s  should a l s o  be  included i n  t h e  a a s e t s  of incree- 
s i n g  publ ic  a c t i v i t i e s .  Tie cons ider  all these  f a c t s  a r e  t h e  r e s u l t  
of augmenting power of g laStn0s t  and democratisation p o l i c y  i n  the  
Soviet  Union. 
Hard consequences of l a r g e  railway acc iden t s  mentioned i n  t h e  
f i r s t  s e c t i o n  of t h e  paper r e f l e c t  s e r ious  drawbacks i n  r i s k  =d 
emergency manegement performed i n  t h i s  f i e l d  of economy. The ecci- 
dents  taken p lace  in 1987-1988 witness t h a t  measures undertaken 
previuosly lacked systems approach and d id  not  touch t h e  orgazliza- 
t i o n  scheme of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a s  a whole. 
Recently, i n  October last year,  t h e  Sa fe ty  t r anspor t a t ion  bo- 
e rd  was formed. It i s  concidered as an independent s t r u c t u r a l  con- 
t r o l  d iv i s ion  of t h e  USSR Railway department respons ib le  f o r  rea- 
l i s i n g  measures d i r e c t e d  t o  accidents9 r i s k  minimizatioo, anelg- 
s i n g  of s a f e t y  c o n t r o l  s i t u a t i o n  as well as developing mein r ~ t e s  
adminis t ra t ive  and t echn ica l  ac t ions  j u s t  t o  e l iminate  t h e  ca-~ses 
of accidents .  These and o ther  s t e p s  should be  perf  ormed throtlg3 
checking up t r a i n s ,  rails, etc., audi t ing  of s a f e t y  con t ro l  work 
i n  " l inea rn  a d  o t h e r  subdivis ions of Railway department, supen-i- 
s i o n  over the  d i f f u s i o n  of technologicel  innovat ions and s o  o-,. 
Administration over  personnel t r a i n i n g  and upgrading aloag 
with coordonation of voluntary s a f e t y  con t ro l  a c t i v i t i e s  done by 
tlpublictt  i n spec to r s  a r e  concidered by o f f i c i a l s  of t h e  Rei1cre:- de- 
partment as one of t h e  main r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of t h e  new board. In- 
ves t ige t ion  of t h e  1987-1988 l a rge  accidents  d i sc losed  t h a t  the  er. 
r o r r s  made by t r e i n  d r ive r s ,  rails inspertors, s t e t i o n  dut.y person- 
n e l  s e rve  as a n  immidiate, d i r e c t  reason of t h e  crashes. 
Organizational shifts i n  t h e  USSR Railweg depertment i t s e l f  
or ien ted  torrards more s a f e  c ~ r r i h g  of bulk and passengers e r e  not 
t h e  only measares t aken  t o  lower technological  r i s k  l inked  ir. par- 
t i c u l a r  with hazardous loads  moved by railways. Other noteble ch=- 
w e s  e r e  as follows: 
1) introducing of t h e  new preparet ion order  (scheme3 of transpor- 
t e t i o n  hazardous loads.  In par t i cu la r ,  cur rent  standards of protimc. 
t i o n  and carry ing  of explosives do not  prescr ibe  moisturing as v~el: 
as f legmat iza t ion  of this kind of load i n  advance i n  order  not  t o  
r eec t  t o  shocks end burning. Now e decis ion  concerning in t roduct i -  
on of more s t r i c t  and s a f e  federz l  s tendards is  under way. 
2) designing s p e c i a l  kinds (types) of traim. Afte r  l a r g e  accidezt  
took place i n  1-rzamas the  USSR Railweg bepertment together  with 
o the r  organizat ions developed a s e t  of more d r a s t i c  requirements 
t o  v=s car ry ing  hazerdous loads, including use of autometic devi- 
ces cushioning s t rong  shocks caused by vans transmissions es well 
a s  e,%*orcenent of t 3 e i r  s:~lelC-iz;r, e t  c. 
3)  planning s p e c i a l  r u t e s  f o r  carrying hazardous loads i n  order  tc :  
pass away from l a r g e  c i t i e s ,  reilmey complexes l i k e  Sverdlovsk, 
t h e  l c r g e s t  bull: loading s t ~ t i o n  i n  >rope. This nork is heir--g 
done now by a s u b s t m t i e l  teen  02 s p e c i a l i s t s  from the  ESSR R e i l -  
wsy depertment and re lev=t  i n s t i t u t '  i0116 
knother s e t  of pol icy  responses, bes ides  preventive ones, ori- 
ented towerds diminishing of possible s c a l e s  of lo s ses  is connec- 
t e b  with ac t ions  taken during eccidents  p e r  s e  as well  as at  t h e  
preparet ion s t a g e  . To perf i r m  this job r egu la r ly  emergency conis- 
s ions  have been recen t ly  organized. They funct ion  ~t republic- 
PZC r e g i o n d  (oblas ts ,  t r e g e )  covxcil of mirtisters ES  ell es s~-;:- 
e t  executive cornnittees et l o c a l  level .  I n  cese of energe-rlc;.: the;- 
gi\-e e s a i s t m c e  t o  t Z l ~ s e  e-cffe~ef., or.t t~r.ize evacuation a d  rescuE 
o?eretions, n u t r i t i o n ,  ~ e c r e a t i o n  of refugees,  etc .  Besides, the;- 
pey compensations f o r  b u r i a l  of victims, perform losses  assesments 
end s o  fo r th .  They a r e  a l s o  responsible f o r  supervision end coor- 
d ina t ion  of ac t ions  s c r n i n g  people from technological  and n a t u r d  
hazards i n  a s p e c i f i c  region of t h e  country. One of t hese  emergex- 
cy commissions funct ioning i n  t h e  reg ion  of Arzamas organized t h e  
work of 6 thousans persons envolved in l i q u i d a t i o n  of consequences 
of t h e  l a r g e  accident  occured t h e r e  i n  autumn 1988. Thenks t o  i t s  
a c t i v i t i e s  t h e  c i t y  of Arzemas (Gorky region)  return-ec:. t o  ik e-;E- 
ryday l i f e  soonest. . . 
4. Pol i cy  responses: some problems of implementing 
...................................... 
A combination of ac t ions  aimed f o r  mi t iga t ing  technologice l  
r i s k  and prevention of emergencies, more rap id  m d  e f f e c t i v e  1iq.i- 
dat ion  of l a r g e  e c c i d e ~ t s  consequences a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by cases 05 
nuc lee r  energy incus t ry  and, t o  l e s s  ex tent ,  of car ry ing  hazerdouu 
loads  by r a i l w ~ y s  discussed e a r l i e r ,  d i sp lay  an i n t e n t i o n  t o  i n t ~ a  
6uce new management z ~ p r o e c h e s  t o  promote s a f e  end sound econorfc 
development. These epproaches a r e  d i s t i n w  shed by more deep 
comprehensive understending of t h e  problem as a whole: beginning 
from a c c i d e n t s l c ~ u s e s  an6 te rminat ing  w i t h  t h e i r  consequences. 
Xolrever t o  oar  nind!' po l i cy  resposee taken es a r e a c t i o n  on 
l e r g e  acc iden t s  occureC r e c e n t l y  i n  indus t ry  and t r anspor t  shoulC 
not  be concidered  full^ edequate t o  requirements produced by szs- 
t e r n  epproech t o  t e ~ ~ o l o g i c a l  r i s k  magemen t .  
Teking XPPe es en example government o f f i c i e l s  i n  B y e l o r d s s l ~  
an2 -X~r&ine xpress t h e i r  uncnimous opinion t h a t  a h o l i s t i c  s t e t e  
program f o r  l i q u i d a t i o n  of Chernobyl accident  collsequenccs shouic. 
be e lebors ted .  T h i s  program ehould t e k e  i n t o  account both dezac t i -  
va t ion  a c t i v i t i e s  end promotion of socio-economic gront5  of t 3 e  
a reas .d j=e icc~ to  30-km zone which su f fe red  b a d l ~ .  from t h e  acc idez t  
Besides,  f i xed  da t e s  t o  perform t h e  job as wel l . -  execut ion per- 
sonnel,  a l l oca t ions '  volumes should a l s o  be designated i n  t h e  p-o- 
gram. Unfortunately,  t h e r e  i s  no sac11 e progrem up t o  now and ef- 
f arts underteken by '?:ombinat" i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  being a . ? a l i s e i  e r e  
obviously inadequete and not  alviays e f f ec t ive .  
There should not be missed as well  t h e t  suspending of 1-FP erec-4 
t i o n  i n  Krasnodar and t o  cont inue works a t  Ignal inskaye IE" ( t h i r d  
block)  along with o the r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  l e a 6  t o  lowering o v e r a l l  ce- 
p a c i t y  of power p l an t s  by 28 mi l l i on  Fa';t. As w a s  s t e t e d  by minis- 
t e r  of nuc lear  power indus t ry  li.F.Lukonin a t  press-co&afe?ence he ld  
on 23 Decenber 1989, t M s  l o s s  czn be conpenseted only by construc- 
ti= h e a t  power plants .  T ie  lest es well  kno\*m e r e  eco log ice l ly  
l e s s  so:zd,  i n  r ~ . d i o l o z i c ~ - 1  r e spec t  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  Zxtensive t ; ~ e  
of economic growth h e - ~ e  y e t  b e i n s  followed nowadays o r l e n t s  to- 
wards inc rease  or" power consumption and does no t  permit so lv ing  
energy su@y problem et fi1 scope. Thus e s h i f t  t o  energy coserve- 
t ior-  s t r ~ t e g y  is  of g ree t  importance not od:- f r o n  energy supply 
po in t  of view but  i n  r r s k  aspec t  a s  n e l l .  
A s  f e r  as r z i l n e j  t r m s p o r t  i s  concerned i t  a l s o  l a c k s  e c t i o n  
program f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  boerd mentioned e a r l i e r .  In p e r t  it can be 
explcined by a s h o r t  time of t h e  board's functiondng. But from t h e  
o t y e r  s i d e  s e t t i n g  up t h i s  r e l a t i v e l y  independent erg-izctioz 1;: 
t h e  USSR Reilwa;~ deptxrtment ofly ha l f  a yeer  ago tea not  be  c o m i -  
dered t imely beccuse t h e  neei: f o r  it  w e s  urgent  manjr yea r s  ago. 
To ou r  mind not  s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  has been pe id  t o  ergono- 
d c  e spec t s  of sefetg.  Horever, E.S i l l u s t r s t e d  b2- ceses  of Cherno- 
by1 end r e i l w ~ : ~ s '  l e r g e  ecc idents  e bulk of opera tors  e r r o r s  a r e  
connected with shortcomings &=I-mechine i n t e r f e c e  i n c l u C L x  
ignorence o r  not  adequate a t t e n t i o n  pe id  t o  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  of humm 
psycology and physiology i n  the  process of devepolment and deploy- 
ment of devices. According t o  vice-president of t he  USSR A c d l e ~ ~  
of sciences K.V.Frolov, onlu 0% of s i v i e t  technology correspon5s 
t o  codern requirements on s a f e t y  IZC? ergonomics. I?o l e s s  a c t s s l  
m e  t h e  problems dee l ing  with cont ro l  and measuring devices neebed 
badly f o r  eerby screening  and esessment of t e ~ ~ o l o g : : ,  t ec lmo2c~i-  
C E ~  p-ocesees mci:::~ement, etc. ,  ES c e l l  RS t hose  concerning mofern 
equipment f o r  c i v i l  defence u n i t s  which should support a c t i v i t i e s  
performed by l o c a l  emergency commissions. 
The l a s t  but  not  t h e  l e a s t  i s  the  i s s u e  connected with de;-elop- 
ment and r e l i e b i l i t y  of communications systems' funct ioning  r;kich 
provide mutichannel and t imely informetion flows t o  d i f f e r e n t  
u se r s  including public .  Nowadays information systems at t h e  bispo- 
s a l  of rele-lent s e r v i c e s  do not s a t i s f y  t h e  requirements f o r  non- 
s top  working andenvelopment of a l l  l e v e l s  of mhnagement as well as 
public.  
The problem of r i s k  communication i s  a l s o  of g rea t  value, es- 
p e c i e l l y  i n  terms of co r rec t  i n t e r p r e t e t i o n  of ave i l ab le  date. For .  
Prmple ,  not  s o  r a r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  mepuns and channels of comnnu5ce- 
t i o n  provide c a t r a t i c i o n a r y  informetion causing tens ion  both enow 
menegers and communities r:hich could b e  observed i n  p a r t i c ~ l ~  
during p o s t c r i s i s  phase of Sverdlovsk l e r g e  rai lway accident.  
Systems approach t o  management of soph i s t i ca t ed  technological  
u n i t s  eomevihat r i s k y  t o  human hea l th  suppose organizat ion of con- 
t r o l  covering t h e  vrhole l i fe -cycle  of t h e s e  units: s t a r t i n g  from 
u n i t s  pro2ects des ign  till terminat ion of t h e i r  functioning. This 
kind of approech f a c i l i t a t e s  overcoming t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  me~tionec' 
above though of course does not  el iminate them completely. Techno- 
l o g i c a l  and environmentel impect asessments of t h e  p r o j e c t s  per- 
formed by independent (from t h e  m i n i s t r i e s  o r  depertments) e x p e r t s  
along with e a r l y  d iscuss ion  by concerned pub l i c  would make t h e  de- 
cision-m&bg process  ea s i e r .  Bel ieve t h a t  i n t e r n e t i o n e l  exper ieme 
inc luding  t h e t  accumulated i n  IIASA w i l l  be paramount in t he  pro- 
cess  of our gterestroika i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  sphere of management. 
Therefore t h e  usage of t h i s  experience cen be concidered as an i m -  
por t an t  po l icy  response on l a r g e  acc idents  or ien ted  towards lower- 
i n g  of technological  r i s k  i n  t h e  fu tu re .  
Conclusion 
---------- 
The experience gained in t h e  Soviet  Union and abroad shows 
t h a t  t h e  a n d y s i s  of t he  major acc idents  took place r e c e n t l y  =d 
t h e  p r a c t i c e  of l i q u i d a t i o n  of t h e i r  consequences have considereb- 
l y  s t imule ted  t h e  development of t h e o r e t i c a l  and applied. research  
f o r  r i s k  management and design t h e  s a f e t y  meesures f o r  t ecb ica l  
(engineering) i n s t e l l a t i o n e  as wel l  as more e f f e c t i v e  p r a c t i c a l  
s t e p s  pr imar i ly  organiza t iona l  ones in t h i s  f i e l d .  Concrete econo- 
mic and managerial aspec ts  at  t h e  s t e t e - l eve l  have been a l reedy  
cosidered i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  s ec t ions  of this paper. It should be  ed- 
ded h e r e  thst in t h e  USSR k c a d e r j  of S c i e ~ c e s  e S c i e n t i f i c  council  
f o r  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  and aeessment and s a f e t y  con t ro l  has  been crea- 
tee .  Its a c t i v i t y  t akes  p lace  wi th in  S p t e m s  ane lgs i s  committee. 
I k s s  deployment of p o t e n t i a l l y  hazerdous techniques i?l t h e  indus 
t r i e s  and t h e  r i s e  of antropogenic overloading on t h e  ecosystems 
l eed  t o  s p e c i f i c  m i r r e g u l e r i t i e s w  in t h e  process  of socio-economic 
development. A t  t h e  l o c a l  o r  sometimes at  t h e  regional  l e v e l s  
they  a r e  c rea ted  by technological  and engineering hezerds, et t h e  
g loba l  l e v e l  this can r e s u l t  i n  i&everee  changes i n  t h e  biosphere 
dea l ing  with poss ib l e  e f f ec t s  of g loba l  warming of t h e  cl imete,  
deple t ion  of ozone l aye r ,  e tc .  To manage socio-economic a c t i v i t i e r  
succesfu l ly  i t  becomes imperat ive t o  g e t  more knowledge about c0nt.i 
t i o n s  of the  funct ioning of technological ,  man-machine and ecologi- 
c a l  s y s t e m ,  t h e i r  b i fu rca t ion  po in t s  and s o  fo r th .  Taking t h i s  new 
knowledge i n t o  conciderat ion t o  formulate t h e  trade-offs i n  the  
development process we can approach t o  more balanced type of hum= 
socie ty .  
Believe t h a t  i n  the  r i s k  menagement f i e l d  the  following impor- 
tant p o s i t i v e  tendencies should be mentioned: 
- t h e  improvement of t h e  r i s k  ena lys i s  end asessment methodology 
espec ia l ly  r e l a t i n g  t o  hazard-prone i n d u s t r i e s ;  
- t h e  development of technologies with i n t r i n s i c  s a f e t y  capac i t i e s ,  
t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  exclude o r  mi t ige te  c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n s  preventing 
s e l f  -des t ruc t ive  processes ( i t  should r e t h e r  be considered a s  
e temporary so lu t ion  a s  f a r  a s  optimal schemes of hezard indus t r i e s  
deployment a r e  concerned) ; 
- optimizat ion og e Cecision-maktag process under conditions of un- 
c e r t e i n t y  and i n s u f f i c i e n t  information; 
- education of the  population from t h e  poin t  of view of r i s k  per- 
cept ion;  
- crea t ing  t h e  systems of con t ro l  and monitoring f o r  screening 
dynamics of technological  and ecologica l  systems t o  a s c e r t e i n  the  
limits of t h e i  sus te inable  funct ioning;  
- asessment of r i s k  f e c t o r s  and poss ib le  s o c i a l   nets; 
- d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  economy s t r u c t u r e ,  deconcentration and 
lowering t h e  l e v e l  of energy- and chemical sa tu re t ion  of t h e  res-  
pect i n d u s t r i e s  and u n i t s ;  
- teliing i n t o  account t h e  r e s u l t s  of r i s k  asessment as wel l  as en- 
vironmental impact s tatements  performed f o r  i n d u e t r i a l  i ne ta l l a -  
t i o n s  end  p r o j e c t s ;  
- development of t h e  na t ione l  end crea t ion  of t h e  in t e rna t iona l  
l e g i s l a t i o n  systems f o r  technologicel r i s k  a n a l y s i ~  and aeessmezt~ 
- t h e  cree t ion  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  mecheaisms of r i s k  'asessnent,  r,u:_i- 
t o r i n g  and e t o r i n g  t h e  data,  e a r l y  warning of acc idea t s ,  the  cente 
of urgent ecologica l  a s s i s t ance  (IITERHELP); 
- ac t ive  publ ic  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  discussions of major i n c u s t r i e l  
pro jec ts  p o t e n t i a l l y  11ezarCoas t o  population o r  environmetlt. Psr- 
t i c i p a t i o n  of communities representat ives i n  e~v i ronmenta l  i q e c t  
asessment f o r  l o c a l  indus to ia l  projects .  
These a d  o the r  meesures should promote t h e  belanced and sus- 
t a inab le  development of socio-ecologicel es wel l  as techno-econo& 
systems t h a t  e s p e c i a l l y  important from t h e  poin t  of view of nex 
cammon.v'alues and t ~ r g e t s  of con?rehensive economic growt'r-. 
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CRITERIA AND INDICES OF NPP SAFETY ANALYSIS 
A.A. Bykov and V.F. Demin 
I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy 
A new approach to ensuring nuclear safety has begun forming sin- 
ce the early eighties. The approach based on the probabilistic safety 
analysis, the principles of acceptable risk, the optimization of sa- 
fety measures, etc. has forced a complex of adequate quantitative me- 
thods of assessment, safety analysis and risk management to be deve- 
loped. Particular attention is paid to large accidents. It is caused 
both two large accidents happened (Three Mlle Island and Chernobyl) 
and specific metodological problems arising in development of methods 
of quantitative safety analysis and risk management. 
The present-day safety measures ensure a very low probability of 
severe NPF accidents. As a re~ult we should oonsider them as a case 
of an insufficient statistics. Even in the oase of availability of 
an exact adequate probabilistic description of considered events there 
is non-compliance between some real results of its appearaoe and pro- 
babilistic characteristics of them, such as the mathematical expeota- 
tion. These problems of PSA level 3 in oase of low probability/hi@~ 
consequence accidents are well-hown in literature. They complicate 
the developmerlt of the system of cryteria and undice~ of safety ana- 
lysis. Besides there are national features in approaches to its de- 
velopment and applications. 
Developing of this system on national and international levels 
especially in frame of PSA, has been paid muoh attention in the eigh- 
ties. It is appropriate to mention here IAFA and IIASA activity in this 
area (see [1,21). A review of this IAFA activity was made in [31. 
In the paper our suggestions on the system of criteria and undices 
for safety analysis are presented. They have been obtained on the basis 
of investigations on safety analysi~ and risk management issues in I.V. 
Kurchatov Institute of atomic energy (Moscow). This system pertains to 
level 3 if the PSA terminology is used. 
2. GENERALIZED INDICES 
The ourrent prooedurer of the  r i r k  m a l y r i r  and regula- 
t i o n  m i r e  a question about the  mearurement of detriment t o  human 
hea l th  due t o  the  f a c t o r  under mtudy. For th in  purpore the  na tura l  
lndioer  oharaoter i r t io  of t h e  detriment a r e  required. The d i f f i o u l t i e r  
of t h e i r  lntroduotion and j u r t i f i c a t i o n  r e m l t  from a number of fac- 
t or8. Among them a r e  t 
- de~endence of hnrmful e f feo t  on an9 and mer: 
- delay hetween-the harmful factor acticm and its mnifestatim; 
- variability of dotrimentt death o r  d i rea re r  of d i f f e r en t  typo 
and mevority; 
- oom e t i t i o n  botreen t he  effeot  of harmful f ao to r r  under mtudy 
and aatura  ! oaurer. 
Tho mtural indioem in t h o i r  or iginal  dof in i t ion  mhould taka 
i n t o  aocount a11 t he r e  f a o t o n .  Am t o  tho app l lmt ion ,  t he  avemging 
could be made f o r  some f a c t o r s  depending on the  f i e l d  of app l i ca t ion .  
A s  a r e a u l t  t h e  e x p l i c i t  dependence on theae f a c t o r e  could diaappear.  
Basing on t h e  experience gained in our i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  of t h e  pro- 
blems of r a d i a t i o n  r i s k  a n a l y e i s  ( see ,  f o r  erample, (41 ) and in t h e  
worka of o the r  au thore  t h e  fol lowing two n a t u r a l  i n d i c e s  a r e  proposed 
f o r  t h e  use: 
- general ized Ind iv idua l  lif r - l o w  risk R -  
- general ized detr iment  t o  h e a l t h  C. 
The term wgenera l izedn i s  connected, above a l l ,  wi th  t h e  at tempt 
t o  desc r ibe  a v a r i e t y  of de t r iments  by a a ing le  index. 
Genelalized ind iv idua l  life-long risk R .  
Let an  ind iv idua l  a t  t h e  age "aw be exposed t o  an  ind iv idua l  who- 
le-body dose D. Then t h e  genera l ized  r i s k  R, 1.e. t he  p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
l i f e  o r  h e a l t h  l o s s  due t o  a curable  o r  incurable  carcinogenic e f f e c t ,  
equals  toco 
'ht) R =j@(t,a)[k {t,D) + kt * ,a )za 'h ,~ )~dt  
0 ' ( rnl l  (1 1 
Here t i s  t he  time from t h e  moment of expoaura, Ptyt,e) (A ( t ,e j )  
i s  t h e  denei ty  of ne t -p robab i l i t y  of death (disease) from t h e  carcino- 
genic  a c t i o n  of i o n i z i n g  r ad ia t ion .  
- 
For  t h e  funct ion8 A ( ~ , D )  i t  i s  propoeed t o  use the  normal d i a -  
t r i b u t  i on  
where ft and d a r e  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  parameterr; f (D) i s  t h e  probsbi- 
l i t  of t h e  malignant r egene ra t ion  of t i s s u e  ( the  s u p e r s c r i p t s  (mt) ,  
o r  fmb) a r e  omitted).  
The d i 8 t r i b u t i o n  a8 given by E a , (2 )  and ( 3 )  obtained on the  be- 
s i e  of t h e  preeent-day idea8  ( see  [ 8 and references  t h e r e i n )  about 
t h e  mul t i s tage  development of malignant tumor and t h e  genera l  p r i n c i  - 
l e a  of t h e  theoretical-prob.bilietic deec r ip t ion  of such a procesa~!.  
Among o t h e r  q u a n t i t i e r  in ~ q . ( l ) @ ( t  a )  t he re  i s  t he  p r o b a b i l i t y  
of survival of a person of t h e  age  a t o  t h e  age ( t + a )  r 
W t  ,a>= ~(t+a)/Cl(a) 
H(t )  18 t h e  p robab i l i t y  of au rv iva l  t o  t h e  age t from t h e  moment of 
b i r t h  under normal conditions. The func t ion  H( t )  l a  ca l cu la t ed  from 
demographio data .  It depend8 on rex,  nooio-economlo condit ion8 of li- 
ving ,  eto. K 18 t h e  weighting f a c t o r  oomparing t h e  r i s k  of dea th  and 
dieease.  Equation ( 1 )  l a  g iven  in a somewhet n impl i f ied  fonn r e l a t i v e  
t o  t h e  f a c t o r  k. General ly npeaking, a l l  poeeible  considered d iaea-  
8ee rhould be divided i n t o  a e v e r a l  categories, each category being 
charaoter iaed  by i t a  own weighting faotor .  The q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  of {&,I 
18 a aubjeot  of exper t  judgement. 
The r i s k  increment pe r  u n i t  time during the  a c t i o n  of a h a d u l  
f a c t o r  w i l l  be c a l l e d  a r i s k  i n t e n s i t y :  
The average annual  r i s k  i n t e n s i t y  ( A t-1 year )  is used, a s  a r u l e ,  
in t h e  asreesment and s t anda rd iza t ion  of i n d i v i d u l  r i s k .  It should 
be noted that 4 t in Eq. ( 4 )  is t h e  period of t he  h a d u l  f a c t o r  a c t i o n ,  
but not  t h e  time of r e 8  onee t o  it. The l a t t e r  can be cons iderably  
prolonged t o  d isagree  4 t h  ~ t .  
I n  a s s e s s i n g  R i t r  de endence on sex ,  age, eto. could be taken  ? i n t o  account i n  a d i f f e r e n  way (on a n  average,  a maxlmum o r  e l s e )  
depending on t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  a r e a  of this index. 
S tandardiza t ion  is one of t h e  b a s i c  a r e a s  of R app l i ca t ion .  , I n  
t h i s  case i t  i s  necessary t o  e s t ima te  t h e  maximum value of R i n  a groug 
of person8 under coneiderat ion (personnel  of dange rou  i n d u s t r i e e  o r  
populat ion ) . 
Generalized detr iment  t o  h e a l t h  G. 
This  index is r e q u i r e d , t o  compare va r ious  sources of p o t e n t i a l  
h a m  by degree of impact on h e a l t h  of people (personnel and/or popula- 
t i on ) .  Such a comparison, f o r  example, i s  made between d i f f e r e n t  po- 
wer p l a t s ,  I n d u s t r i e s  and between n a t u r a l  and authropogenic source8  
of ham. 
The same index is  needed t o  e s t ima te  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of environ- 
mental p ro tec t ion  and s a f e t y  improvement measures. 
It is proposed t o  use  mathematical expecta t ion  of t h e  l i f e -  
span reduct ion  due t o  t h e  a c t i o n  of t h e  considered hannful f a c t o r  as 
a measure of h a m  t o  health.  A genera l i zed ,  o r  reduced, man-year s e r -  
ves  as a u n i t  of measurement, a umnday being a ranaller un i t .  The 
time l o s t  due t o  d isease  i r  converted t o  t h e  l i f e s p a n  r educ t ion  
by mul t ip ly ing  i t  by t h e  corresponding covereIon f a o t o r  X .  The s stem 
of such f a c t o r  (a~,.) f o r  d i f f e r e n t  d i s e a s e s  ehould be e t a b l i s h e d  r, y 
t h e  expert  judgement. In  t he  genera l  ca se  t h e  f a c t o r s  introduced 
in t h e  above s e c t i o n  t o  ensure t h e q u i v a l e n c e  of r i s k s  do not  co inc i -  
de wi th  [u~], but t h e r e  i r  a r e l a t i o n e h i p  between them. The q u a n t i t y  
G equals  t o  
NI 
Here t h e  summing i e  made over each i n d i v i d u a l  from t h e  considered group 
of people (Eq.(5)) o r  over  t h e  subgroups k of N i nd iv idua l s .  gi i r  
t h e  i n d i r i d w l  h e a l t h  detr iment ,  1.e. t h e  expofat i on  of t h e  s w i -  
va1 t ime reduct ion  f o r  t h e  1 0 t h  i n d i v i d u a l  ( 8 ,  is t he  average va lue  
f o r  t h e  k-th rubgroup). The i n d i v i d u a l  detr iment  t o  a perron of t h e  
age  a from a shor t - t e rn  exposure t o  a harmiul f a c t o r  is equal  t o  
where 
Here r ( t - t ) i s  a survivor function f o r  a person with the  desease diagnosed 
i n  the  time moment r. Other functions and var iables  were defined above. 
For some appl ica t ions  the  quant i ty  &(a) should be calcula ted ta- 
Hag i n t o  account the  discounting function. 
- 
The expression? s imi l a r  t o  Eqs. ( 6 )  and ( 7 )  were obtained a l s o  f o r  
the ind ices  estim2tin.g the genet ic  e f f e c t s .  Howerver, they a r e  not given 
here because of t h e i r  g rea t e r  complexity and some awkwardness. 
3. OR THB CONCEPT OF WEIGHTED #)SES 
The ooncept of the  e f feo t ive  dose equivalent D, was introduced 
t o  al low f o r  t he  d i f f e r e n t  s e n s i t i v i t i e s  of human organs and t i e s u e s  
t o  rad ia t ion  [S ]  . I n i t i a l l y  i t  we8 intended f o r  using in t h e  r tandar-  
d izat ion of r a d i a t i on  expornre. However, l a t e r  the  quant i ty  D became 
widely used t o  aaaeas and compare the effeot  of o r  the  r i s k e  from 
d i f fe ren t  souroer of ioniz ing rediation. For this purpose i t  i e  used 
in the  UNSCEAR mater ia ls  (see ,  f o r  example, 161  ). In this case,  as 
a ru le ,  i t  i s  pointed out that a careful  a t t i t u d e  is needed t o  the  qu- 
a n t i t a t i v e  assesemento on the  bas i s  of D, due t o  a oonaiderable un- 
oer ta in ty  in the  coeff io ients  of risk,underestimation of ourable i o n ~  
of cancer and genetio ef feote  in each generation, rex-age s p e c i f i c i t y  
of human organism, etc. 
To avoid the  rhortcomihgs of D the var iour  concepts of "weighted 
dosea" a r e  propoaed in rome works: (he gene t ica l ly  ( o r  l eucbemica l -  
l y )  r i gn i f i c a n t  dore equivalent, etc. ( ree  review [ 7 ]  1. 
T h i s  work roposer t o  introduce two d i f f e r e n t  e f f ec t i v e  (o r ,  in 
other  w odr ,  :e!ghted) d j e s  on the  basis of the  two introduoed indice. 
There a r e  df end { intended f o r  us* in the  s t m d a r d i r a -  
t i o n  and aaaeawent  of r r k  respectively. 
The general  de f i n i t i on  of the  weighted dose i n  
a =+dini (8) 
Here Ui a r e  the  weighting fac to rs ;  i i n  the  human body organ o r  tis- 
me;  .d- i r  the  dpse equivalent t o  organ o r  t i r s u e  1. The weighted 
doses bf8' and ' a r e  defined by the  r e t s  of f a o t o r r  [q-uJ) 
and lo?' respect ively  
csJ. R; /$  R i  ; *i  OF'= 9/z 6. ( 9 )  b 
R and O a r e  the  above-defined generalized ind ice r  of r i r k  and d e t r i -  
ment respectively. To ca lcu la te  oia) the  maximum valuer of k,. 
(in t h e i r  r a x a g e  var ia t ion)  a r e  taken, aad t h e  averaged (over popu- 
l a t i o n )  valuer  of Oi a r e  u e d  t o r  9PJ. 
Table I givee the  ca lcula ted  values of (o:l? and and conpa- 
r e 8  them with lo;) f o r  t h e  cument  concept of e f f e c t i v e  dose. The 
correeponding values of R; and 6,. a r e  a l e o  preeented in t h e  
Table. 
4. CBA PAUTERS AND INDICES 
3.1. The oonoept of socioaconomic dama~e. 
Unti l  r ecen t1  t h e r e  ex i s t ed  serious d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t he  quant i -  
t a t i v e  o r  even q u a b t a t i v e  ee t l rmt ion of the economical damage Y due 
t o  hulmiul e f f e c t s  on t h e  h e a l t h  of population. Some of the  diff$,cul-  
t i e s  hold so f a r .  
A great  number of work8 including thoee b Soviet  authors a r e  
devoted t o  the  problem of detelminstion of Y f eee ,  f o r  example, t h e  
Proceedings of t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Symposium [el ). This work p resen t s  
t h e  r e s u l t e  of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  performed in 1.V.Kurchatov I n s t i t u t e  
of Atomic Energy. 
The quan t i ty  Y i r  proport ional  t o  t h e  damege G: 
Y = d 6 ,  (10) 
where d i s  t he  p r i c e  of the  damage. The value &= 2 mansday is taken 
as t he  damage uni t .  In s o  doing, d becomes simultaneouely the  p r i c e  
of 1 man-rem. (0.01 man.Sv), i f  t he  ICRP recommendation on the  l i n e a r  
doee-response r e l a t i o n e h i p  wi th  no threehold is  accepted. 
Conceptual d e f i n i t i o n  of d 
The quan t i ty  d cone i s t s  of two components: 
d = d a +  da (11) 
where 4 and d8 e r e  the  objeot ive  and r u b j e c t i v e . p r i c e e  of damage 
respect ive ly .  
The component d, characterizes a d i r e o t  damage t o  t h e  s o c i e t y  
due t o  t h e  death  o r  t h e  cont rac t ion  of dieease of sn indiv idual  a s  
8 producer of m a t e r i a l  goods and the  expensee f o r  indemnity, medical 
t reatment,  etc .  
The oomponent r e f l e c t s  the  nubjective a t t i t u d e  of a n  i n d i -  
v idua l  t o  r i sk .  It is  8 meaeure of equivalence between v a r i a t i o n s  in 
r a f e t y  and q u a l i t y  of human l i f e  (within the  d e f i n i t e  l i m i t a ,  r e e  191  
Otherwise d4 oould be named a s o c i a l  component of t h e  p r i ce  of da- 
mage. Aocordlngly, t h e  quan t i ty  Y could be def ined a s  8 socio- 
economio demage. 
It l a  lnadmieeible t o  r e l a t e  d wlth " the  coat  of l i f e w .  The 
r t r i o t  l i m i t r  s e t  on t h e  l e v e l  of individual  r i e k  p r a c t i c a l l y  exclude 
t h e  uae of t h e  l a t t e r  term in CBA ( i n  more d e t a i l  r ee ,  f o r  eurmple, 
[9.101 1. 
Quant i f i ca t ion  o f d  
The mean value  of d, f a l l 0  in the  range Bbl. 5-10. 
The value of dg l o  emtimated am follows: 

Thir implies thnt 
d d8=dJ=Rbl.100-400 (12' 
Thur, the value of Y ir determined mainly by thf component %. 
A further narrowing of the uncertainty range (12 ) f o r a  ir har- 
dly poesible. 
The coat of damage d belong8 to thore quantitier that, in pri- 
nciple, cannot be, evaluated to a high accuracy. A substantial uncer- 
tainty in d ir due to it8 nature; it refloat the rubjeotive opini- 
on of an ind!vidual about the risk-benefit relationship (or in other 
words about the rafety-quality of life relationship). Thir opinion ir 
characterized by a considerable uncertainty. 
The uncertainty in d, is it8 property, but not its demerit, and 
should just be taken into account in the standardization of the dva- 
lue. 
It ir appropriate to mention here that rome other quantities of a 
sooio-economio nature have rimilar uncertainties. For example, ouch 
ir the care in the rtandardiaation of the discount rate E. Neverthe- 
less, the specifia value of'B ir established as a standard one in the 
interest8 of the effiaient control of the economy. 
The differential optimum coat criterion is often used in the 
optimiration of radiation protection 
I =  
ir the aoet of detriment reduotion. 
(13) 
where a: - d~ /d  6 
Acoording to the data available for different industrial and 
non-induetrial human aotivities in a developed country the value of Y 
fallr within the range 
4 8 = Rbp. 2-2.10 per unit detriment G, (14) 
For optimal rafety measurer rhould be the same for all indu- 
atrial and non-industrial human activitier and equal to the rtandar- 
dized value of d in accordance with the condition in Eq.(l3). The 
wide rpread of J valuer is the evidence of a rignificant departure 
from the optimum In  current rafety decision-making. 
To lay a practical basis for making optimal decisions on safety 
it is necessary, firstly, to establish government regulations for 
the d. value. The choice of the o timum safety measure should then be 4 governed by the condition in Eq.( 3). 
The opinion of the author8 with regard to the rtandardization 
of the value under uncertainty condition8 (12') amounts to the 
f ollowing. 
Firrt, the choice of any d value from the range (12') for re- 
gulatory purporer would not Oontradict the human perception of risk- 
benefit relationship. Second, it ir important to note that because 
of a large gap in uncertaintier of ol and & valuer (ree (la and (14)) 
the choice of a rtandard al value would enable to get oloser to 
optimum rafety decirions. 
The rtandardized value of d. murt be the same over the whole 
xmnge of the aoceptable valuer of fi. 
It i r  proposed t h e  following value  f o r  d :  
Could thir va lue  prove t o  be excessive from t h e  angle  of t h e  
s c a n t i n e s s  of reeources t h e  r o c i e t y  rpendr on t h e  q u a l i t y  of l i f e  
and s a f e t y ?  
~t present  t h e  technogenlo r i s k  in t h e  develooed 8 o c i Q t ~  1s 
c h a n c t e r i s e d ,  on a n  a v e n g e ,  by t h e  va lue  ir too3 Th i s  
comeeponds t o  a l o s s  of about G,- 10 man-day p e r  one perron. 
mn-year  o r  
The va lue  
due t o  us ing  u p - t o 4 a t e  t r anspor t ) .  
Th i s  a l lows one t o  conclude t h a t  t h e  propoeed r t anda rd  (15)  does 
not  prove t o  be excessive. 
Allowance f o r  t ime f a c t o r  
The damage Y d i s t r i b u t e d  in time should be rummed t a k i n g  i n t o  
account a temporal weighting f a c t o r  - a discount ing  funct ion:  
where t is t h e  time; E i r  t h e  discount  r a t e  s tandardized f o r  t h e  
cu r ren t  economio c a l c u l a t i o n s  ( r e e  a l s o  [g] ). 
4.2. On restrictions of risk from severe accidentr 
The p r e r e n t 4 a y  r a f e t y  measurer ensure a vexy low p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
r eve re  NPP a c c i d e n t r  (with considerable r ad ioac t ive  r e l eases ) .  
The high oonsequences of t h e  a c c i d e n t s  and t h e i r  low p r o b a b i l i t y  
pose 8 number of p rob lem f o r  both t h e  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
f o r  damage assessment)  and the  r i s k  management as 8 whole. 
Fo r  a l ong  time t h e  follorring ques t ions  have been a r u b j e c t  f o r  
coxmiderat i o n  by expe r t s  : 
1. What r igo rous  l i m i t a t i o n r  on acoident  consequences rhould be 
added o t h e r  than  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  on ind iv idua l  r i e k ?  
2. What CBA index of expected damage due t o  8co iden t r  rhould be 
ured under  cond i t ion r  when t h e  var iance  can exceed t h e  expec ta t ion  of 
damage? 
The r o l u t i o n  of t hese  ques t ions  i s  given  much a t t e n t i o n - t o  on 
both n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l r  i nc lud ing  the  IAEA a c t i v i t y .  
There a r e  no  anambiguous answers t o  t h e s e  q u e r t i o ~ .  They depend 
strongly on na t ional  eoonomio s t ruoture  f e a t u r e s  e t s .  
Our  view on r o l r i ng  tho above quortions rorolvor i t r o l f  in br iof  
i n t o  tho fo l lo r ing .  
It is imposaiblo t o  f i nd  a correct  answer t o  these  questions from 
the  rtandpoint of conaidering a s ing le  NPP. It is necessary t o  take  
i n t o  conaideretion tho induetry as a wholo and, moreover, a l l  poten- 
t i a l l y  dangerous Fndunt r ios.  
In addi t ion t o  o ther  non-economic s t r i c t  l i m i t a t i o n r  a r i g o r o u  
r e r t r i c t i o n  rhould bo Imposed on the  maximum demago from a n  accident  
at a NPP and othor  indunt r i a l  f a o i l i t l o r  (in our opinion thir limit 
f o r  BPP rhould o q u l  t o  Rbl. 3-5 b i l l i o n #  f o r  oomg.riron tho damage 
duo t o  t he  TMI acoident unountod t o m  2 b i l l i o n  t h e  Chornobyl- 
Rbl. 8 b i l l i on ) .  A r t a t o  ryrtem of h u r a n c e  a g a b r t  damage duo t o  
aooidonts ahould bo met up at poten t ia l ly  dangerour plantr .  The r i s e  
of an obl igatory  'Insurance premium rhould bo e a t h a t e d  from tho oxpec- 
tanco of damage < Y a  deepi to  i t r  l a rge  variance 
For example, t he  annual payment f o r  t h e  accidente of a gi -  
ven type with a frequency w and a damage Y rhould mount t o  t h , = < ~ > . o ~  
o r  the t o t a l  payment &&,in the  moment of r e t t i n g  EPP i n t o  operation 
x n l  * Y / €  
where E i r  the  diecount ra te .  
In addition to Yli, a minimum value of oomplementarg oumulative 
distribution funotion W (Wm ) is suggested to be established (so 
oalled "de minimus" level).It atemines lower limit for aooidents whioh 
are taken into aooount. Aooidents with W < W are oonsidered as inore- 
dible. It is proper to oall them "hgpotetioa~Qooidents". The value WmL 
is established from the oondition 
NowmFn << 1 , 
where N is the total eum of reaotor-years, ourmilated by a reaotor gene- 
ration of oonsidered type (eee Figure). 
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Large Accident and Denunds to Safer 
NPP of New Csneration 
Novikov V.M., Ponomarev-Stepnoj N.N., Slesarev I.S. 
Abstract 
Large accidents at Tree Mile Island and Chernobyl became a 
landmark in world nuclear power (NP) development and produce 
stricter demands to nuclear p o w r  plants (NPP). As a result the 
safety and social acceptability of NP became of absolute priority 
among other problems. In the paper quantitative criteria of safety 
derived from estimation of social risk and economic-ecological 
damage due to large accidents like TMI and Chernobyl are 
formulated. Concepts of high safety reactor and asymptotic high 
safety reactor are introduced. It is stated that latter could 
hardly be created in the framework of traditional ways of safety 
improvement. 
1. Introduction 
In the history of NP development two stages may be definitely 
outlined. NPP large accidents took place at Tree Mile Island and 
Chernobyl became a landmark which divided these stages. 
The first one can be characterized by rather high NP growth 
and too optimistic attitude to safety. It is correct, that NP 
could overcome ecological problems caused by organic fuel 
combustion. This is a decisive advantage of NP, but in some way it 
hypnotized wide NP development supporters. Somehow or other high 
hypothetical accidents were not paid much attention. But TMI and 
Chernobyl showed their reality. So NPP large accidents resulting 
in reactor d isrupt ion and possible radioactivity re lease to the 
environment became synonyms of public acceptability of nuclear 
power. 
Now NP has entered the second stage of its development and 
ought to obtain the same public support, it had earlier. This time 
safety and social acceptability of NP are of absolute priority 
among other problems. It means that concept of safer reactor of 
new generation should be wrked out. 
Safety of any energy capacious technology can't be absolute, 
this is a technical "nature" of safety. Improveuent of safety 
means permanent movement and apportionment of technicaly reachable 
intermediate goals. The experience gained at TMI and Chernobyl 
accidents may serve as "experimental data" for this purpose. 
2. Estimation of NPP large accidents social damam. 
Social damage is connected with global character of large 
accidents, great uncertainty in real economic damage, possible 
loss of human values which couldn't be estimated from the economic 
point of view and public unacceptability of radioactive releases 
to the environuent. To formulate social criterion of NPP safety it 
is necessary to take into account that even a few large accidents 
with radioactive release to the environment could completely blow 
confidence to NP and put a quest ion of its elimination. So social 
criterion consists of demand, that during forecasted period of NP 
development (approximately 50 years) no large accident with 
radioactive release to the environuent occurs within confidence 
limits of probability. 
This demand correlates with psychological barrier of human 
unacceptabi 1 ity dangerous events repetition and some smoothing it 
after change of generation. Quantitative estimations of Pa - 
probability of large accident with radioactive release to the 
environment are obtained on the base of this criterion 11 I .  
I Ps I=  ( year 1-I . The f 01 lowing assumptions were used: 
- s l m z  mh-Yr  i~~x-l&mhs my h v w  lrrhemakl0.ma1' ~ ~ ~ m z s  h h  
~ s e s m e n t  is determined by expected NP scale in the wrld; 
- in the middle of the next century the specific energy 
consumption will be about 5 kW per capita; total w r l d  population 
will be 8 billions; nuclear power will be about 30% of total. 
The expression for Ps is of the form: 
ps s min {=+ nPBs 1 ; d 6 
5 
where n n 3-10 reactor-years worked out and 6 - "psychologically" 
acceptable probability of of large accidents up to 2050 yr. Fig. 1 
presents m - the mathematical expectation of such accidents for 
various values of P and uncertainties within the limits of one 
dispertion - o . It is seen that first condition in ( 1  ) is 
satisfied by P < It was assumed that all NPP were 
characterized by the s a w  value of P. But if construction of new 
NPP with P = ~ o - ~  begins at 2000 yr. or later, and old ones have 
P = I O - ~  or lo-', then this condition is not satisf led (see Fig.2 ) . 
This means that it wouldn't be sufficient to introduce only safer 
reactors. It is necessary to replace old NPP's or to improve their 
safety drasticaly ( + 1 o - ~  ) .  Second condition in ( 1 1 means 
that two and more large accidents are excluded with propability - 
6. For 6=0,5% one can obtain from ( 1  ) ,  that social criterion leads 
to 
P,, s lo-' (2 
3. Estimation of economic-ecolonical damam due to NPP 
larm accident. 
Economic-ecological damage is connected with that of 
reactor, reactor building or NPP itaelf, impossibility of land use 
around NPP and ao on. Damage may result in full loss of 
repairbility of NPP, even when all radioactivity (r/a) is 
localized inside it. 
Economic-ecological criterion consists of demand that 
economic lossea from large accidents will not exceed a certain 
part of income from energy production. The latter la comparable 
with y - economic growth ahd equal to some percent. It follows 
from this criterion 
PaC4Y 5 y 0 C 0 n , (3 1
here C - damage due to a large accident; fl  - factor of income 
excesa compare to damage; C - specific discounted coat of energy 
production; Y - expected quant i ty  of large excidents .  To est imate  
t h e  l a t t e r  w use a conservative approach and put  it equal t o  m+o. 
Taking i n t o  account t h a t  main p a r t  of c is connected with k- 
c a p i t a l  c o s t ,  we put f o r  s imp l i c i t y  c = Ank ,A- discount  r a t e .  The 
equation( 3 ) t akes  t h e  form 
where Pe - permissable p robab i i i t y  of NPP large accident  derived 
from economic-ecological c r i t e r i o n .  
From ( 1  and ( 4 )  it follows t h a t  funct ions Ps (n )  and Pe (n )  
a r e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  The funct ion PS decreases monotonously when n 
grows. That means s a f e t y  demands becomes s t r i c t e r  upon time. The 
funct ion Pe increases  with n and is asymptotic t o  &ok. I t  has a P c 
simple physical  meaning. Soc ia l  c r i t e r i o n  denrands 1 i m i t s  of 
expected quant i ty  of acc idents  no matter how large n is. So 
- 1 PS-n , when n is large enough. Economic-ecological c r i t e r i o n  
demands only t h a t  damage w i l l  be small  compare t o  income. For 
large n both values are proport ional  t o  n and the re fo re  Pe+ cons t .  
To est imate  Ps quan t i t a t i ve ly  t he  fol lowing two types of 
large acc idents  a r e  taken as "reference" ones. 
Type A .  Large accident  following core d i s rup t ion  and r/a 
r e l ea se  t o  t h e  environment. Chernobyl could be a model f o r  such 
acc ident .  For t h i s  case we have C P look. 
Type B. Large accident  fol lowing core melt and r/a loca l ized  
ins ide  containment. TMI is a model f o r  t h i s  type and we have C P k. 
- 1 Taking f o r  o the r  parameters 7=0. l ;  @=lo;  A=O.loyr we 
obta in  t h e  solutions P:"' and pLB) shorn at  Fig. 3 f o r  both types 
of accidents .  
4 .  Safe ty  demands t o  nuclear r eac to r s  of new generat ion.  
The necess i ty  t o  s a t i s f y  both c r i t e r i a  leads t o  t h e  
conditions: 
p' B ' ( 8 )  
'e 
Fig.  3 shows t h a t  f o r  large enough period of t i m e  one can 
t a k e  as necess it i v e  t h e  f o 1 lowing va lues  : 
p( A ) 5 ( r e a c t .  yr. - 1 
-5 - 1 P ' ~ '  5 1 0  ( r e a c t .  y r . )  
and as a s u f f i c i e n t  
p ' B ' _  p ( A )  
5 ( r e a c t .  y r . )  - 1 ( 7 )  
I t  m u s t  be d e f i n i t l y  s a i d  t h a t  modern r e a c t o r s  do n o t  s a t i s f y  
t h e s e  demands. Therefore  t h e  cond i t ions  ( 6 and ( 7 r a y  s e r v e  as 
bear ings  i n  development of nuc lea r  r e a c t o r s  of new genera t ion .  
Following t h i s  way it is poss ib le  t o  d i s t ingwish  tw  s t e p s .  The 
NPP of t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  have d B )  = f o r  c o r e  d i s r u p t i o n  and 
e x t e r n a l  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  l o c a l i z e  r/a r e l e a s e  i n s i d e  t h e  containment 
down t o  P ' A  ) -  We c a l l  such r e a c t o r s  as high s a f e t y  r e a c t o r s .  
( 6 )  _ The NPP of t h e  second s t e p  have P 1 6 '  f o r  c o r e  
d i s r u p t i o n .  We c a l l  such r e a c t o r s  as asymptotic high s a f e t y  
r e s c t o r s  . 
I t  is n a t u r a l l y  t h a t  working o u t  of high s a f e t y  r e a c t o r s  w i l l  
go i n  t h e  framework of t r a d i t i o n a l  approaches with maximum use of 
r e a c t o r  technology developed. So s a f e t y  improvement is is r e a l i z e d  
as a r u l e  by a d d i t i o n a l  a c t i v e  eng ineer ing  f a c i l i t i e s .  Though some 
inheren t  and pass ive  s a f e t y  may a l s o  be used. This  ex tens ive  way 
obviously  r e s u l t s  i n  more expensive NPP and one c a n ' t  exclude t h a t  
NPP advantage before  t r a d i t i o n a l  PP w i l l  be used up . (For  European 
p a r t  of USSR t h i s  c o s t  advantage f o r  modern NPP is about  20-40% 
[ 1 I ) .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  asymptot ic  h igh s a f e t y  
r e a c t o r s  is accompanied by very s t r i c t  c o s t  demand. To 
c h a r a c t e r i z e  it l e t  us in t roduce a - t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of c o s t  
investment i n  s a f e t y  de f ined  by 
a = (AP/P) / (Ak/k) , ( 8 )  
where AP - reduc t ion  of P va lue ,  which c o s t s  Ak; P and k a r e  t h e  
corresponding b a s i c  va lues .  I t  was shown i n  [ 1 I ,  t h a t  t h i s  f a c t o r  
s a t i s f i e s  t h e  non-equation 
a 2 (X/P) 0 (WC) (9 
For t y p e  B a c c i d e n t s  and r e a c t o r s  with P ( ~ ) =  we have 
( B 1- 
rr r l o 4 .  I t  means t h a t  t r a n s i t i o n  from r e a c t o r s  with P -lo-' t o  
ones with d B ) = 1 f 7  must practically leave the capital cost of 
NPP the erame. 
There is no real hope to fulfil it by us in^ only additional 
active safety facilities. The proper way is to use simple physical 
( but not complex engineering principals of fission phenomenon; 
that of natural convection of coolant; perhaps quasi-continuous 
fuel reprocessing and so on. 
In any case the safety demands obtained from TMI and 
Chernobyl experience are challenge to world nuclear society. The 
future of nuclear p o m r  depends on its solution. 
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LEARNING FROM CHERNOBYL. 
The r i g h t  t o  in fo rmat ion  and 
t h e  problem o f  communicating 
about major hazards. 
Angela L i be ra to re  
European U n i v e r s i t y  I n s t i t u t e  
Abstract  
The management o f  t h e  Chernobyl emergency can be regarded as a  
chal lenge t o  e:?perts' and p o l i t i c i a n s '  c r e d i b i l i t y  and t o  t h e  
whole system o f  i n f o rma t i on  and communication i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  
h igh - r i sk  technologies.  
During t h e  emergency pe r i od  f o l l o w i n g  the  Chernobyl accident,  
t h e  c i t i z e n s  o f  almost a l l  european coun t r ies  discovered: 1 )  t h a t  
they had never been informed be fo re  about t h e  poss ib i  1  i t y  o f  
being exposed t o  such k ind  o f  hazards and about poss ib l e  
p r o t e c t i v e  measures; 2) t h a t  the  exper ts  had d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t s  o f  
view about t he  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  same data and gave d i f f e r e n t  
advicec concerning t h e  ac t ions  t o  be taken; 3)  t h a t  i t  was no t  
complete1 y  c l ea r  which were t h e  respons ib le  a u t h o r i t i e s  and the  
measures t o  be fo l lowed t o  cope w i t h  such an event. 
Because o f  t he  lack  o f  s p e c i f i c  i n fo rmat ion  channels and 
procedures, t h e  mass-medi a  funct ioned as t h e  main re fe rence  po i  rtt 
f o r  c i t i z e n s  will in^] Co know what was going on, f o r  c e n t r a l  and 
l oca l  a u t h o r i t i e s  t h a t  had t o  i n f o rm  t h e  c i t i x e r ~ s  aboclt t h e  
mesures t o  be fo l lowed,  f o r  " o f f i c i a l "  and "d i ss i den t "  s c i e n t i s t s  
asked t o  o f f e r  explanat ions.  
It has been maintained t ha t ,  because o f  t h i s  c r u c i a l  r o l e ,  o f  
t he  mass-media and because o f  t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  way o f  s e l e c t i n g  
and d i s t r i b u t i n g  in fo rmat ion ,  Chernobyl may be considered as a  
s o r t  o f  mass-media cons t ruc t ion .  From t h e  p o i n t  o f  view of  the 
percept ion o f  t h e  r i s k s ,  Chernobyl i s  c e r t a i n l y  plrp  a mass-media 
cons t ruc t ion .  But t h i s  element should no t  h i de  t h e  f a c t  t ha t  
one c r u c i a l  problem has t o  be addressed: i .e. which forms and 
channels o f  i n fo rmat ion  and communication ( t h e  second term 
imp ly ing  a  mult i-way r e l a t i o n s h i p )  are/would be t he  best  s u i t e d  
t o  meet t h e  r i g h t  t o  - and t h e  need o f  - i n fo rmat ion  i n  a  f i e l d  
(h igh- r i sk  technolog ies)  o f  ten charac te r i zed  by con t rove rs i a l  
s c i e n t i f i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  and advices, c o n f l i c t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e res t s ,  secrecy, and a  transboundary dimension both i n  space 
and i n  t ime. I n  t h i s  respect,  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  cons t ra i n t s  o f  the  
whole in fo rmat ion  system must be taken i n t o  account. 
Risk communication s t ud ies  may o f f e r  some c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  deal 
w i t h  t h i s  pt oblem. But i t  i s  necessary t o  be ca re fu l .  On t h e  one 
hand, i t  has t o  be stressed t h a t  t h e  in fo rmat ion  and 
communi ca t i on  processes concerning major hazards cannot be 
conf ined t o  t h e  post-accidents s i t ua t i ons ,  o therwise t h e  so- 
c a l l e d  l a y  people w i  l l be and f e e l  overpowered by a  l o t  o f  
i n fo rmat ion  which w i l l  t u r n  out t o  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  alarming 
because i t  concerns hazards t h a t  people ha rd l y  suspected t o  be 
exposed to .  On the  other. hand, r i s k  communication cou ld  be 
regarded and used as a  1  eg i  t i mat i o n  device (i .e. communi ca t  i nq  
i n  a  more "n ice"  way i n  order t o  make otherwise unacceptable 
dec is ions /ac t ions  t o  be accepted). I n  t h i s  case r i s k  
comm~.~nication woctld no t  meet t he  r i g h t  t o  -nor t he  need o f -  
in format ion;  and probably i t  would be a lso  not  very c f  f e c t i i i e  as 
l e g i  t i  mati on dev ice because i n  our contemporary "global  i 1 I iqe"  
.i ; j.5 q u i t e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  con t ro l  and manipulate a l l  forms and 
contents o f  i n fo rmat ion  t o  ob ta in  u n c r i t i c a l  consensus. 
Ihe C h e r ~ ~ b y l  ~ h a l l e ~ q e s  
When faced w i t - t i  t h e  evidence t h a t  a  meltdown occurred a t  t he  
Chernobyl p l an t ,  a l l  t he  s c i e n t i f i c  and p o l i t i c a l  wor ld showed 
s~t rpr - ise.  Rnd f o r  t he  c i t i z e n s  of marly  ELI^-opearr countr. ies an 
hard e::peri ence o f  unvei 1  i n g  s t a r t ed .  
The m a j o r i t y  of  exper ts  i n  the  nuclear f i e l d  showed s u r p r i s e  i n  
r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  an event ca lcu la ted  t o  have such a  low p r o b a b i l i t y  
of occurrence coctld have happerled. Central  arid l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
i n  a l l  european coun t r i es  found themselves t o  be unprepared t o  
cope w i  t h  si.tch an ~lnespected everit. C i t i zens  of coun t r ies  w i  t t iout  
nuclear p l a n t s  discovered t h a t  they were never the less exposed t o  
r a d i a t i o n  coming from very long distances, and c i t i z e n s  o f  
coun t r ies  w i t h  nuc lear  p l a n t s  discovered t h a t  t he  e x i s t i n g  sa fe t y  
meas~tr-es were no t  c , ~ ~ f f  i c i e n t  t o  p ro tec t  them from r a d i a t i o n  
exposure. 
But why a l l  t h i s  surpr ise,  espec ia l l y  among exper ts? One 
poss ib l e  answer i s  t ha t ,  even i f  i t  i s  obv i o~ t s  t h a t  very  low 
p r o b a b i l i t y  does no t  mean " i m p o s s i b i l i t y " ,  t h e  problem o f  copying 
w i t h  t he  occurrence and t he  conceqt-~ences o f  a  l a r g e  but  very 
u n l i k e l y  acc ident  had been underestimated and somehow regarded as 
a  waste o f  t ime and money. Moreover, wh i le  impor tant  e f f o r t s  have 
been made t o  examine a l l  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  conceivable causes o f  
va r ious  k inds  o f  nuclear acc idents  (but  t he re  are con t rovers ies  
concerning t he  assumpti on5 and methods used t o  c a l c u l a t e  t he  
p r o b a b i l i t y  of occurrence o f  such acc idents) ,  l e s s  had been done 
be fo re  Chernobyl concerning t he  fo recas t ing  o f  a l l  poss i b l e  post-  
accident cond i t i ons  and t h e  r e l a t e d  conseqitences f o r  human 
hea l th  and f o r  t h e  environment; not  t o  speak about t h e  soc ia l ,  
psycholog ica l  and p o l i t i c a l  ones. and what r e s u l t e d  t o  be 
p a r t i c ~ t l a r l y  s u r p r i s i n g  i n  t he  case o f  t h e  Chernobyl accident a re  
p r e c i s e l y  t h e  sca le  ( i n  space and i n  t ime)  and t he  ser io~ tsness  o f  
i t s  consequences. While the  accident o f  Three M i l e  I s l and  had 
a l ready shown t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one very  impor tant  element t h a t  can 
provoke major acc i  dents had been underestimated by r i s k  asse5sor.s 
and by t he  respons ib le  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  t h a t  i s  t he  so-cal l e d  "human 
f a c t o r "  ( I ) ,  t he  Chernobyl accident demonstrated t h a t  t h e  whole 
contemporary soc i e t y  i s  a  s o r t  o f  experimental f i e l d  f o r  complex 
techno1 og i  es (2). 
Fol lowing t he  Chernobyl me1 tdown, c i t i z e n s  o f  many coun t r i es  
found themselves exposed t o  hazards they d i d  no t  know o r  expect; 
and many people became t h e  v i c t i m s  o f  an h i gh - r i s k  technology 
t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  demonstated no t  t o  know as we l l  as some o f  them 
pretended, and t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  proved t o  be unable t o  
con t ro l .  
I n  few days i t  appeard i n  f a c t  c l e a r  t h a t  t he re  was d isa-  
greement between exper ts  regard ing re l evan t  issues l i k e  the  
dangerousness o f  low doses o f  r a d i a t i o n  f o r  human heal th ,  the  
very  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " low doses", t h e  possi  b i  1  i t y  o r  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  
t o  de f i ne  a sa fe  r a d i a t i o n  threshold.  And on t he  bas is  o f  t h i s  
disagreement about s c i e n t i f i c  -or " t r a n s - s c i e n t i f i c "  (3)- issues, 
exper ts  expressed d i f f e r e n t  op in ions about t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
t he  same data ( f o r  instance, what was considered by some r-adio- 
l o g i s t s  or  doctors,  a "safe"  dose o f  r a d i a t i o n  i n  m i l k  or vegcta- 
bles, was regarded as an "overdose" by o t t ~ e r s ) ,  and gave d i f f e -  
r e n t  or  even c o n f l i c t i n g  advices w i t h  regard t o  t h e  p r o t e c t i v e  
measures t o  be taken. 
Disagreements and c o n f l i c t s  were a lso  deep a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  i n  some count r ies  i t  was not 
c l ea r  which a u t h o r i t i e s  were responsib le  f o r  t ak i ng  ac t ions  i n  
face o f  such a wide r a d i o l o g i c a l  emergency, and/or there  was an 
over1 apping o f  r e s p o n s a b i l i t i e s  between d i f f e r e n t  min is ter  s ar~cl 
between cen t ra l  and l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  (4). Theref ore conf 1 i c % s  
ar-ose concerning bo th  " who" had t o  decide, and "what" had t o  bc 
decided. Regarding t h i s  l a s t  po in t ,  conf 1 i c t i n g  advices g iven by 
d i f f e r e n t  exper ts  were used by d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  au thor - i t1 .e~  t o  
j u s t i f y  one dec is ion  o r  t h e  opposi te one ( l i k e  f o rb i dd ing  o r  not  
t he  t rade  and t h e  import  of  some k inds of  food ) . 
What became manifest  from t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  was t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
emergency p lans were i n s u f f i c i e n t  (when not  r - i d i c ~ 1 1  0~1s) t o  qua- 
rantee c i t i z e n s  sa fe ty ,  and t h a t  almost noth ing had been done t o  
l i m i t  t h e  harmful consequences of  an un l i ke1  y but poss ib le  majot- 
nuclear accident abroad or  w i t h i n  each country.  
The d i  sagreemel ~ t s  between exper ts  and between po l  i t  j ca l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  about t h e  seriousness o f  the  accident,  about the 
danger f o r  hea l th  and environment and about t h e  measures t o  be 
adopted, were repor ted by t he  mass-media; which were i n  t u r n  
accused by many s c i e n t i s t s  and p o l i t i c i a n s  t o  c rea te  confusion, 
alarmism and d i s t r u s t  i n  science and progress. And i t  had a l so  
been s ta ted  t h a t  t he re  had been two Chernobyl, t he  r e a l  one and 
t h e  one const ructed ( i n  a l a r m i s t i c  and u n s c i e n t i f i c  terms) by 
t he  mass-media ( 5 ) .  
From t h e  p o i n t  o f  view of t he  percept ion o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  and 
o f  t he  r i s k s  involved, i t  can a c t u a l l y  be argued t h a t  Chernobyl 
was a lso  a mass-media cons t ruc t ion  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  t h e  
i n v i s i b l e  danger was made " v i s i b l e "  by using spoken o r  w r i t t e n  
words l i k e  " r a d i o a c t i v i t y "  o r  "Iodium 131" ,  and by showirrg 
s a t e l l i t e  photographs o f  t h e  Chernobyl f i r e  and p i c t u r e s  o f  
people evacuated from t h e  area o r  hosp i ta l i zed .  Rut t he  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  media had a major r o l e  i n  t h e  way r i s k s  were perceived 
does no t  mean t h a t  r i s k s  were j u s t  imaginary; nor t h a t  by 
worrying about what t o  eat,  d r i nk  and so on, o r  by extending t he  
fear o f  acc idents  from one t o  a l l  nuclear p l a n t s  people were 
shown t o  be i r r a t i o n a l .  On t h e  cont rary ,  they behaved i n  a ver-y 
reasonable way g iven t he  f a c t  t h a t  t he  few elements of  c e r t a i n t y  
known by everybody were t h a t  a l a r g e  and unespected accident had 
happened i n  a very dangerous p lan t ,  t h a t  an i n v i s i b l e  c loud f u l l  
o f  a dangerous "substance" was moving about i n  Europe, t h a t  some 
of t h a t  "substance" was i n  t he  a i r ,  i n  t h e  water, i n  t h e  s o i l  and 
i n  t h e  food, t h a t  some s c i e n t i s t s  were o f  t h e  op in ion  t h a t  t o  
ingest  even very smal l  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  such "substance" was harmful 
wh i l e  o ther  s c i e n t i s t s  disagreed, and t h a t  some a u t h o r i t i e s  
decided t o  f o r b i d  t h e  t r ade  o f  some food and other  measures 
wh i l e  o ther  ( cen t ra l  o r  l o c a l )  a u t h o r i t i e s  disagreed on such 
measures. 
The media d i d  not  "create"  confusion, nor d i d  they " i nven t "  
s c i e n t i f i c  con t rovers ies  and p o l i t i c a l  conf 1 i c t s  : they r e f l e c t e d  
them (6) . Theref o re  t h e  Chernobyl chal  lenge t o  exper ts '  and 
p o l i t i c i a n s '  c r e d i b i l i t y  was no t  due t o  t he  mass-media but  by the  
breakdown o f  a  model o f  science t h a t  does not f ~ l l y  recognize i t s  
l i m i t s  and t h a t  seems t o  go t oo  f a s t  (7), and by t he  evident 
unfa i rness o f  a  model o f  p o l i t i c s  where c i t i z e n s  are exclckded 
from dec is ions concerning r i s k s  t h a t  they have then t o  run. 
Ce r ta i n l y  t h e  world o f  mass-media t oo  i s  f a r  froin being a  
"pure" one, and dur ing  t h e  Chernobyl emergency some journa l  i s t s  
made mistakes o r  d e l i  berate1 y  t r i e d  t o  manipulate news. Many 
newspapers and TV and rad ios  gave uncorrect and sometimes wt-ong 
in fo rmat ion  about what occurred a t  t h e  Chernobyl p l an t ,  or  about 
t he  l e v e l s  of  contaminat ion due t o  the  f a l l - o u t  ( 8 ) .  Moreovet- 
j o u r n a l i s t s  and d i r e c t o r s  o f  newspapers and TV or  r a d i o  
pt-ogrammes se l  ected which data and which exper ts '  t i t  
p o l i t i c i a n s '  op in ion  t o  s t r ess  or  t o  neglect ;  and they made t h e i r  
se lec t i on  according t o  the i r -  po l  i t i c a l  views, t o  t h e i  t- resources, 
t o  c r i t e r i a  o f  news "marke tab i l i t y "  and t o  externa l  cons t ra in ts .  
Some. of  t he  ex te rna l  cons t ra i n t s  are s p e c i f j  c  o f  each mcdj a: 
f o r  a  TV programme i t  makes a  d i f f e rence  i f  an event can be 
f  i lmed ot- not,  whj I e t h i s  does no t  matt-et- f  ot a  newspapet- 
a r t i c l e ;  and f o r  a  r a d i o  broadcast i t  i s  importanP t o  have the 
poss ib i  1  i t y  of ob ta i n i ng  t-ecor-ded mater i  a1 , whi le  f o r  a  wt. j t.Lc.r~ 
(and t he re fo re  more "controllable") a r t i c l e  i t  i s  important t o  
f i n d  exact data arrd f  i gctt-es and rept..oducibl e p i c t ~ ~ r e s .  
Other c o n s t r a i n t s  are instead s t r ~ t c t ~ ~ r a l  of  t he  in fo rmat ion  
system i rt general. They are problems o f  sour-cgs acceasj b i  I i  t . ) , .  
r e l i a b i  1  i t y  and v e r i f  i a b i  1  i t y  a t  t h e  na t iona l  and i n te rna t i ona l  
l eve l ,  problems concerning t h e  choice of  t h e  appt-upriate 
Lnfpypat_Lnn channel_s (obvo~ ls l  y  not on1 y  t he  var i 01-15 mass-medi a )  , 
artd problems regard ing t he  r o l e  of t he  media i n  t he  s t t - i c t  sclrse 
of  t h e  word: t h a t  i s  :media1' tool_? of comrnun~c_g&~gn betw_een 
d i f f e r n n t  sectnrzLsrnue? nf ?pcLety. 
With respect t o  these s t r u c t u r a l  cons t ra in ts ,  Chernobyl can be 
regarded as a  chal lenge a l s o  t o  t h e  whole system of infor-mat ion 
and communication i n  t he  f i e l d  o f  h igh- r i sk  technologies.  
Hi gh-ri sk techno1 oq i  es and t he  p ~ p ~ ~ c ~  of e c y _ e c y ,  
-- - ---- -------- --- --- --- 
The f i r s t  i n fo rmat iona l  problem t h a t  emerged a t  t h e  very beg] 1 1 -  
n ing  o f  t h e  Chernobyl emergency, i .e. when t h e  f i r s t  considerable 
increases i n  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  l e v e l s  were detected i n  Sweden, had 
been a  problem o f  in fo rmat ion  channels. 
I n  I t a l y  - fo r  instance- t h e  f i r s t  news a r r i v e d  from Cairo, 
where t h e  message o f  a  Scredish amateur radio-operator had been 
received ; i mmedi ate1 y  t h e  i t a l  i a n  na t i ona l  press agency fil.lSf? 
sent some corr ispondents  t o  Sweden t o  v e r i f y  t h e  news, which were 
then t ransmi t ted  t o  t he  newspaper-s (9). This q u i t e  adventut-oils 
procedure i s  c e r t a i n l y  not su i t ed  t o  assclre quick and proper 
exchange o f  in fo rmat ion  between author-i t i  es and sc i  e r ~ t i  sts of 
d i f f e r e n t  coun t r i es  i n  cases o f  abnormal f i nd ings  t h a t  may 
i n d i c a t e  catastophic  events, not  on ly  i n  t h e  nucleat- f i e l d  but  
a l so  w i t h  regard t o  re1  eases o f  genet ica l  1  y  engineered organisms, 
spread of  chemicals i n  a i r  and watet-, and a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  may 
provoke major hazard having a trasboundary dimension i n  space and 
time. 
The second in fo rmat iona l  problem t h a t  came up a f t e r  r a d i a t i o n  
increases were monitored i n  nor thern european countr ies,  was a 
problem of source a c c e s s i b i l i t y ,  i .e .  the  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  ob ta in  
qu ick and complete in fo rmat ion  from the  Soviet  a u t h o r i t i e s  about 
  hat was happening a t  Chernobyl . 
This was main ly  due t o  t he  sec re t i ve  managr.ment o f  r ~ i ~ c l  eet 
technology i n  general and t o  the  lack  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n d l  
agreement on eat--1 y  not i f i cat- i  on o f  riucl ear accidents.  
As i t  has been demonstrated by o ther  se r ious  nuc lear  accidents 
- l i k e  t he  ones a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  p l a n t  o f  Windscale (now S e l l a f i e l d )  
i n  1957, a t  t h e  US m i l i t a r y  nuclear p l a n t s  o f  Hanford, Savannah 
River and Fernald dt t r ing many years, a t  t h e  German p l a n t  of 
R i b l i s  i n  1987 , etc .  (how many a re  s t i l l  kept sec re t? ) -  secrecy 
w i t h i n  and ou ts ide  t h e  count ry  where t he  accider l ts take  p lace  is 
not  a  pecu l i a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e  Sov ie t  p o l i t i c a l  system, 
but  i t  i s  a  necess i t y  o f  t h e  technolog ica l -organizat iona l  nucleat 
system. Th is  i s  espec ia l l y  t r u e  i n  coun t r ies  where t h e  c i v i l  and 
m i l i t a r y  uses o f  nuc lear  poi-~er a re  d i r e c t l y  connected (10) .  Hilt 
not  on1 y: as t h e  NUKEM scandal showed (1  11, a l s o  coun t r i es  t h a t  
a re  not  p rod~ tc ing  nuclear- weapons can he lp  o thers  t o  produce 
them. And even p u t t i n g  aside t h e  c i v i  1  - m i  1 i t a r y  connection, 
ncccl ear techno1 ogy asks f o r  secrecy because o f  i t s  centr-a1 i z r d  
and h i e r a r c h i c a l  management, i t s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  t e r r o r i s t i c  and 
wartime at taks,  i t 5  ever decreasing pub1 i c  acceptabi 1  i t y  t h a t  
cou ld  a r r i v e  a t  t h e  bottom ( i t  i s  the  case o f  t h e  I t a l i a n  
referenda against  nuclear power i n  1987) i f  more or  l e s s  ser ic j~ ts  
acc idents  a re  made pub l i c .  I t  i s  probably no t  a  matter of chance 
if - f o r  e:.:ample- i r b  France, one o f  t h e  b iggest  producer-s of 
nuclear  power f o r  c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y  purposes, t h e  media spread 
t he  news o f  t he  Chernobyl accident and f a l l - o u t  l a t e r  and 
dedicated t o  them l e s s  space than the  ne i  ghbouri ng cot-cntr irs 
shar ing a s i m i l a r  contamination. 
Ni.tc1ear secrecy ( l i  kc t h e  secrecy r e l a t e d  t o  o ther  h igh- r i sk  
technolog ies)  i s  more a t h r e a t  t o  humankind and envi ronmcnt, tharl 
a  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  economic and p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  i n d u s t r i e s  
and s ta tes.  Being t h i s  an e x p l i c i t  matter- o f  judgment, l e t  me 
a l s o  add t h a t  i n  case t h e  environment would be se r i ous l y  and 
i r remediab ly  damaged and -as a  consequence- t h e  human species 
endangered, i n d u s t r i e s  and s t a t e s  would no t  count very much. 
The IAEA has a fundamental r o l e  i n  prevent ing i l l e g a l  t r ade  i r t  
nuclear  mate r ia l  and i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  i t s  t ranspor t .  The problem i s  
how t o  improve c o n t r o l  procedures concerning t h e  whole f u e l  c y c l e  
i n  order t o  avo id  no t  on l y  o ther  NUKEM-like scandals, bu t  a l so  
t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  acc idents  happening i n  p l a n t s  o r  i n  waste 
storages o f  each count ry  w i l l  be kept secret  both w i t h i n  arid 
ou ts ide  t h e  border s. The problem o f  c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  i s  a  vet y 
d i f f i cc -c l t  one, bu t  a l s o  a  c r u c i a l  one f o r  t h e  implementation of 
important i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreements l i k e  ttre Vienna Cor~ver~t-lo11 oil
E a r l y  N o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  Nuclear Accident signed t h e  26 September 
1986, exac t l y  5 months a f t e r  t h e  Chernobyl accident.  
Obvious1 y  t h e  same problem -1 i m i t a t i o n  o f  secrecy and 
contt-01 l a b i  1  i t y  procedut es- ar e vet- y in~pot ar t t  dl  5 0  rJJ t h  r espert 
t o  o ther  h i gh - r i  sk technolog i  es: chernical prodtcctiori and 
b io technolog ies can be even more d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o r ~ t r o l  - 
secre ts  easier. t o  be kept-  bucattsc o f  t h e i r  smal ler  pr-oditction 
sc a1 e and more widespread d i  f f  u s i  orb. 
Coming back t o  t h e  Sov ie t  a u t h o r i t i e s '  s i l ence  about t he  
Chernobyl accident,  i t  has t o  be sa id  t h a t  i t  l a s t e d  on l y  (bi t t  
c r u c i a l )  72 ho~crs: i n  t h e  evening o f  28 A p r i l  1986 t h e  Sov ie t  
rep resen ta t i ve  t o  t h e  IAEA informed t t ~ c  IREA D i rec to r  General 
t h a t  an acc ident  had occurred a t  1.23 a.m. on 26 A p r i l  1986 i n  
t he  f o u r t h  u n i t  o f  t h e  Chernobyl p l a n t  (12).  
Th is  can be regarded as a  s o r t  of v i c t o r y  o f  commccnication 
technolog ies over nuc lear  secrecy: sate1 1 i t e  photographs o f  t t l e  
Chernobyl f i r e  prevented any attempt t o  keep i t  longer secret  and 
t o  pretend t h a t  increases i 11 r-adj oacl- i \.li t y  wet-c ~ I I E  t o  suliwt i11 ng 
e l  se. Soph is t i ca ted  communication technol og i  es seemed ther cf ut L- 
ab le  t o  ga in  v e r i f i a b i l i t y  o f  news i n  s p j t e  o f  non a c c e s s i b i l i t y  
of t he  o f f i c i a l  soLlrces o f  in format ion.  I t  has been a r g ~ ~ e d  t t ~ a L  
the  s a t e l l i t e  photographs o f  Chernobyl dt-amatical 1  y  demonstrated 
t h a t  government c o n t r o l  over t h e  f l ow  of  i n fo rmat io r i  jr 
decreasing, and t h a t  boundaries a re  now so porous t h a t  s h u t t i n g  
o f f  commL~njcatiorl i s  imposs ib le  (13) .  Th is  i s  t rue ,  bu t  t h r t  e a r e  
impor tant  d i s t i n c t i o n s  t o  be made: 1) h igh1 y  soph i s t i ca ted  and 
very expensive cornm~lnication technol  og ies a re  unequal I y 
d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  t he  wor ld  (14), which means t h a t  economic and 
technolog ica l  1  y  developed coun t r i es  have t he  poss ib j  1  i t y  t o  
gather i n f o rma t i on  about t h i r l d  wor ld  coclntr ies (and i n  case use 
it as a  resource against  them) wh i l e  t h e  con t ra ry  i s  hard ly  
poss ib le ;  2) t h e  f a c t  t h a t  communication technolog ies a re  used i n  
a co~lnt t -y does no t  mean t h a t  c i t i z e n s  of t h a t  count ry  are enabled 
t o  see o r  l i s t e n  what t h e i r  government f i n d s  or-~t thanks t o  such 
technol  ogies; 3 )  borders a re  i nc reas ing l y  porous, but  i f  a 
government decides no t  t o  l e t  j o c ~ r n a l i s t s  enter  c e r t a i n  areas arid 
i f  t he re  i s  no th ing  -or no th ing  b i g  enough- t o  be photographed 
even w i t h  soph i s t i ca ted  technologies,  then environmental (no t  t o  
speak about soc i  a1 ) catastr-ophies can be detected/moni t o red  but. 
t h e  o r i g i n  can be kept secret .  
S c i e n t i f i c  data and in fo rmat ion  erpccssez, 
---------- ---- --- ----------- 
When t h e  o r i g j  n  o f  t h e  cons iderab le  increases i n  t -adioact i  v i  t y  
l e v e l s  i n  many E~rropean coun t r i es  became knor~n, problems arose 
concerrring t he  ga t t~er - ing  ar~d t h e  trarmonization o f  data a t  t t ~ e  
na t i ona l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  about t h e  i n t c r p r e t a t i o n  and 
e v a l ~ l a t i o n  o f  data t o  decide on t h e  measures t o  be taken, and UII 
t h e  communication o f  s c i e n t i f i c  data t o  a  wide pub l i c .  I n  other 
terms, thet e  had been problems concerning t h e  re1 l a b i l i t y  t f  
s c i e n t i f i c  sources, t he  cho ice o f  i n f o rma t i on  channels (between 
experts, between exper ts  and po l  i t i  ca l  au t t~or - j  t i  cs, and from them 
t o  t he  p u b l i c ) ,  and t h e  use o f  t h e  media. 
Dur ing t h e  Chernobyl emcrgerbcy, t h e  r a d i a t i o n  monitot- ing 
systems o f  european coun t r i es  were shown t o  be d i f f e r e n t l y  
organized. I n  I t a l y ,  f o r  example, t he  moni tor ing network was not  
homogeneusl y  d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  t he  na t i ona l  t e r r i t o r y ,  r e f  l e c t l n g  
no t  so much t he  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t h e  few nuc lear  p l a n t s  working a t  
t h a t  t ime  i n  1tal.y (two i n  t he  North and one i n  t h e  South, p l u s  
one i n  t he  stage o f  decommissionir~g a1 50 i n  t h e  South), bu t  t h e  
unequal s o c i a l  and economic development o f  southern and nor thern  
areas: i n  f a c t  t h e  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  mon i to r ing  s t a t i o n s  (mainly t t ~ e  
ones o f  ENEA - Nat iona l  Commission f o r  Nuclear and a l t e r n a t i v e  
Energy- and t he  ones of  t h e  Local Heal th  U n i t s )  were most ly  jr l  
t h e  North. I n  face  o f  t h e  t he  Chernobyl f a l l - o u t  t he  moni tor ing 
network had t o  be extended, and u n i v e r s i t y  labora to ry  and other 
cent res i n  t h e  whole count ry  were asked t o  cooperate. But then 
an other  problem emerged: d i f f e r e n t  1  abora to r ies  were i t s i r ~ g  
d i f f e r e n t  ins t ruments  and producing non homogeneol~s data, 
t he re fo re  ENECI-DISP (Safety  and P ro tec t i on  Dj v i s i o r ~ )  had t t ~ c  
task  t o  c o l l e c t  and harmonjzc them (15).  
I n  o ther  c o ~ l n t r i c s  d i f f e r e n t  problems arose: i n  a ~ l s t r i a  - t o  
g i v e  another exampl e- t h e  sourve i  11 ance system f o r  environmental 
r a d i o a c t i v i t y  was almost equal 1  y  d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  t h e  cour~ t r  y (but 
w i t h  a  h igher  dens i t y  o f  mon i to r ing  s t a t i o n s  along t h e  borders 
and i n  t he  Nor th) ,  and worked q u i t e  we l l .  But the  numbeta o f  
r a d i a t i o n  p r o t e c t i o n s  exper ts  was t o o  low -mainly because of t he  
absence o f  nuclear p l a n t s  i n  eus t r i a -  and data transmission and 
evalctation proved t o  bc d i f f  i c u l  t ( 1 6 ) .  
A t  the i n t e r n s t i o n a l  l eve l ,  t h e  EC count r ies  had t he  duty 
(pr o:*i ded f o r  by t he  EUHhTOtI Tr eaty )  t o  commi.tr~icate the  dattl 
on rad ioac t i \ . < i t y  contarninstion qathered i n  t h e  na t i ona l  t e r r i t o r y  
t u  t t ~ c  EC Commission. And t h i s  d i d  not happened w i  t h o ~ t t  pt-oblcrt~z 
because i n  t he  beginniny t l l 2  ~j-,ta coming frorn d i f f e r e n t  c o ~ t n t r i o s  
were not  homogcncoi~s. 
On t he  bas is  o f  these examples, i t  i s  easy t o  see t h a t  dicta 
gather ing and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a re  a  not  s imple and uncontrovers ia l  
processes. Duri  ng t h e  Chernobyl emct gcricy, controvct-si EE, ct-oppeci 
up concerning t he  re1  i abi 1  i t y  or -on the  con t ra ry -  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  
of p rod~tc ing  from very unequal 1  y  d i s t r i b u t e d  data some "average" 
data cover ing more o r  l ess  b i g  areas: t h e  c r i t i c s  o f  average 
estimates maintained t h a t  i t  was s c i e n t i f  i c a l l  y  wrong and 
po l  i t i c a l 1  y u n f a i r  (because o f  t he  consequences regard ing t he  
p r o t e c t i v e  measures t o  be taken) t o  speal: about averages when the  
metereological  cond i t ions  had ' ca~rsed a  very  d i f f e r e n t  
d i  s t r i b u t i o r l  of r ad ioac t i ve  contaminat ion a l so  i n  re1  a t i  vel  y  
c lose  areas, and consequent1 y  d i f f e r e n t  1  eve1 s  of  dangerousness 
fo r  people. Defenders o f  average est imates maintained ori t t le  
con t ra ry  t h a t  these est imates were co r rec t  -and usefu l  i n  
deciding on measures- because of  the  t r ade  o f  non-1 ocal 1  y 
prod~rced food i n  t h e  shor t  term, and because o f  t h e  en te r i nq  o f  
r ad joac t i ve  isotopes i n  t h e  food chain i n  t h e  medium and 1or1g 
t-orm ( 1 7 ) .  
These curttr ~ \ ~ e r . . s i  e  concerning t he  gather ing and t h e  [tee uf 
s c i e n t i f i c  data, and t h e  mentioned cont rovers ies about the 
evaluat ion o f  data t o  es tab l i sh  "safe"  r a d j a t i o n  doses (a l so  ttte 
gu ide l ines  prepared by t h e  ICPH - I n te rna t i ona l  Commission f o r  
Radio log ica l  F't-rjt.ec.ti on- had been questioned and lower t-adi at ior t  
admissible doses suggested), were made p u b l i c  by t he  media. 
S c i e n t i s t s  workjrlg i-~i t t ~ i ~ t  o f f  i c j  a1 ar~d rturr o f f  i c j  a1 i n s t i  t ~ l t i u r ~ c ,  
-and having d i f f e r e n t  opinions- were in te rv iev~ed;  and T V  and 
r a d i o  debates betweer~ expet-ts, pol i t i c a l  a~rthot i t i  es r~~tc j  
sometimes env i  ronmsrital groups were organized. Some o f  them had 
been very  use fu l  i n  order t o  g i v e  c i t i z e n s  some elements t o  
understand t h e  main fea tu res  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n :  i n  f ac t ,  because 
of t h e  t h e  lack  o f  o ther  in fo rmat ion  channels ( a p a r t  from some 
telephone numbers of  hea l t h  and c i v i  1  p r o t e c t i o n  a u t h o r i t i e s  
where people coir ld ask f o r  in fo rmat ion) ,  t h e  media had been ttbe 
main re ference p o i n t  f o r  c i t i z e n s  wanting t o  know what was going 
on, f o r  cen t ra l  and l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  t h a t  needed t o  infot-m 
c i t i z e n s  about p r o t e c t i v e  measures, and f o r  " o f f i c i a l  " and 
"d iss iden t "  s c i e n t i s t s  asked f o r  explanat ion. I n  some cases 
de ta i l ed  and c l ea r  maps o f  t he  f a l l - o u t  were shown, t h e  causes of  
t h e  accident a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  explained , and comparative 
( w i t h i n  t h e  var ious  areas and i n  d i f f e r e n t  days) l e v e l s  o f  food 
contamination discussed. But very o f t e n  t h e  language used w a s  
c r y p t i c ,  t h e  arguments given f o r  or  against  measures were 
uncleat-, and disagreements which were no t  e x c l ~ ~ s i v e l y  s c i e r t t i f i c  
but  a l so  p o l i t i c a l  i n  na tu re  were not  made e x p l i c i t  bu t  t r ea ted  
w i  t h  a f  a1 se l  y  neu t ra l  1  anguage. 
As a  consequence, c i t i z e n s  f e l t  overpowerd by a  l o t  of 
con t rovers ia l  and sometimes not understandable i n f  ormat ioi j  t t r ~ < t .  
questioned t h e  re1 i a b i l  i t y  of s c i e n t i f i c  sources and the 
c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  exper ts  and p o l i t i c i a n s .  And t h a t  turned out t o  be 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a1 arming no t  on1 y  because (as previous1 y  sa id )  i t  
concerned hazards t h a t  t he  so-cal l e d  1  ay peopl e  hard1 y  suspected 
t o  be exposed to ,  but  a l s o  because i t  sounded e i t h e r  not  very 
re1  i a b l e  o r  u n i n t e l l e g i b l e .  
R ight  t p  i q f  orrnatiqn pnd cqmmuni ca t  1 on e r p b l c ~ s ,  
-- 
The Chernobyl chal lenge t o  t h e  whole system of i n f  or ma ti or^ 211d 
communication i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  h igh - r i sk  technolog ies can be 
summarized i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  po in ts :  1)  sect-ecy may tleavi I ), 
t..rndermine t h e  r i g h t  t o  and t he  need o f  i n fo rmat ion ;  2 )  pt-obleins 
may enbet-qe i f  t h e r e  a re  not  adequate and coordinated p o l  i t i c a l  
and s c i e n t i f i c  i n fo rmat ion  channels a t  t he  na t i ona l  arid 
i n t e v n a t i  onal l e v e l  3 3)  not  t o  be and f e e l  uvet puwct c.d srtd 
pass ive v i c t i m s  o f  someone e l s e  dec is ions,  and t o  b e t t e r  p r o t e c t  
themselves, c i t i z e n s  have t o  be p rope r l y  informed i n  a1 1 stages 
o f  deci sion-making concerning h i gh - r i s k  technolog ies and no t  on1 y 
i n  cases o f  l a r g e  acc idents  ; moreover- they shoi i ld have C I I ~  
chance t o  ask which k i nd  o f  i n fo rmat ion  they need and t o  express 
t h e i r  own op in ions  i n  a two-way, o r  b e t t e r  (g iven t h e  plctt a1 i l y  
of  s o c i a l  r o l e s  and i n t e r e s t s )  a mrrlti-way comm~~nicat ion 
pt- occss . 
So f a r ,  t h e  f i r s t  two p o i n t s  arbd hame elements concerning t t ~ e  
t h i r - d  one have been analysed. I t  i s  t ime  t o  remind these 
elements and t o  address t h i s  f i n a l  po i n t .  
I n  order t o  p rope r l y  i n f o rm  c i t i zenc-  i n  a l l  stages o f  dec is ion-  
making i r l  t h e  f i e l d  of  h igh-r isk:  technology i t  i s  neceusat y L c ,  
make access ib le  and ~tnderstandable t h e  in fo rmat ion  which i s  
avai 1 ab le  (g iven the  c o n s t r a i n t s  and t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  
uncer ta in t ies /cont rovers ies  mentioned be fo re )  on t h e  hazards 
i n v o l  ved i r~ suctr techno1 ogi  es, on t he  sa fe t y  measut-es p rov j  ded 
f o r  both r o u t i n e  and emergency s i t u a t i o n s ,  on t he  c r i t e r i a  
suggested f o r  the  cho ice o f  t h e  s i t e ,  on t he  re l evan t  l e g i s l a t i v e  
p t -os/ is ions,  and on t h e  a1 l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  
I n  t h i s  respect ,  some important s teps have bcert ; 3l::c11 b~t. t t l C  
l e g i s l a t i v e  l e v e l  -or are i n  course of dcbate- i n  t he  USA and i n  
t he  EEC ( I admit rn)' iqrlor arlce about non-EC European Coi.lr)tt i eo  
- inc luded eastern coun t r ies -  and about o ther  developed and 
dew1 oping co i tn t r - ies)  . 
I n  t he  USA, t h e  Nat iona l  Erbvironmental Po l i c y  nc-t (NEPR) 
approuved i n  1969 inc ludes  procedures o f  i n f o rma t i on  about the 
environmental impacts o f  pt upused dct i one, arld a f  r-eedom u f  
i n f  ormat ion p r o v i s i o n  regard ing environmental matters.  And i t  i s  
well-known t h e  system o f  t h e  p u b l i c  hear ings used i n  t h a t  c ~ i i r ~ t t . ~  
(and a l so  i n  Great B r i t a i n )  aimed a t  enabl ing an informed 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  c i t i z e n s ,  s t a r t i n g  from t h e  e a r l y  stages of  t t te 
decision-making processes ( f o r  instance, s i  t i n g  of  ha= ardous 
i n s t a l l a t i o r t s ) .  Th is  system has prouved t o  be a good s tep i r ,  t t l r  
d i r e c t i o n  of a c t i v e  c i t i z e n s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and a way o f  
improving p o l i t i c a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  a u t h o r i t i e s '  ( f o r  instance, 
r egu la to r y  agencies) responsiveness; even i f  i t  has been argued 
t ha t  more i s  needed t o  r e a l l y  achieve these ends, and t h a t  i r t  
order  not  t o  be j u s t  symbolic r i t u a l s ,  t h e  p u b l i c  hear ings should 
be reformed (10). 
I n  t h e  EEC, a proposal f o r  a D i r e c t i v e  concernir lg the  f t  eeiiu111 
of  i n f o rma t i on  on environmental mat ters  i s  under debate, whi 1 e 
t he  D i rec t  i ve on Envi t onment a1 Ilnpact Assess~~ertt -appt o~tvc i i  i I I 
1905- s t a t e s  t h a t  bo th  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  respons ib le  f o r  the 
au tho r i za t i on  procedures and t h e  p u b l i c  concerned have t o  be 
informed about p r o j e c t s  regard ing  nuc lear  and i n t eg ra ted  
chemj c a l  p lan ts ,  to::i c wastes reprocessir lg p lan ts ,  and ottlct 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  adverse environmental impacts. Moreover, 
a r t i c l e  0 o f  t h e  so-cal 1 ed Seveso D i r e c t i v e  r e q i ~ i  r e s  t h a t  Menlbet 
States i n f o rm  a l l  persons l i k e l y  t o  be a f f ec ted  by majot 
accidents ( inc luded c i t i z e n s  o f  o ther  States)  o f  sa fe t y  measures 
and behaviour t o  be adopted i n  case of  acc idents  r e l a t e d  t o  t t ~ c  
i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  covered by t h e  D i r e c t i v e .  Nuclear p l an t s  
a re  no t  covered by t h e  Seveso D i rec t i ve ,  t h e r e f o r e  a f t e r  t t le 
Chernobyl accident a  proposal has been submit ted by t h e  EC 
Commj. s s j  on concerning t h e  in fo rmat ion  o f  t h e  p o p ~ t l a t i  on aburrL 
h e a l t h  p r o t e c t i o n  measures t o  be appl ied and s teps t o  be taken i n  
t he  event o f  r a d i o l o g i c a l  emergency (19) .  Hopef~ . t l l y  t h i s  prupureLS 
Dj rect5 vt. a ~ i d  t ho  one concerning freedom of in fo rmat ion  w i  11 be 
appr ouved. Rut l e g i s l a t i o n  has t o  be implemented i n  ordet- t o  Lc 
trsoful, and t h e  cond i t i ons  t o  achieve implementation and -more i n  
gener b l  -- t o  b r i n y  abo~r t  e f f e c t i v e  i n f  ormat ion and commcrni c a t j  or1 
processes a re  not on1 y  o f  j u r i d i c a l  natcrre. Risk Comm~tnications 
stcrdjec, can he lp  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  some o f  them. 
C o n t r o l L a b L l L t y  i s  one element. I t  i s  no t  enough t o  s t a t e  tha t  
in fo rmat ion  has t o  be made access ib le  o r  has .to t ~ c  a c t i  :.el y 
d i s t r i b u t e d ,  nor t o  i n d i c a t e  who should do t ha t :  i t  i s  a l so  
necessary t o  c o n t r o l  i f  t h i s  i s  dor.te ar~d t~ow, t ak i ng  i n t o  accocrr~t 
t h a t  t h e  procedrrres and t h e  forms of  i n fo rmat ion  can be as 
impor.tarlt a5 t h e  contents  of  i t .  
Lagggugg i s  an important element i n  t h i s  respoct-. I f  the 
access ib le  in fo rmat ion  i s  c t - y p t i c a l l  y  worded or f  u l l  u f  
unexplained t e c h n i c a l i t i e s ,  c i t i z e n s  w i  11 f i n d  themselves i n  the 
s i t u a t i o n  of yoLtng Ftenzo i n  f r o n t  of  t he  u n i n t e l l e g i b l e  I a t i r ~  
sentences of lawyer Azzeccagarbugli i n  t he  "Fromessi Sposi" o f  
Manzoni : they w i  11 f i n d  i t  useless and ever1 SLISP~C~OLIS ,  or  j ~ t s t  
bo r i ng  i n  t h e  b e t t e r  case. Language i s  no t  neu t ra l  because of  
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  cu l t u res ,  va l~ res  and power re1  a t i o n s  under-1 y i r ~ g  j t, 
and t he re  i s  no n e t ~ t r a l  way t o  present in fo rmat ion ;  on the  
con t ra ry  " f raming e f f ec t s " ,  i .e .  d i f f e r e n t  reac t io r le  t o  t h e  same 
data framed i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways, have been observed (20). Rut some 
c r i t e r i a  o f  cor rectness can be probably found: f o r  example, t u  
make e x p l i c i t  a l l  t he  assumptions made, t h e  sources o f  t h e  data 
u t i  1 ized, t h e  methodologj es choosen and t h e i r  1  i m i  t s .  
Q ~ e q g ~ s  i s  an o ther  c r u c i a l  element. I f  s c i e n t i f i c  
unce r t a i n t i es  at-e hidden i n  order t o  g i v e  a  reassur ing imagc u f  
r i s k y  technolog ies and o f  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  s c i e n t i s t s  t o  master 
them, i n  case o f  acc idents  people w i l l  f ee l  no t  o n l y  st~oltcd btlt  
a1 so disenchanted and cheated. The same app l ies  t o  p o l i t i c a l  and 
o rgan i za t i o r~a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  r e g a r d i r ~ g  t t ~ e  rnanagemer~t of  compl c:: 
technolog ies ( 2 1 ) .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  genera l l y  people look f o r  
reassurance and t h a t  s c i e r~ce  has been ( a f t e r  o r  together w i t h  
r e l i g i o n )  a  main source of  i t .  Bctt an i l l -g rounded  reassurance 
(not t o  speak about i 1  1  -grounded s e l f  -con+ i dence) sooner or 1  atev 
t u r n s  out t o  be danqerorrs. 
Mu1 t i -way communication i s  a lso  fundamental. Usual 11) 
in fo rmat ion  f l o r ~ s  a re  supposed t o  go from the  source t o  t h e  
r ece i ve r  ( o r  r ece i ve r s )  i n  a  one-way process. But i n  order t o  
v e r i f y  t h e  e f f ec t i veness  o f  i n fo rmat ion  ( f o r  instarrce, i n  case uf 
emergencies l i k e  Chernobyl, t o  v e r i f y  i f  c i t i z e n s  rece ived the  
in fo rmat ion  abo~t t  t h e  measures t o  be fo l lowed and understood 
them), i t  i s  necessary t o  have some feedbacks. Which means t h a t  
procedcrres sho~ r l d  be found t o  g i v e  t h e  oppor tun i t y  t o  t h e  ~rsutr l  
r ece i ve r s  t o  become sources o f  i n fo rmat ion  (about t h e i r  needs, 
t h e i r  d i f f  i c ~ t l t i e s ,  t h e i r  pe rcep t ion  o f  t h e  r i s k s ,  and t t w j  t 
wi l l i ngness  t o  r u n  them o r  n o t )  i n  a  mult i-way process of  
commctni c a t i  on between experts,  po l  i t i c i a n s ,  va r ious  organized 
i n t e r e s t  groups, and concerned i nd i v i dua l s .  I n  t h i s  m u l t i  -way 
communication process, t h e  mass-media can have a  p r i v i l e g e d  r o l e  
as t o o l s  of communication between d i f f e r e n t  sec to rs  of  soc ie ty  
tha t  would probably never meet otherwise, both at  t he  nat ional  
and t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  
The pgwppggs of communication have a1 so t o  be examined and made 
expl i c i t .  I n  t he  f i e l d  of haza rdo~~s  technologies, communication 
procedures i n  general and r i s k  communication s tud ies  i n  
p a r t i c ~ ~ l a r  can be used as l e g i t i m a t i o n  devices: t h a t  i s ,  f  inrJ ir~y 
a more "n ice"  way t o  t e l l  th ings  i n  order t o  make 
accepted/tolerated otherwise unacceptable r i s k s ,  technologies arid 
p o l i c i e s .  I n  o ther  words they can be used f o r  manipulatory 
purposes ins tead  of being aimed a t  g i v i n g  people elements t o  for (11 
t h e i r  own op in ion  and a t  in fo rming  them about t he  measures ( i f  
any) t o  m i t i g a t e  t he  r i s k s  they run  i n  r o u t i n e  and i n  ernet-gel~~y 
s i t u a t i o n s  (22). 
The Chernobyl chal lenges t o  experts '  and po l  i t i c i  all!=.' 
c r e d i b i l i t y  seem t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i t  i s  l e s s  and l ess  easy t o  
l e g i t i m i z e  dec is ions and keep consensus by reassur i r ~ y  c i  t i z c ~ ~ c  L ~ I I  
t he  bas is  of f a l s e  o r  i 11-grounded ( or  excessivol  y  e z l f  - 
con f iden t )  in fo rmat ion  about t he  hazards a t  stake, and about t t lc  
s c i e n t i f i c  unce r ta i n t i es  and t he  po l  i t i ca l - o rgan i za t i ona l  
dj f  f  i cc11 t i es i nvol ved i n managi ng h i  gh-r i sl; techno1 ogi e5. Ar r ci 
t he  widespread (even i f  unequal 1  y  d i s t r i b u t e d )  d i f f u s i o n  of  
comm~tni ca t i on  technologies i nd i ca tes  t h a t  i n  o~lt- " g l  obal  v i l  l aye"  
i t  i becomincj increasing1 y  d i f  f  ic1.11 t t o  keep secrets  about 
" j  r~converi ierlt" events, and t o  con t ro l  a l l  f  ot-ms and c o r ~ L c ! ~ l ~  uf 
i n fo rmat ion  i n  order t o  ob ta i n  u n c r i t i c a l  consensus. 
I -ear l l ing from Chernobyl has been and i s  art hard e::pet-ic~~cc.. 
Espec ia l l y  f o r  those who su f fe red  and are s u f f e r i n g  - d i r e c t l y  o r  
i n d i r e c t l y -  f o r  i t .  H o p e f ~ r l l y  i t  w i l l  he lp  avoid ing some futclt e 
Chernobyl i n  t he  nuclear and i n  o ther  f i e l d s .  Humankind i s  not 
al lowed t o  face  many of  them. 
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The approach to rick management of industrial hazards in Canada is bared 
primarily on a cooperative approach rather than the usual regulatory 
approach. I t  is expected that this approach will lead to higher levels of 
safety and a morrcompotitiveposition for Canadian industries. In 
Canada, legislative authority for risk management is mainly vested in the 
Provincrs with some residual areas being a Federal responsibility. The 
Major Indurtrial Accidents Coordinating Committee (MlACC) w r  formed to 
coordinate activities of Provincial and Federal governments, self 
regulation p r o g r m e r  by industry, and safety efforts by other sectors of 
rocimty. Tho expmctation Is that the cooperative approach, uith rome 
regulations as necessary, will result in higher compliance with safety 
practicer. 
The papor will present the results of studies by Canadian industry, 
Provinces, Federal ministrier of Environment, Transport, Emergency 
Preparedness, and others, presented to the 2nd annual meeting of MlACC, 
November 29-30, 1908, The conclusions of the MIACC meeting and the 
implications for the timing and implementation of risk management of 
industrial hazards in Canads will also be prerented. 
MIACC 
MIACC is the Major Industrial Accident Coordinating Committee and it is 
the unique Canadian approach to the risk management of major industrial 
accidents. The objective of MIACC is; 
"to provide, for all interested parties, a focus for actions and 
leadership to reduce major accidents involving dangerous substances 
in terms of number and severity as they impact on public safety, 
health and the environment, by improving prevention, preparedness 
and response programs." 
MIACC functions as a voluntary organization of stakeholders who meet at 
an annual convention to present progress on the objective and to 
establish policy directions and task forces on a cooperative basis. The 
second convention was held in November 1988. A key concept is that of a 
"stakeholder" who is defined as; 
"groups that have a vital interest in developing a workable approach 
for managing chemicals, are directly affected by the issue and can 
make important contributions to its resolution" (ref.1). 
Stakeholders include: Federal departments of Environment, Transport, 
Emergency Preparedness and Health and Welfare; three representatives of 
Provincial governments; chemical and petroleum industry associations; 
fire and police associations; university representatives; and public 
interest groups. 
The MIACC approach resulted from an extensive process of consultation 
and consensus-seeking over a number of years. There was early 
recognition that a cooperative approach rather than a strictly 
legislative approach would be more effective in Canada. Many of the 
stakeholders have legislative or self regulatory capabilities. In Canada 
the provinces have responsibility for preventative and response 
activities for major industrial accidents. Also Canadian industry, with 
its very small national population, must maintain its competitive 
position in order to survive. Finally, there is a high level of concern 
for safety and the protection of the environment in Canada. 
A key issue is whether or not the MIACC approach will work and will be 
an effective alternative to other approaches. The next few years may 
provide the verdict. However, it must be recognized that different 
approaches have different problems and this complicates the evaluation 
task. For example, experience in the U.S. OSHA program is summarized as 
follows: 
"The OSHA rule (on provision of Material Safety Data Sheets) is now 
being implemented, but corporate compliance and agency enforcement 
have been problematic. The agency is investigating over 6000 
alleged violations by firms, mostly small companies, during 1986 ; 
trying to enlighten its own inspectors as well as regulated firms 
as to what chemicals are subject to the rule and what constitutes 
appropriate methods of implementation; seeking help from Customs 
officials on how to enforce the rule against foreign firms whose 
chemicals are imported into the U.S.; and initiating additional 
related inspection and communication programs . . .  all with a reduced 
budget and opposition from the President's office and the small 
business sector of the chemical industry" (ref.2, p52). 
The MIACC approach is one of coordination of activities of others 
through the review of activities, gathering of information, and 
monitoring the progress of levels of safety. Legislation is considered 
on an "as necessary" basis where the voluntary approach will not work or 
has reached its limit of effectiveness. 
BACKGROUND 
Thirty years ago the chemical industries in Sarnia, Ontario joined to- 
gether to form the Chemical Valley Emergency Coordination 
Organization(CVECO), an association to prevent and mitigate the risk of 
a major chemical accident. Thirteen industrial plants and the local 
community entered into a joint planning exercise which has resulted in 
an integrated emergency response plan. The plan includes annual 
testing, provision of sirens for warning of an incident, purchase of 
equipment by industry, a joint industrial/community management 
committee, etc. 
Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta, has also had a joint industry community 
emergency response cabability for many years. In Quebec the VARENNES 
industrial society has worked closely with community officials to 
institute zoning changes to reduce exposure to possible accidents. 
There are many other examples of successful long term safety activities 
to manage risks from major industrial accidents. 
After the Mississauga train derailment, which had only a few injuries 
but evacuated 250,000 people, Canada, in 1985, provided regulations for 
the movement of dangerous goods under the Transportation of Dangerous 
Goods Act. These regulations have been adopted by the provinces. This 
act requires the existence of an emergency response plan in the event of 
an incident and also specified a list of some 400 dangerous goods which 
provide the starting point for MIACC's list of substances. 
Since 1979 Transport Canada has provided one central 24 hour source of 
information for responding to spills of chemicals, called CANUTEC. It 
has on file over 25,000 data sheets on products shipped by producers. 
If either the shipper or the PIN number can be identified for a 
transportation release then information can be provided to assist in 
responding to the incident. 
Prior to the Bhopal incident the Canadian Chemical Producers' 
Association (CCPA) had started a self regulating activity "Responsible 
Care: A Total Commitmentn. Each member of the association is reauired 
to implement the responsible care program reflecting a new "corporate 
environmental mentality". The statement of commitment reads as follows: 
"The Canadian Chemical industry is committed to taking every 
practical precaution towards ensuring products do not present an 
unacceptable level of risk to its employees, customers, the public 
or the environment. The most senior executive responsible for 
chemical operations in each member company of CCPA has formally 
accepted these principles" (ref.3). 
A key program of Responsible Care is the Community Awareness and 
Emergengy Response (CAER) program. To date 100% of the 224 plants in 
110 Canadian communities have participated in a CAER seminar. Eighty- 
seven percent of plants have had discussions with the local community, 
40% have draft community emergency response plans and about 16% of all 
plants have had at least one of the annual field tests required by CAER. 
The responsible care program of CCPA also requires plant safety 
assessments, a CAER type program for the shipment of product including 
minimum risk routing, a community right to know policy, a program of 
care in the storage and production of chemicals, a hazardous waste 
management code of practice, a panel of the public to provide feedback 
and a chemical information "hot linen. 
In anticipation of the need for information, the Federal Department of 
the Environment started in 1983 to develop a series of EnviroTIPS-- 
Technical Information on Problem Spills, which provide information on 
individual chemicals, their properties, their hazards, how to handle 
then to minimize risk, and so forth. There currently are 50 manuals. 
The concern for the environment in Canada, combined with the desire to 
have a strong economy, led in 1984 to the initiation of a task force of 
industry, government, public interest groups and labour to study how 
chemicals should be managed. The result was the concept illustrated in 
Figure 1 (ref.1). that chemicals should be managed from "cradle to 
grave". The task force also emphasized the need for monitoring and 
evaluation. Finally, the task force demonstrated that the cooperative 
approach would work since the CCPA undertook to implement the 
recomendations that applied to their industrial sector. 
The Department of Health and Welfare, in devloping an approach to risk 
assessment and management in Canada, developed a conceptual approach 
that has a heavy emphasis on the monitoring and evaluation of regulatory 
decisions. 
After Bhopal a Canadian committee was formed by Environment Canada to 
assess the Canadian situation. This committee was a cooperative effort 
by industry, government and public. It made 21 recommendations on 
actions required in Canada to ensure the safety of, arid public 
confidence in, the production and use of chemicals (ref. 4). By the end 
of 1988 monitoring of the progress on these 21 recommendations has 
identified over 200 programs, plans and activities of agencies and 
organizations in Canada. These varied from training programs for first 
responders to the establishment of provincial disaster funds for 
compensation of victims. 
In October 1988, Canada initiated the WHMIS system of Workplace 
Hazardous Materials Information System under the Hazardous Products Act. 
WHMIS, in a similar way to the transport of dangerous goods regulations, 
has been implemented by adopting legislation in all the provinces of 
Canada. This act requires the provision of information to all workers 
handling dangerous chemicals. It is providing a heightened awareness of 
risks in the workplace. 
FIGURE 1 Stages in the Life Cycle Approach to Risk Analysis and 
Evaluation. 
RISK MANAGEMENT - THE PROBLEM 
The mayor of Hississauga, Hazel McCalleon, has said "accidents happen in 
communities not on the floor of the House of Commonsn. This could be 
paraphrased as "accidents happen on the plant floor not in discussions 
about approaches to risk management". There are many studies of major 
accidents that lead to the conclusion that accidents happen when a 
technical system gets out of control and there is no person on the plant 
floor who has the needed training and experience, the right equipment 
and the correct knowledge to regain control. 
The management of risk is a difficult task. There are thousands if not 
millions of situations that can cause out-of-control accidents and 
potential disasters. All but a few of these situations are dealt with 
by people and equipment in the system. How can the few that are not, be 
identified before the fact? After the fact it is relatively easy to 
discover what went wrong and what corrective action was not taken as the 
reading of any inquiry document will demonstrate. But how to do this 
and take corrective action before the rare event? 
A recent workshop on the impact of organizational structure and 
management on risk was held by the World Bank. While there was 
agreement that there was a problem it was felt that several more 
workshops would be necessary before the problem was defined and the 
search for solutions could begin. The problem is confounded by several 
factors; 
1. The very low frequency of potential disaster situations. 
2. The complexity of levels of government, governmental departments and 
overlapping regulations. 
3. The communication problem between industry and government and within 
industrial organizations. 
4. The difficulty of having people "take caren in situations that appear 
to be relatively risk free. 
5 .  The rapid changes in technology, production, government actions, and 
world events. 
These difficulties can generally be summarized as the "compliance" 
problem. Will the approach to risk management be followed? Will the 
operations follow the plan? Any effective risk management strategy has 
a monitoring and measure of effectiveness component. However, given the 
very low frequency of critical situations and the high frequency of 
system failure, even for the best systems, the evaluation of compliance 
is itself a difficult task. 
The morality of the problem must also be examined. Is it worth finding 
a solution to the problem? Given that we know many situations in the 
world where a few thousand dollars will save many lives through the 
provision of medical care, through the provision of education or through 
the provision of technology, are there solutions which have a high 
enough level of risk reduction to justify spending resources? 
It is generally assumed that given the magnitude of the potential 
disasters associated with major industrial activities that there are 
relative risk reduction-cost effective activities that should be under 
taken. This dimension of the problem should always be kept in the 
forefront, especially given the difficulties of finding good solutions 
to the problem. 
One problem in Canada is that many cities do not view industrial 
accidents as a priority and some chemical plants have had difficulty 
obtaining community cooperation in developing response plans. The 
likely reason is that the risks are perceived to be minimal and not of 
concern to the population. In some instances where there are no off- 
site risks this may be an accurate evaluation. However, it does pose 
problems for a comprehensive approach. 
Any approach to risk management will take several years to develop and 
to implement. A major incident will lead to a political response and if 
there is an incident in the development period of a risk mangement 
approach then it is possible that this will lead to adjustments in the 
approach and the reduction in effectiveness. Since zero risk is not 
possible and disasters will happen the response of the risk management 
approach to the political response must be a consideration in the 
selection of solutions. 
RISK MANAGEMENT - THE CANADIAN APPROACH 
The events leading up to the MIACC approach have been described above. 
They are characterized by a cooperative self-interest approach to the 
problem with the absence of a "grand plan of attack" that is typical of 
Canadian solutions to problems. The chemical industry was concerned 
that regulations copied from elsewhere would be neither effective nor 
efficient. Governments were cognizant of the difficulties of 
implementing policies across the provinces with their different 
situations and the public was demanding quick action to protect the 
environment. 
There were basically three options, 1) a federally regulated approach 
with comprehensive legislation and regulations, 2) a laissez faire 
voluntary approach, or 3) a cooperative approach that recognized the 
existing voluntary activities and then attempted to fill in the gaps 
of legislation or other programs as necessary. In regulating the 
movement of dangerous goods, the first approach was taken but in the 
case of major industrial accidents the third approach has evolved. 
The main reason was the expectation that at the level of the plant 
floor, on a day to day basis, the cooperative approach would lead to a 
higher level of safety. There does not exist techniques for evaluating 
or rationalizing this option. It was arrived at through the course of 
events and through a political type consensus seeking process. It is 
still thought to be the best approach and only time may provide a 
measure of its relative effectivness. 
A key component of the evolution of HIACC was the willingness of the 
chemical industry, through self regulation, to undertake to implement a 
program which meets or exceeds the requirements found in other 
countries. There was a commitme~lt from the top down and the active 
involvement of the local community, both factors which hold promise for 
effective results. It should be noted that a survey of Canadian opinion 
indicated that few people trust the chemical industry. Thus the 
cooperation with government and public interest groups is required to 
give credibility. 
Limitation of resources was also a key consideration. By concentrating 
on coordinating activities and identifying and filling the gaps the 
available resources could be more effective. 
The complexity and extensiveness of the existing initiatives and 
activities was also a key factor in the decision. In response to 
Mississagua, the Ocean Ranger, Bhopal, etc. many local communities, 
provinces and industrial associations had taken action to improve their 
planning, preparedness and response capability. Because of the self 
initiation of these efforts it was expected that they would be more 
effective than new regulation imposed from above. 
The speed of implementation is a major advantage of the MIACC approach. 
Historically, in Canada, major legislation of this type could take 3 to 
7 years to develop, promulgate and provide regulations. On the other 
hand some progress could be made immediately using the cooperative 
approach. 
A major concern about the MIACC approach is that not all industrial 
sectors/activities are amenable to self regulation. Not all chemical 
companies are members of CCPA. There are industrial sectors such as 
mining and pulp and paper which have the potential for major accidents 
which are not yet involved in MIACC. Recent incidents such as the fire 
in a PCB waste storage facility in St. Basile-Le-Grande, in October 
1988, with 3500 people evacuated for 17 days underscores the fact that 
many existing regulations are not complied with effectively. The 
approach of self regulation has lower public credibility. Some 
provinces such as Quebec and Alberta have implemented extensive risk 
management activities while others have not even considered the needs. 
Government legislation to support voluntary or self regulation programs 
will be considered on an "as necessary basis". For example, if there 
are chemical companies who are not members of CCPA and who are not 
undertaking CAER programs then appropriate legislation could be 
introduced by a province based on guidance developed by MIACC. The 
legislation would follow the approach already developed by the industry 
association and thus would not impose any additional burden on them but 
would in fact act to equalize the competitive position. Similarly, in 
the event of an incident leading to a political response, the approach 
developed under cooperative self regulation could form the substance of 
the new legislation. This would provide for rapid yet appropriate and 
well developed legislation. 
MIACC - PROGRESS REPORT 
Progress is measured annually at the national conference which also 
appoints the steering committee for the next year and identifies 
objectives for working groups. At the first conference in November of 
1987 the HIACC concept was developed and a concensus reached on its 
suitability as well as 13 working groups to begin the task of monitoring 
the existing activities and filling in the gaps. The second conference 
in November 1988 received the report of the working groups and proposed 
a number of major thrusts for 1989. 
The following highlight some of the results of the working group 
activities in 1988-1989: 
1. For the major chemical plants it appears that within two years all 
major producers in Canada will have joint industry community hazard 
awareness and emergency response plans and that these plans will have 
had field testing. 
2. The Canadian Manufactures' Association will shortly issue a series of 
manuals on hazard identification and risk management which are 
specifically aimed at small and medium sized firms. 
3. The conceptual approach to risk assessment was developed and 
standards for definitions, etc. presented that are consistent with 
other Canadian risk management activities. 
4. The fire and other emergency response forces are establishing 
national standards for the training of first responders. 
5. A set of manuals will be published by Emergency Preparedness Canada 
to guide communities in developing general emergency response plans 
incorporating major industrial accidents. 
6. Canadian municipalities were surveyed to establish a base line for 
the measurement of community preparedness. 
7. An examination of existing buffer zone legislation is underway and 
national guidelines can be expected shortly. 
8. The chemical information system in Canada is being examined with a 
view to linking the existing 10 separate data banks and user 
information systems. 
The top priority for 1989 is the development of joint industry community 
response plans. In particular, methods of overcoming the reluctance of 
communities to participate actively was identified as the top priority. 
The communication function was also identified as a priority for HIACC 
given its voluntary cooperative approach and the need for public 
acceptance. 
A priority approach to risk assessment and management has been proposed, 
as illustrated in Figure 2. This will provide for the maximum 
effectiveness in the implementation of risk management activities over 
the short term as well as maximizing the incentive for cooperation. 
The importance of monitoring and evaluation of progress were identified 
as a priority and a working group established to suggest measures and 
the creation of base-line measurements. 
- 1 3 2 -  
FIGURE 2 Strategic Approach to HIACC Risk Management 
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The regionalization of MIACC activities based on the national approach 
and providing the opportunity for provincial and local coordinating 
activities is to be studied by observing the pilot initiatives in the 
provinces of Quebec and Alberta. 
The identification and participation of other industry groups not 
currently in MIACC is an important priority for 1989. 
DISCUSSION 
The risk management of major accidents is subject to the difficulties of 
most risk management activities: no data, no models and no experience. 
The usual approach in such a situation is to gather the people with the 
most understanding and the people who are impacted and try to reach a 
concensus. To those in the scientific community and those seeking 
assurances of no risk this approach is not entirely satisfactory. 
However, there seems to be no real alternative but to get on with the 
management of risk and at the same time put in place a system to measure 
and evaluate the performance. Furthermore, new methods must be 
developed to model the expected compliance of the approach selected and 
thus begin to estimate the expected reduction in risk when compared to a 
laissez faire approach. 
It would seem that a study on a multi-country basis is required to 
generate the data necessary to evaluate approaches to the control of 
major accidents within a reasonable period of time. 
This paper has not considered nuclear power plants, since in Canada they 
are wholly under the control of governments or government owned 
companies and are not considered by MIACC. They are, as in many other 
parts of the world, heavily regulated and represent one extreme in the 
range of approaches to risk management. The regulatory authority has 
complete control over design, construction and operations of these 
plants. There is always some one looking over the shoulder. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Canadian approach to managing the risk from major industrial 
accidents is unique in that it is based on a voluntary cooperative self 
regulation approach. The diversity and the complexity of the task is 
thought to be more effectively and efficiently addressed by this 
approach. The expectation is that the result will be safer than other 
approaches. 
There is no proof that the approach taken is better than alternative 
approaches. 
The MIACC approach is made possible by the leadership shorn by the 
chemical industry and key government departments as well as the active 
cooperation of many other sectors of the Canadian economy. 
The approach is a direct result of the historical development of 
stakeholders reaching consensus through extensive consultation and 
discussion within an understanding that action must be taken voluntarily 
or by government. 
Progress to date appears to be occurring faster than strict legislative 
approaches and the activities underway compare favourably in 
effectiveness with other initiatives in other countries. 
There is a need for a study of the effectiveness of approaches taken in 
different countries and in different industries to identify conditions 
which actually improve safety for the public and the environment. 
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The Market Failure as a Functional Economic 
Moment 
Michael Huber 
European University Institute 
Preface 
I attempt to present some more theoretical considerations 
regarding the distribution of costs which are caused by large 
accidents and the political management of these costs. One 
mechanism I shall examine more thoroughly is the Polluter - 
Pays-h-inciple ,which I analyse in the context. of policy analysis. 
My two main hypotheses are: 
* The political management of market failures jn particular of 
negative externalities , is simulating the market mechanism in a 
way ,that the allocation of resources might become economically 
optimal, although the political aspect of distribution of those 
costs is largely ignored.The meaning of the Polluter-Pays- 
Principle tips over to,what I call provocatively, the Victim- 
Pays-Twice-Principle. 
* My second hypothesesis i s ,  that there is an economic necessity 
to keep the distribution of the costs asymmetric, as otherwise 
international disasters of high severity might endanger the 
existence of an entire market or segment of a market. 
The market is not able to integrate all consequences of an 
accident on its own as certan qualities of large accidents exclude 
parts of i t  to become an object of market transactions.There is 
need for political action as accidents do not only damage material 
goods,but might threaten social systems. 
I assume in this paper the managernent of large accidents and 
their consequent socia1,yolitical and economic costs to be a social 
problem ,which cannot be treated sufficiently within the 
social sub-system from which i t  emerges. Niklas Luhmann 
characterizes in his t m k  'Okologische Kommunikation " (1986) 
ecological problems as those which have to be r ~ l v e d  in 
diverse subsy stems,as there are : economy ,science,poli ticsjeligion 
and 1aw.Luhmann states ,that the essential problem ,why 
ecological problems could not be resolved till now is, that in those 
distinct sub-systems different approaches and conceptualizations 
of the issue are applied and the do not treat the identical social 
problem but different parts or elements of it. 
This phenomema appears also in the different meanings the 
notion of risk has in an economic,political or technical context. 
The increasing intensity and frequency of large accidents, the 
resulting alarm on the political side and the increasing scarcity 
of common resources,which obliges to rethink U~eir management 
on the economic side,emphasize the importance of those issues. 
They also question the progress of a society that sets equal 
societal with technical progress; Adorno summarizes this 
reasoning ,when he remarks: 
Xeine Universalgeschichte fikhrt vom 
Wilden zur HumanitAt,sehr wohl eine 
von der Steinschleuder zur Megabombe.' 
(ADORNOJegative Dialektik, 1975.3 14)l 
Large Accidents 
- 
Before I shall analyze the political management of the cost 
distribution resulting from large accidents I want to analyze the 
'No univera l  histroy leads from the savage to humenity,yet there i s  one from 
the slingshot to the rnege-bomb.'(My trens1etion.M.H.) 
notion of accidents more carefully. 
Charles Perrow describes technical accidents as functional 
disruptions of a technical system,which can be characterized by 
two factors: comlex inter actions and tight coupling.3~errow 
concludes ,that accidents become normal or unavoidable ,as the 
orignate from the construction of technical systems; 
"(Tlhese systems require organizational 
structures that have large internal contradictions 
and technical fixes,that only increase interactive 
complexity and tighten the coupling".(FERROW 
1984:5l 
An accident in this context is defined as 
' a failure in a sub-system or the system as a 
whole that damages more than one unit and in 
doing so disrupts the ongoing or future output of 
the system."(PERROW 1984:66) 
This approach has its merits for the conceptualization of accidents 
as consequent products of a certain organizational structure and 
allows also to perceive an accident not as an outer-societal force 
,as i t  is done in the main stream of disaster research. A t  the same 
time this approach represents the traditional conceptualization of 
disasters as an unwanted event, that has to be located in time 
and space. I shall call this type of disaster a ' centered disaster 
' ;the classical ideogram is the explosion of a steam engine,that 
did not only fulfill the requirements of a limited geographical 
and social place - a center - but could also be perceived with 
the human senses. A 'social place ' means the limitation to one 
2 Charles P e r r w  ,Ilorml Accidents- Living v i t h  High-Risk -Techmlogy,l984 
Charles P e r r w  ,Complex Organizations ,1986 
3'rhe precise description of t k  two factors and their explanatory pover can be 
found i n  P e r r o w  'Normel Accidents - Living v i t h  High Risk Technology' and 
shall not be repeated here. 
social group,in particular to those operating the machinery .4 
Furthermore f rom a point of view of sclciety,these processes were 
reversible,that is , the damge and the consequences can be 
managed with societal means . 
Diasters of a new type,which I would call 'non-centered- 
disasters ' ,have different features ,which not all have to appear 
a t  the same time: 
First. they cannot be perceived with the individual senses,but 
only on an aggregated,that. is: societal level of perception ; or the 
cannot be perceived a t  all. 
Secondly,they do not necessarily have an individualized center. 
Thirdl~~they are, because of their geographical or temporal 
extension not limited to a certain group of society. 
Fourth, those processes are irreversible. 
=the management of consequences is characterized by a high 
degree of scientific and political uncertainty. 
The very nature of non-centered-disasters can be illustrated by 
the accumulation of environmental pollution,that tips over to a 
disaster. 
This kind of impacts are not ruling out the the type of centered 
disasters, although they are of increasing importance. 
By taking those features into consideration I implicitly propose to 
extend the notion of disaster - even when this does not 
correspond with the form of perception and conceptualization of 
accidents by organizations,that are supposed to manage them. 
Those organizations which manage the 'emergency 
4 Til l  the beginning of this century ,d imters  i n  technical system and their 
ecological consequences were perceived to be outside of society; their consequences 
were mainly restricted to the vorking class. Ortega y W t  (La rebelion de les 
~ S B S  1 9 3 0 ) ~ ~  the first one to debate the mssses breeking into the 
bourgeais vorld,vith the masses also the negative consequences of the technical 
system emerge for the public.(f.ex.;SARTRE,Critique de l a  raison dialectique, 
1960) 
planning','search and rescue' and first steps of 
'reconstruction'jeac on the impact of the event on a social 
system.This impact is defined in a wa.y,that the decision ,when 
and how to intiervene ,can be made dependent on the impact only 
and does not require particular instances of decision-making.This 
impact can be distinguished according to the dimension of its 
geographical and temporal extension,the dimension of intensity - 
measured in units of destruction or fatalities - or a combination 
of those. 
While the organizations in their process of defining the impact 
follow the logical pattern of cause-effect-relations as main point 
of reference,the non-centered-disasters cannot necessarily be 
traced back to individual origins; they have no predictable 
patterns of extension.That makes interventions difficult as there 
is no sufficiently understood cause,but much effect. 
I am interested in the impacts of those accidents ,as they call for 
a management different to centered disasters. 
Being interested in the management of those disasters I 
concentrate on one form of market failures namely negative 
externalities and leave aside all other forms as there are 
asymmetric information and (natural) monopoly. 
Market Failure 
A market failure can be defined as a situation in which the 
optimal allocation of resources to reach an maximal overall- 
utility - that is the utility for producer and consumer - can be 
provided only by the intervention from the outsidemay i t  be the 
state or actors like f .ex. neocorporate settings. 
A disaster can be taken as a market failure because the optimal 
allocation of resources is endangered by this event and it is a 
product of economic transactions, if we perceive the market as 
being closely bound to the material production which proves to 
be essential . 
The forms of state intervention that attempt to stabilize the 
market are: 
First ,the state initiates the entire process of management of 
-
market failures. 
Secondly, main parts of reliability that are normally taken over 
by the individual polluter are ensured by state authorities. 
Thirdly. the state provides immediate emergency aid. 
Further activities by the state concern the regulatory policy and 
the provision of coercion to implement policies even when they 
are pursued by non-govermental institutions;that shall be 
discussed later. 
Taking up the economic reasoning on the market failure,we can 
distinguish two sets of problems ,that could be called 
a) Procedural Problems 
and 
b) Distributive Problems. 
The procedural problems are concerned with the set of actors and 
the rules applied which are supposed to resolve the pricing 
problem within the political or legal setting , while the 
distributive problems point to the groups that are supposed to 
bear the costs or enjoy the benefits of this activityJ3oth are 
political problems . 
Focusing on the procedural problems we find several approaches 
to deal with the market failure; the common origin lays in the 
political context. 
We can distinguish two main solutionspamely the 'state 
intervention or regulatory policy ' and the so-called 
'bargain-solution '. 
Both procedures need a yardstick to ensure the performance as 
well as the accsptanc~ by a broad g-eneral public.The yardstick is 
coercion or power: to forbid or stimulate certain activities or to 
i m p  rigid control with the possibility of direct sanction for the 
individual responsible as well as an entire market segment.5 
The legitimacy for this procedures is gained by the functionality 
of the system and the carrying out of the essential political 
conflict - the conflict about the distribution of societal wealth . 
The applied procedures are supposed to reach two goals: the 
(tempoaray) solution of the polibcal conflict and , simulaneously, 
the provison of an optimal allocation of resources for the market. 
As i t  is a political setting ,that attempts to ensure the optimal 
allocation,I speak of the simulation of market mechanisms. 
I t  has to be underlined that these procedures are able to reach 
the contradictory goals,when certain circumstances are 
fulfilled.There are some strategies that can mainly be applied in 
the situation of centered disasters. 
In the case of geographical and temporary limited disastersjn 
which the group of victims can be individualized, what I would 
call :the strategy of substitution6 provides a balance 
between the risks taken and the benefits gained for a particular 
group. In short: risk is translated into monetary units as long as 
the consequences and their probabilities are known and the 
victims can be individualized 
As these costs occur only with a certain ,low probability that can 
be deduced from societal experience ,the strategy of substitution 
could provide , due to reasonable forecasts, adequate prices for 
the risk taken.It has also to be emphasized that with a limited 
and known group of potential victims , negoziations can be 
started. 
To discus this point more thoroughly, all possibilities to regulate and the 
developed mechanisms and instruments should be presented.This canmt be the 
task of this pswr 
Of murse,there are several modes to provide this result ,vhich I do m t  vent to 
dicuss here. 
Some of the features of non-centered-disasters necessarily 
change the ways of managing their consequences as pursuing 
f .ex. the strategy of substitution when there is a purely randomly 
created group of victims,which can be constituted only they 
are already victims ,seems to lead to enormous constraints for 
the management ,as the possibilities of reimbursement changes: 
-the ad-hw constitution of the group of victims does not 
allow negozations , as no organizational structures exist; this 
favours individual legal processing which is costly. 
-The number of victims is increasingwhich endangers also 
the reimbursement of the responsible polluter or/and its 
insurance company. I t  becomes financially unbearable for 
individual organizations. 
-The increasing number can also be produced by the 
internationality of disasters,which poses totally new 
problems; some of them are attempted to be solved within 
international settings like the European Community ,as shall 
be discussed later. 
To avoid these problems, which are mainly of financial nature the 
market failure is not any longer a functional disturbance of the 
market, but a strategy of market actors to ensure the production 
and keep severe perturbations from the market. 
Talking about strategy ,I emphasize that a market failure is a 
situation in which the market is not able to find a p m  for a 
good. 
Strategy means , tha t  the  marke t  might be  able to  find a 
price ,but i t  might be a very high one,when it  has to reflect the 
probable damage of a disaster as well; the market actors prefer 
to make other actors carrying the burden of responsibility for 
this ( probable costs. 
I t  is evident that this kind of management only is functioning in 
very particualr fields which are characterized by a high degree of 
interest from the state or by the fact that additional costs occur 
only with a very low probability. 
The strategy t ransfers  the burden of costs with a low 
probability to s ta te  actors and keep so the  group of 
persons or organizations t ha t  benefit  from an activity 
apa r t  from those. paying the  costs.The marke t  
mechanism would lead to  the congruence of the  group 
tha t  pays and benefits. 
Real Costs 
To give some empirical insights I present some estimates that 
were made in a study by Heising and George 196b7.~he scope 
of this study was to find the overall costs the the US-american 
economy caused by a severe nuclear accident. 
The authors distinguish between three different levels of 
severity of the disaster and four possible levels of regulatory 
responses. 
All cost estimates reflect the restoration of the status quo and the 
costs of substitution; they do not consider societal changes. 
The levels of severity are : 
* severe core damage (TM I ) 
* core melt (Chernobyl) 
* worse accident (?I. 
These accidents are imposlng some regulatory responses which 
are supposed to be: 
* total moratorium 
* partial moratorium 
* stringent regulation 
* no change. 
i n  : "Nuclear Financial Risk" ,in: Energy Policy 2,1986 
The on-site-costs as well as the off -site-costs of an accident are 
estimated with each 3 billion S. 
The estimated total costs for the american economy reach from 3 
billion S ,when U~ere is no regulatory action taken and only the 
on-site-costs to be paid, to 1200 billion $ in the case of a total 
moratorium.The amount of costs - if there are any regulatory 
measures taken - reaches from 834 billion $ to 1200 billion 
$.The period of time for Wlich these costs are estimated is 10 
years. 
Doubtlessly: those costs have to be related to the probability of 
their occurance. 
For the rest of this paper I shall not deal with the problem of the 
probability,although it bas to be kept in mind.Some problems 
support this decision: 
* high risk technologies are a field of high 
uncertainties 
* within the last years estimates of the probabilities for 
High -Risk -Technologic changed dramatically. 
* environmental disasters ,which I introduced above, 
are not easily estimated and appear to be not 
unlikely; their probability might be rather high. 
Economic Manafement in Political S e t t i n g ~  
The essential problem of the political management of market 
failures regards the compatibility of the different goals that have 
to be reached in politics; the compatibility between 'distributive 
justice ' and ' optimal allocation of resources ' is not given as the 
goals might contradict eachother.The only applied form of 
compatibility is to be reached on the level of 'monetary 
comparability '. 
M e  sfmulauon or the market mechanism reproduces also the 
exclusion of elements that ,or cannot be provided by the market - 
like most public goods - or cannot be priced.Me simulauon or the 
market. is an attempt to re-integrate negative externalities into 
the market with the help of coercionRe-integration means that 
the responsible polluter should pay the costs ,if they want to 
enjoy the benefits of an activity. 
In this context the costs might be: 
** economic costs 
that are investments into developing and implementing a 
technology that reduces the emission of toxlc substances and 
avoids accidents.Also the already caused damage has to be 
repaired and the substition of one technology with another has to 
t>e considered. 
*$ social costs 
'...der Begriff der Sozialkosten bzieht  sich auf alle 
diejenigen negativen Effekte und Verluste,die dritte 
Personen oder die Allgemeinheit als Folge der 
Produktion zu tragen h a b n  und fur die der 
Unternehmer nicht ohne weiteres b langt  werden 
kann.( ... )Um als Sozialkosten anerkannt zu 
werden,mussen Schaden und Mange1 zwei 
Eigenschaften aufweisenEs mufl die Mcjglichkeit 
bestehen sie zu vermeiden ,sie m h n  Folge der 
wirtschafuichen Produktion sein und auf dritte 
Personen oder die Allgemeinheit abgew2lzt werden 
kdnnen.'(KAPP 1966: 10)8 
U: political costs; 
8 - ... the notion of social m t s  refers to a l l  those negative effects and loses 
vh ich have to be bourne by th i rd  persons or the public es result of production; 
the menufecturer cannot be essily mde reliable.( ... ) To be accepted es social 
costs,losses and shortcomings hwe to hwe t vo  properties.'lhere must be the 
possibility to m i d  them,they hwe to be caused by economic production and it 
must be ~ i b l e  to transfer them to th i rd  persons or the public.' (My 
tramlation,M.H.) ,K.W.KAPP,Soziale Kosten der M e r k t v i r t s ~ h a f t ~ l 9 8 8  
or transaction costs,that have ta be paid ta make the entire 
process work.They are the costs ol procedure lor political and 
legal actors. 
All those costs have two common properties: 
1)  they can be expressed in monetary units and 
2 )  regard reversible processes or reversible parts of processes. 
Reversibility in this context could be defined by Ule time horizon 
of a society or a sub-system of itBoth properties are necessary to 
make the management of the issue compatible with the imylict 
requirements of the market. 
Within a political setting ,the issue of large accidents could - 
potentially - be solved in a different way as the economically 
optimal level ol safety does not. necessarily correspond with the 
politically or socially optimal level. 
Polluter -Pays-Principle 
One mechanism that is increasingly discussed and implemented 
,which attempts to balance out market failures is the Polluter- 
Pays -Principle.This principle adds to the market mechanism the 
task or constraint 
' ..that the polluter should be charged with the cost of 
whatever pollution prevention and control measures 
are determined by public authorities,M~ether 
preventive measures jestoration or a combination of 
both .' 
with the restriction 
'..in other words: the Polluter- Pays -Principle is not in 
itsef a principle intended to internalize fully the cost of 
pollution.' (OECD 1975: 6) 
Within the Polluter-Pays-Principle several characteristics appear 
,which should be made explicit: 
First, this mechanism is imposed by state authorities and 
implies coercion. 
Secondly,it addresses the issue to a legal arena. 
Thirdly,the costs are the very point of reference and by that the 
mechanism provides the compatibility between the addressed 
legal and economic system ; otherwise it might be difficult to re- 
internalize the negative externalities ,as they do not exist for the 
market. 
Fourthathis principle allows also to cover international 
consequences of disasters which become of major interest? 
Within the European Community the problem of legal 
compatibility is resolved as the Polluter-Pays-Principle is laid 
down in the Single European Act, 130 R and in a recommandation 
of the Council, March 3,19753.436 . The EC-Commission 
underlined that this principle shall be applied in tight connection 
to the economic aspect of environemntal problems and that 
'. 1 costi ambientali siano presi in considerazione 
nello sviluppo dell' economia.'(MELI 1989: 5)1° 
Exceptions can be made j f  the functioning of the latmur market is 
endangered.There are three types of costs mentioned in the EC- 
recommandationpamely 
*the costs for reduction of pollution . 
*the costs of its elimination and 
*the costs of reparation,which have to be paid by the 
polluter.0ne the one hand the EC emphasizes the reimbursement 
of costs,the optimal functioning of the market and better 
development of the economy in general and on the other hand 
9 For a more detailed discussion see OECD,The Polluter P a p  Principle 1975; 
MELI,M.,'Le origini del Principio ' chi inquine ,pep' e il 3uo amj l imento da 
parte della Communita' E u r o p '  i n  : Rivi3ta Guiridica dell' Ambiente,l989 
{2),forthcoming p r w i d w  particular findings regarding the EC-policim. 
l o  Environmental costs hsn to be taken into cornideration i n  the development of 
earnomy .(Hy transa1ti~n~M.H.) 
civil responsibility is stressed. 
This allows the conclusion that the Polluter-Pays-Principle is not 
thought exclusively as market simulation,but should introduce 
also political attributes. 
The Polluter -Pays-Principle is considered to be the very 
mechanism for the political system to bind back the costs to the 
benefits, or in other words: to internalize Uie whole bundle of 
costs .In this paper I am not interested in the numerous technical 
problems of the Polluter-Pays-Principle, I am rattier interested in 
the form how this political mechanism approaches the problem of 
the distribution of the costs of large accidents. 
Some features of the Polluter-Pays-Principle do not allow to deal 
sufficiently with problems emerging from the non-centered - 
disasters. 
** The legal (and political) actors have to carry the burden of 
prove in a field of science based technology that is mainly 
characterized by scientific uncertainty and little societal 
exyjerience.The competing schools and approaches make it  
difficult to decide for non-scientific actors. 
** Non-centered-disasters can have many polluters which cannot 
be individua1ized.h legal terms : we have no origin and 
consequently no responsibility. 
*$ As we have no individual origin the course of actions to be 
taken is externalized to administrative actors ,which then have to 
provide the lacking safety or common resources.The 
internalization of the costs does not work. 
** The burden of prove is even heavier as the disaters often can 
only be perveived on an aggregated societal level; the monitoring 
and analysis of the consequences of an disaster can be made only 
by organizations that invest into sophisticated machinery as well 
as highly educated researchers. The construction of a particular 
reality concerning the risk of large accidents is - because of the 
little and unequally distributed knowledge - easier to adapt to 
parucular interests. 
Resulting from the uncertainties involved many distributive and 
procedural problems might emerge. The conclusions that might 
be drawn from this shortcomings of the Polluter-Pays-Principle 
regarding non-centered disasters are of major interest . 
The Polluter-Pays-Principle as a political mechanism to simulate 
the marketJelps to legally externalize the costs of disasters and 
has an important legitimating function.The political problem of 
the distribution of the costs is vastely ignored. 
In this paper I Wanted to focus on the mechanisms build in the 
political procedures and ignored the power relation that largely 
shape the application of these procedures and the results 
achieved. I wanted to show that those mechanisms create an 
asymmetric distribution of costs even when applied with the best 
intentions.When there is compatibility to be reached between 
distinct sub-systems, the interest in optimal allocation of 
resources becomes the dominate paradigm of political 
management. 
Victim-Pays-Twice-Principk 
The market - per definitionem - is supposed to internalize all 
costs as well as benefits. I attempted to show in this paper that 
disasters might create social and economic problems ,that 
endanger the existence of certain high risk industries and of 
social systems. This is the reason why the costs are externalized 
from the market. 
Coming back to the real costs: I presented an example about the 
costs of a nuclear accident for the US-american economy,which 
mounted up to 1200 billion $.In the Federal Republic of Germany 
the private reliability for nuclear accidents is 1 (one) billion DM. 
The rest has to be taken over by the state and/or the victims. 
When the market is not able to manage its own externalities, the 
population ,which was already vi&mized,has to pay - directly or 
indirectly through taxes - the costs of damage and necessary 
restoration (if this is possible a t  all). 
Even mechanisms like the Polluter-Pays-Principle do not seem to 
be adequate procedures to distribute the costs more just ,but 
seems to be a legitimating faqde for the mechanism that makes 
the victim pays twice : as a victim and as members of a social 
system which have to reconstruct their social and natural 
environment - often without having had any benefits from the 
production of a good,that damaged this environment. 
Conclusion 
The considerations presented in this paper were not only of 
theoretical nature but can be refered to concrete political 
issues.In the Federal Republic of Germany the environmental 
issues are thought to be managed sufficiently by the marketAn 
increasing frequency of disasters, particularily in the field of 
pollution creates enormous problems for the public, to financially 
bear certain types of activities ,specially when i t  appears to be 
rather certain that some of them destroy irreversible the social 
and the natural environment.To resolve this problem it is 
inadequate to introduce economic reasoning as the origin of the 
entire problematique can be found there. 
On the other hand market mechanisms are excluded for nuclear 
power production Additional danger, is produced by this 
procedure and it does not even produce economic benefit for 
society. 
This lack, respectavely , too much of intervention is not only due 
to power relations, but result also from the mechanisms build in 
the political procedures. 
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Abstract 
Major a c c i d e n t s ,  occu r red  i n  t h e  l a t e s t  y e a r s ,  d i d  show an immediate 
impact of c a t a s t r o p h i c  n a t u r e  i n  t h e  chemical and phys ica l  consequences. 
An even g r e a t e r  r e l e v a n c e  d e r i v e d  i n  t h e  s o c i a l ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  impac t s :  t h e  main pu rpose  of t h e  p r e s e n t  a r t i c l e  i s  
i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e s e  a s p e c t s ,  v i a  a  resume of t h r e e  s p e c i a l  s t u d i e s  
performed by ENEA ( I t a l i a n  Commission f o r  Nuclear and A l t e r n a t i v e  Energy 
Sources) . 
The pe r spec t ive  adopted i s  t h a t  of t h e  s o c i a l  pe rcep t ion  of t h e  acc iden t .  
(1) An a c c u r a t e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  I t a l i a n  d a i l y  p r e s s  du r ing  ONE year  a f t e r  
t h e  Chernobyl a c c i d e n t  i n t e n d s  t o  measure t h e  above mentioned pe rcep t ion ,  
o p e r a t i n g  i n  such a  way a s  a  s enso r  of p u b l i c  opin ion o r  a s  a  thermometer 
of t h e  s o c i e t y  m i l i e u .  
(2) A second c a t e g o r y  s e n s o r  adopted  i s  t h a t  of  t h e  r a d i o p r o t e c t i o n  
m e d i c a l  d o c t o r s :  t h e i r  r e a c t i o n s  a r e  s t u d i e d  i n  a c t i o n s  and words, 
summarized i n  in t e rv i ews .  
( 3 )  A p u b l i c  opin ion p o l l  on energy and environment problems c r e a t e d  by 
t h e  l a r g e  a c c i d e n t  occur red  i n  Sov ie t  Union i s  used a s  a  t h i r d  senso r  i n  
o r d e r  t o  e v i d e n t i a t e  t h e  swi t ches  i n  a t t i t u d e s  (from ' d i g i t 0  m o n s t r a r i '  t o  
' d i g i t e  ve r so '  and v i ceve r sa )  i n  t h e  minds of t h e  people .  
From t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  of t h e  t h r e e  s p e c i a l  s t u d i e s  it i s  t h e n  p o s s i b l e  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  f o u r  major i s s u e s :  
- t h e  r o l e  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ;  
- t h e  s o c i a l  concern f o r  t h e  environmental  s i t u a t i o n ;  
- t h e  r o l e  of t h e  e x p e r t  and h i s  s o c i a l  image; 
- t h e  need f o r  b e t t e r  informat ion .  
Plato, at his time, raised a question: "Why the man and not the crane?" 
Today this question is very significant for environmental analysts and to 
answer is not simple. 
H. Rolston says that the man vascular system includes arteries, veins, 
rivers, oceans and atmospheric currents, so that it is not possible to 
distinguish between the "world" and "my body". This is a just issue to 
demonstrate that the nature is inside us too, that environment is also inside 
us. so that we are inside the environment. 
W. Inge, a churchman: "many people believe to feel drawn to God or Nature, 
when they detest only the man". This assertion is important, because it is 
professed by a churchman. Often and unawares we hide behind naturistic or 
religious recall an estrangement from another man. 
Heliot Marshall says that before human control on nature all was worse. It 
is possible but, from an environmental point of view it is not possible to 
deny that man can live without bears, eagles, ants, but he cannot be 
indifferent to their existance without ceasing to be a man. Their 
disappearance is a warning: we can disappear too. 
Ethical questions are questions about how we ought to act. We 
do not speculate, discuss and disagree about ethics merely 
for the fun of it, but because we wish to know how we should 
live, and particularly how we should treat others. But which 
others? If respect is a duty, who or what is worthy of 
respect? Whose happiness should we consider? In other words, 
what are the limits of the moral community, the class of 
beings which we ought to consider as having worth and towards 
which we are obligated to act or forbear in various ways? 
Most people today might that the human race is the entire 
moral community. 
av: an 
Increasing risks in energetic and environmental terms, deriving directly 
and not from use of heavy technology, are adding up. 
It is matter of discussion if it is possible to plan a different relation 
between risks and benefits deriving from technology. 
The terms of the problem can be clarified by the following statements: 
- there are technological innovations 
- there are politics of technological innovation 
- there are risk policies (preventive ones, cautious ones, or post factum) 
- there are technological conflicts with respect to the choice between 
technologies, to the risk-benefits, trade off, to the technological-mix 
- there are technological options that prefigure a different technological 
"regimen and a different culture of risk. 
The last statements coincide with the question less agreed. 
There is, in Italy, a certain lack of maturity in facing policies, risk, 
innovation, regulation, etc., in terms not proper of sociological, political, 
jurisprudencial sciences, as well as in facing the current political debate. 
The same lack of maturity is apparent in the cultural issues that more likely 
contribute to assess public opinion. 
The lack of maturity consists of the still poor capability to make 
autonomous elaborations, of the dependence on foreigner models, on the scarce 
insight of the most considerable aspects, on the trial to semplify, on the 
still too simple ideas of the problem dealed with. 
On the other hand both technological innovation and technological risk just 
recently became cathegorized themes of the political process and of the public 
debate in Italy. 
The main task is to find out the useful instruments to define correctly the 
problem of sinergy between technological innovation and risk policies that 
unfold on different levels of reality: sociotechnical systems and 
organizations, politics and public administrations, culture and social change. 
Often these various components are dealed with as if they had the same 
structure, that is as if they could be accessed through the same methodology 
of analysis, generally an economicistic and technicistic paradigm. 
Viceversa it is worth to take in account that in analyzing the conflicts 
and the social changes there is an increase of complexity and contingency. 
In democracies this must not be seen as an unsormontable difficulty. 
Technological innovation and risk are matters of systematic policies, that 
results to be inadequate. 
The innovation policies often are not addressed to develope objectives and 
to the capabilities to attain goals politically defined, while risk policies 
are an analytical construction more than an institutional compact reality. 
However the crucial point is that the two policies usually are dealed with 
as two separated bodies, conceptually and institutionally, so that their 
sinergy is, to date, only occasional and not foreseen. 
To make possible a sinergy between the two policies the following moments 
must be considered: 
a) The innovation policies should have the availability of more sensitive 
and focused instruments, beyond the current policies of demand and supply 
commonly used; 
b) The effectiveness of these policies relies upon the answering capability 
or resilience of the institutional system responsible for the innovation and 
for the enterprises system. 
These answers can be cured and strengthened by coherent regulatory and 
institutional policies that facilitate the jump to higher level of 
organizative and technological rationality. 
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I n  May 1986 t h e  acc iden t  a t  Chernobyl nuc lea r  p l a n t  f i l l e d  t h e  f i r s t  pages 
of I t a l i a n  d a i l y  p re s s ,  wi th  an average i n c r e a s e  of t h e  s a l e s  equa l  t o  30%.  
During t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e r e  was a  c r o s s c o r r e l a t i o n  of many i s s u e s :  what w e  
want t o  stress h e r e  concerns t h e  func t ion  of media f a c i n g  t h e  emergency. 
Communication mass media work eve ry  day fo l lowing  s t a n d a r d  r o u t i n e s ,  s o  
d iscounted  t h a t  one seldom asks  about t h e i r  l o g i c  of ope ra t ion .  I n  f r o n t  of  an 
emergency t h i s  s t a n d a r d  procedure  f a l l s  i n t o  a  c r i s i s ,  o r  i n  any case ,  it 
r e v e a l s  i t s  hidden mechanisms: t h i s  i s  what p u n c t u a l l y  occurred  i n  r e l a t i o n  
wi th  Chernobyl even t .  
The a c c i d e n t  t ook  p l a c e  on 26 A p r i l  1986 a t  1.25 a.m.. S o v i e t  media, i n  
absence of governmental b u l l e t t i n ,  d i d  no t  mention t h e  n o t i c e ;  au c o n t r a i r e  
western media "jumped" on t h e  event  s i n c e  Swedish nuc lea r  a u t h o r i t y  d iscovered  
an i n c r e a s e  i n  atmospheric r a d i o a c t i v i t y .  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  days,  t h e  d i s a s t e r  dimension was emphasized: it i s  t r u e  t h a t  
an i n c r e a s e  of t h e  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  causes  s h o r t ,  medium and long  term i n j u r i e s ,  
bu t  a  damage which can be  i n s t a n t l y  q u a n t i f i e d  i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  p i e c e  of 
news. 
T h i s  i s  a  common behaviour  i n  t h e  western  p r e s s  and corresponds  t o  a  
hidden code t h a t  d e f i n e s  t h e  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  an event  must possess  t o  become a  
scoop. 
The b a s i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  f o r  which an even t  becomes a  p i e c e  of news, a r e  
t h e  fo l lowing seven: 
- i t s  s t r angeness ,  a l s o  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  media pub l i c ;  
- t h e  importance t h a t  an event  assumes f o r  t h e  l i f e  of t h e  people;  
- t h e  p o s s i b l e  consequences on d a i l y  l i f e  and onese l f  i n t e r e s t s ;  
- t h e  p h i s i c  and p s i c o l o g i c a l  nearness;  
- t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  p l ay  on emotions and t o  c r e a t e  a suspense;  
- t h e  development which an event  promises; 
- t h e  exc lus ive  r i g h t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  
These a r e  t h e  r e fe rence -po in t s  on which a pressmen normal ly  measures t h e  
c a p a b i l i t y  of a s u b j e c t  t o  g r i p  t h e  p u b l i c :  a  n o t i c e  t h a t  has  t h e  seven 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  o r  most of them, deserves  t h e  f i r s t  page. 
The value-news, i n  c a s e  t h a t  an event  i s  i n  posses s ion  of it, o p e r a t e s  i n  
two d i f f e r e n t  ways: 
- t hey  a r e  c r i t e r i a  t o  choose t h e  a v a i l a b l e  m a t e r i a l  and 
- c r i t e r i a  t o  propose t h i s  m a t e r i a l .  
Another element,  a b l e  t o  b i a s  news product ion ,  s e t t e d  up sources :  r e p o r t e r s  
p r e f e r  a set of sou rces  t h a t ,  on t h e  one hand r e f l e c t s  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  of 
t h e  power and, on t h e  o t h e r  hand o rgan izes  i t s e l f  i n t o  j o u r n a l i s t i c  r u l e s  of 
procedure.  
Sources ,  t h a t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  days  a f t e r  Chernobyl a c c i d e n t  c r e d i t e d  a h igh  
m o r t a l i t y ,  were United  S t a t e s  and i n t e r n a l  a t  t h i s  Admin i s t r a t ion .  I n  t h a t  
t i m e  e l a p s e  two requi rements  m e t :  t h e  media need of informat ions  a b l e  t o  make 
an a c c i d e n t  a no t i ce -even t  and t h e  oppor tun i ty  of Uni ted  S t a t e s  sou rces  t o  
f i l l  t h e  S o v i e t i c  empty space .  The acc iden t ,  l i k e  an  uncommon even t ,  should  
have exhausted  i t s  c a p a c i t y  of value-news du r ing  t h e  f i r s t  days of May i f  t h e  
r a d i o a c t i v e  c loud should have remained on S o v i e t i c  Union. 
When t h e  c loud a r r i v e d  on western  emisphere t h e  even t  became n o t i c e  a s  it 
invo lved  each of us :  from t h i s  t i m e  t h e  n u c l e a r  c u l t u r e  of e v e r y  n a t i o n  
engraved g r e a t l y  on p r e s s  e v a l u a t i o n s .  The most e v i d e n t  example de r ived  from 
French d a i l y  p r e s s ,  t h a t  o n l y  on May 1 2 t h  n o t i c e d  t h a t  t h e  a tmosphe r i c  
r a d i o a c t i v i t y  had no t  s topped a t  Sovie t  and e a s t  n a t i o n a l  bo rde r s  and spoke, 
c l e a r l y ,  a b o u t  n u c l e a r  d i s i n f o r m a t i o n ,  c h a r g i n g  t h e  government w i t h  
i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  have b u r i e d  d a t a  on r a d i o a c t i v i t y  increment d u r i n g  t h e  
f i r s t  days  of May. Af terwards  French p r e s s  b e l i e v e d ,  f o r  two weeks, on ly  
government sources .  The s i l e n c e  was j u s t i f i e d  a s  t h e  o f f i c i a l  Agencies a r e ,  a t  
t h e  same the, appointed  develop and check of atomic energy,  i n  consequence of 
a fundamental nuc lea r  choice .  
Le Monde accuses  nuc lea r  lobby t h a t  cannot,  a t  t h e  same t ime,  be judge and 
p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  c a s e :  bu t  why d i d  t h e  p re s s ,  a l s o  Le Monde, g i v e  t r u s t  only  t o  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s o u r c e  and wa i t  t h a t  t h e  e v e n t s  had c h a r a c t e r s  of news, 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  def ined,  t o  a r r i v e  on f i r s t  pages? 
Opinion p l u r a l i t i e s  of western  p r e s s  has  been a func t ion  of presence  i n  t h e  
n a t i o n s  of d i f f e r e n t  and c l a s h i n g  i n t e r e s t s  groups ,  movements, p o l i t i c a l  
o rgan iza t ions ,  p a r t i e s ,  l obb ie s .  
E r i c  Oberhausen, t h e  p r e s i d e n t  of  Western Germany Nuclear  P r o t e c t i o n ,  
a t t r i b u t e d  a d i f f e r e n t  a t t i t u d e  of h i s  n a t i o n a l  p r e s s  i n  comparison wi th  
France,  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  French have not  t h e  same s e n s i b i l i t y  and a r e  not  
exposed t o  c r i t i c a l  groups .  
I t a l i a n  i n f o r m a t i o n  moved d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  two weeks of May i n  German 
s i m i l a r  way, c a s t i n g  doubt  on c r i t e r i a  of value-news and a t t e n d i b i l i t y  of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  sou rces .  
W e  s h a l l  d e a l  w i th  t h e s e  t o p i c s  i n  t h e  next  pharagraph 
The Chernobyl n u c l e a r  a c c i d e n t  h a s  been an  even t  which made &, even on 
c o n t i n e n t a l  s c a l e ,  and no more on ly  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  problem of r a d i o a c t i v e  
p o l l u t i o n .  
D i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  consequences,  h e a d l i n e s  on f r o n t  pages,  s t i m u l a t i o n  of 
i n t e n s e  deba t ing ,  d i d  o f f e r  and s t i l l  o f f e r  food f o r  thought ,  which looks  f a r  
from c o n c l u s i o n .  One of  most c o n s i d e r a b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  i s  t h e  s o c i o l o g i c a l  
impact of  t h e  e v e n t .  Here communication p roces ses  and t h e  op in ion  making by 
t h e  media assume a r o l e  of major importance.  
I n  f a c t ,  a s  p r e v i o u s  o c c a s i o n s  t e a c h ,  even  s p e c i f i c  f e c h n o l o a i c a l  
evaluations show c l e a r l y  a s o c i a l - c u l t u r a l  s u b s t r a t e .  For  example, Vincent  
Covello,  writes on a Washington Pos t  e d i t o r i a l  (October 31, 1979) t h a t  a  t r u l y  
unexpected r e s u l t  emerged from t h e  Kemeny Commission Report  on t h e  Three M i l e  
I s l a n d  a c c i d e n t .  A group o r i e n t e d  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  a t echno logy  ended up t o  
d i s c u s s  about  peop le .  I n  t h e  ve ry  words of t h e  Commission: "It  became c l e a r  
t h a t  t h e  fundamental problems concerned people  ". 
Emergency c o n d i t i o n s  due t o  a c c i d e n t s  i n  ene rgy  p roduc t ion  power p l a n t s  
r e q u i r e ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  performances ve ry  s o f i s t i c a t e d  i n  t e rms  of  i n fo rma t ion  
p r o c e s s i n g  and  communication t e c h n i q u e s .  Handl ing  of  s o c i a l  problems of 
emergency makes i n d i s p e n s a b l e ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  a c t i v a t i o n  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  
mechanisms of h igh  complexity:  t h e s e  l a t t e r  ones need s p e c i f i c  a t t e n t i o n  from 
t h e  viewpoint  of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  
A l l  t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  h o l d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  n u c l e a r  
a c c i d e n t s  because:  
(1) t h e  i n fo rma t ion  emergency connects  t h e  e n t i r e  communication network of 
t h e  s o c i a l  system; 
( 2 )  t h e  r eques t  f o r  i n fo rma t ion  i s  set up a t  h igh  l e v e l s  f o r  long per iods ;  
( 3 )  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d e l i c a t e  and c a r e f u l  h a n d l i n g  of  communications i s  
needed  i n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  t h e  s o  c a l l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  
c a t a s t r o p h i e s .  
I n  t h i s  e x p l o s i v e  s c e n a r i o  t h e  l e a d i n g  p a r t  of  t h e  p l a y  goes  t o  t h e  mass 
media.  Both i n  t h e  emergency phase  and i n  t h e  post-emergency fol low-up,  a  
p r o p e r  r e a d i n g  of  t h e  mass media may r e p r e s e n t  t h e  opening  of  meaningful  
windows of obse rva t ion  ove r  s o c i a l  p roces ses s  a c t i v e t e d  by t h e  a c c i d e n t .  
The p r e s e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  c o n s t i t u t e s  an  a n a l y s i s  of  how a  p a r t i c u l a r  
conununication mass medium ( t h e  n ine  b e s t  s e l l i n g  d a i l y  p r e s s  newspapers) d e a l t  
w i t h  Chernobyl  f a c t s .  The a n a l y s i s  i n t e n d s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  how f a c t s  and  
consequences may have modif ied  theand t h e  relevance of some 
i s s u e s  ( i . e .  energy p o l i c y  and environmental  r i s k )  i n  t h e  news agenda.  
The cho ice  of d a i l y  p r e s s  has  been mot iva ted  by r ea sons  of t e c h n i c a l  o r d e r  
and economic n a t u r e .  
It  is w e l l  known t h a t  t h e  d a i l y  p r e s s  r e f l e c t s  from one s i d e  t h e  view-point 
of t h e  writer and on t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  t e n d s  t o  r e f l e c t  view-points  and opin ions  
of  t h e  r e a d e r s  t o  whom t h e  newspaper is  s o l d .  I n  o t h e r  words t h e  newspaper 
i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  p u b l i c  op in ion  bu t  it is a l s o  in f luenced  by t h e  people  and t h i s  
way o p e r a t e s  a s  s o c i a l  thermometer. 
The m u l t i f o r m a l  g l o b a l  v i l l a g e  network c o n s e n t s  t o d a y  t h e  u s e  o f  a  
p r a c t i c a l l y  e n d l e s s  number of  i n d i c a t o r s ,  o f t e n  o f  uneasy  a c c e s s  and  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  f o r  d e s c r i b i n g  s o c i a l  phenomena. 
The most t roublesome problem f o r  s o c i o l o g i s t s  has  been,  and s t i l l  i s , t h a t  
of  f i n d i n g  i n d i c a t o r s  a t  t h e  same t ime  meaningful ,  s y n t h e t i c ,  u s e r - f r i e n d l y  
and n o t  t r i v i o u s  i n  o r d e r  t o  e x p l a i n  and ana lyze  s o c i e t y  phenomena i n  r e a l  
t ime  . 
T h i s  is  t h e  reason f o r  t h e  picking-up of t h e  d a i l y  p r e s s  a s  one of t h e  most 
s e n s i t i v e  and f r e q u e n t l y  used  s e n s o r s .  
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  make d a i l y  p r e s s  s o  impor tant  a r e :  
(1) t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  r eco rd  and s t o r e  e v e n t s  through news; 
( 2 )  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  q u a n t i f y i n g  messages; 
( 3 )  t h e  p o t e n t i a l i t y  of s ea rch ing  and merging d i f f e r e n t  and 
independent theme a r e a s ;  
( 4 )  t h e  d a i l y  p r e s s  d i f f u s i o n  a l l  over  I t a l y ;  
(5) t h e  e a s y  and unexpensive day-by-day d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n .  
It  is  a l s o  well-known t h a t  i n  p re sence  of c a t a s t r o p h i c  e v e n t s  o r  h igh ly  
emot iona l  even t s ,  an increment of t h e  number of s o l d  newspapers is recorded,  
d e s p i t e  of t h e  massive coverage by t h e  e l e c t r o n i c  mass media. The exigency of 
t h e  people  t o  l i v e  e v e n t s  i n  f i r s t  person  and n o t  v i a  t e c h n i c a l  media may be 
an hypo thes i s  of exp lana t ion  of such phenomenon. 
The newspaper consen t s ,  fur thermore ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  cho ice  of bo th  type of 
j ou rna l  and s e l e c t i o n  of m a t t e r s  and t h e r e f o r e  g i v e s  t h e  r eade r - c i t i zen - soc i a l  
a c t o r  a  f e e l i n g  of g r e a t e r  freedom. 
The anomalous e v e n t  cannot b e  conceived  a s  an  a u t a r c h i c  occu r rence  p e r  se: 
t h e  ensemble of a s s o c i a t e d  p r o c e s s e s  depends, i n  a  v e r y  s t r i c t  s ense ,  scdum 
Excep t iona l  and r e l e v a n t  e v e n t s  may induce noteworthy muta t ions  i n  t h e  
i n t e r a c t i o n s  between t h e  two t y p e s  of r e a l i t i e s ,  i n  t h e  way t h e y  " c o l l i d e "  
a g a i n s t  s o c i a l  a c t o r s  and communication channels.  
Chernobyl days  d i d  a c t i v a t e  such s o c i a l  muta t ions :  t h e  exp los ion  on f r o n t  
pages  of d a i l y  p r e s s  of energy sys tem r i s k  and s a f e t y  ja rgon set up an 
ev idence  of t h e i r  r e l evance  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y  l i f e ,  i . e .  t h e  deep c o n t r a s t  
between t h e  t e c h n i c a l  r i s k  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  and t h e  s o c i a l  r i s k  a c c e p t a b i l i t y .  
Now t h e  p u r p o s e  i s  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  c h o i c e s  f o l l o w e d  by t h e  E N E A ' s  
r e s e a r c h e r s  f o r  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  I t a l i a n  d a i l y  p r e s s  a t t i t u d e  i n  f r o n t  of t h e  
Chernobyl even t .  
The r a n g e  of t h e  r e s e a r c h  i s  formed by t h e  f i r s t  9  n a t i o n a l  
w ide -bes t - se l l i ng  newspapers and an ensemble of l o c a l  newspapers e d i t e d  i n  
towns around n u c l e a r  power p l a n t s  o r  sites chosen f o r  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of 
f u t u r e  nuc lea r  power p l a n t s .  
The examined a r t i c l e s  a r e  con ta ined  e x c l u s i v e l y  i n  t h e  "na t iona l "  pages of 
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  newspapers.  The s e p a r a t i o n  i n s i d e  t h e  newspapers between 
n a t i o n a l  pages and l o c a l  pages  i s  looked l i k e  an a r t i f i c e  i n  many cases ;  but  
it is  u s e f u l  i n  o rde r  t o  determine t h e  l i m i t s  of r e sea rch  range and t o  succeed 
i n  ou r  g o a l s .  
The a n a l y s i s  h a s  been developed on t h e  whole set of t h e  9  newspaper 
a r t i c l e s ,  s i n c e  t h e  t r e n d s  d e t e c t e d  d i d  no t  j u s t i f y ,  a s  we s h a l l  s e e  l a t e r  
on, a  s e p a r a t e  a n a l y s i s  and even because  o u r  r e s e a r c h  r a n g e  was t h e  
informat ion  i n  i t s  whole meaning a s  t r e n d  a n a l y s i s .  
The r e sea rch  cove r s  a  t i m e  range from t h e  f i r s t  Chernobyl acc iden t  n o t i c e  
( A p r i l  29, 1986) t o  t h e  conc lus ion  of I t a l i a n  Na t iona l  Energy Conference 
(February  26, 1987) .  Moreover, have been t a k e n  i n t o  account  t h e  a r t i c l e s  
appared i n  t h e  d a i l y  p r e s s  a  yea r  a f t e r  t h e  acc iden t .  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  phase  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h ,  h a s  been o p e r a t e d  a  census ,  v i a  
schedula ,  a l l  ove r  t h e  a r t i c l e s  which a r e  concerned with e n e r g e t i c  themes, 
d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  l i n k e d  t o  t h e  Chernobyl acc iden t .  
I n  t h e  second phase,  t h e s e  d a t a ,  ordered  by a  set of v a r i a b l e s ,  have been 
in t roduced  i n  a  d a t a  base  and processed i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  some i n d i c a t i o n s ,  
u s e f u l  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  analyzed phenomenon. 
The variables describing every article are the following: 
DATE / SUBJECT / TYPE / DIRECT - INDIRECT / RANGE / GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION / 
AREA / EVIDENCE / ENERGETIC SOURCE / AUTHOR / NUMBER. 
The choice criteria for the variables are: 
- "editorial" characteristics of the article (Type - Range - 
Evidence - Author); 
- article content (Subject - Area - Energetic source - Geographic 
location) ; 
- connection with the event "Chernobyl" (Direct/Indirect). 
We have associated, for each of these 11 variables, with the exclusion Data 
and Number, a set of descriptive indicators, from a minimum of 2 to a maximum 
of 41. 
1 - DATA 
Its importance is of "descriptive" type, i.e., for providing a base for a 
frequency distribution of the number of articles per day, month and year. 
2 - SUBJECT 
The subject variable is one of the main variables of the research in order 
to provide to the articles a well defined character. It is described by a very 
large number of indicators, larger than 40, and it determines "whom the 
article is talking about" and provides, therefore, a description of the 
presence/absence of the different subjects. 
Among the indicators describing this variable, one can find together with 
the governamental Boards, like Ministries, the Parliament, the First Minister, 
politic parties, also "green" movements, State Agencies and Lobbies. 
The goal of this variable is to answer to the question: "who is talking" by 
the article. 
3 - TYPE 
This variable is described by 9 indicators. The goal of its presence is to 
answer to the question: "what the article is talking about". This information 
is related to the topic or the topics contained in the articles. Its 
indicators contain both chronicle and scientific information and legislative 
initiatives and give the newspaper attention toward the different topics. Some 
indicators appear very often simultaneously, for in the same article a number 
of topics may be present. 
4 - DIRECT / INDIRECT 
This variable, described by two indicators (Direct - Indirect), tends to 
locate the article in reference to the Chernobyl event. Several articles about 
environmental and energetic themes, along the data collection, would have not 
been in the press in absence of the Chernobyl accident. Articles stimulated 
by the accident have been defined as "indirect". 
5 - RANGE 
This variable is described by two indicators (General - Particular) and has 
been set i n  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  a t t e n t i o n  g iven  by t h e  h e a d l i n e s  t o  
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  themes.  An a r t i c l e  has  been cons ide red  of  Genera l  Range when 
m a t t e r s  connec t ed  t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  dynamics o f  t h e  a c c i d e n t  and  t o  t h e  
consequences wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  whole s o c i e t y  a r e  t r e a t e d .  An a r t i c l e  has been 
c o n s i d e r e d  of P a r t i c u l a r  Range when m a t t e r s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a  p o r t i o n  of t h e  
s o c i e t y  a r e  t r e a t e d .  
6 - GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 
T h i s  v a r i a b l e  ( I t a l y  and sub loca t ions ,  Abroad) cove r s  a  double goa l :  (1) t o  
g i v e  a  t e r r i t o r i a l  c u r v e  of  a t t e n t i o n ;  ( 2 )  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  weight  of  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  p r e s e n c e  wh i th  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a c t i o n s ,  i n i t i a t i v e s  and mot ions  
devoloped a t  l o c a l  l e v e l .  
7 - AREA 
The f o u r  a r e a s  p icked up a r e  t h e  fo l lowing ones:  
(A)  S a f e t y  and Heal th  P r o t e c t i o n ;  
(B)  I n t e r a c t i o n  between C e n t r a l  and P e r i p h e r a l  Organiza t ions ;  
(C) Energy P o l i c i e s ;  
(D) Energy I s s u e s  and Envi ronmenta l i s t  Moviments. 
The c h o i c e  of t h e s e  a r e a s  h a s  been mot iva t ed  by (1) i n t e r e s t s  of energy 
r e s e a r c h e r s  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e i r  o c c u p a t i o n a l  r o l e  w i t h i n  ENEA, (2 )  a  
number of f i n d o u t s  d e r i v e d  from t h e  r ead ing  of a  l a r g e  amount of a r t i c l e s .  
Area A has  been set i n  i n  o r d e r  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  weight  of t h i s  theme f o r  
t h e  popu la t ion  s u b j e c t e d  t o  t h e  r a d i o a c t i v e  c loud.  
Area B c o n c e r n s  a  more p o l i t i c a l  momentum; i n  f a c t  it e v a l u a t e s  t h e  
presence  of r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  c o n f l i c t u a l  o r  no t ,  between c e n t r a l  and p e r i p h e r a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  of t h e  s o c i e t y .  
Area C  cove r s  t h e  presence  of  a r t i c l e s  i n  which t h e  main theme i s  deba t ing  
n a t i o n a l  energy p o l i c i e s .  
Area D is  o r i e n t e d  t o  measure t h e  impor tance  of  t h e  "green" segment of  
s o c i e t y  which t r a d i t i o n a l l y  has  been p l a y i n g  a  r o l e  of o p p o s i t i o n  i n  I t a l y  
a g a i n s t  (1) n u c l e a r  energy,  ( 2 )  Nat ional  Energy Plan .  
I n  g e n e r a l  t h e  AREA v a r i a b l e  h a s  become t h e  p r i n c i p a l  v a r i a b l e  among t h e  
"independent v a r i a b l e s " ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  o t h e r s ,  on t h e  whole set of t h e  
r e s e a r c h .  
8 - EVIDENCE 
T h i s  v a r i a b l e  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  degree  of importance g iven  by t h e  newspaper t o  
t h e  a r t i c l e s .  I n d i c a t o r s  (Very High, High, Medium, Low) i d e n t i f y  on a  nominal 
s c a l e  t h e  degree  of " p r e s s a b i l i t y "  of t h e  t r e a t e d  t o p i c  and, consequent ly ,  t h e  
h i g h e r  o r  lower a t t e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  r e a d e r  w i l l  be provided  i n  r e c e i v i n g  t h e  
news. 
9 - ENERGETIC SOURCE 
A s  soon a s  ou r  r e s e a r c h  was going  on, one becomes aware t h a t  t h e  s t a r t i n g  
m a t t e r  ( i .e .  Chernobyl) has  been ampl i f i ed  inducing  i n t e n s e  d e b a t i n g  no t  only  
on  n u c l e a r  i s s u e s ,  b u t  a l s o  on  o t h e r  e n e r g e t i c  i s s u e s .  T h i s  v a r i a b l e  
i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  t y p e  of energy ( coa l ,  o i l ,  ga s ,  renewable s o u r c e s ) .  
10 - AUTHOR 
Beside  SUBJECT , AREA and ENERGETIC SOURCE, who i s  w r i t i n g ?  Th i s  v a r i a b l e  
t e n d s  t o  i d e n t i f y  n a t u r e  and background ( s p e c i a l i s t ,  non - s p e c i a l i s t )  of t h e  
a u t h o r s .  The g o a l  i s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  unusual  columns ove r  themes uncomon f o r  a  
d a i l y  newpaper and it s u g g e s t s  o v e r a l l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  on t h e  r o l e  of  e x p e r t s  
and t h e i r  use  of t h e  d a i l y  p r e s s .  
11 - NUMBER 
Th i s  v a r i a b l e  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  number of d a i l y  a r t i c l e s  and g i v e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
a  v a l i d  i n d i c a t i o n  over t h e  long pe r iod .  
ts of invest- 
OBJECT: Ana lys i s  of t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  d a i l y  p r e s s  d u r i n g  and a f t e r  t h e  
Chernobyl emergency; I n v e s t i g a t i o n  over  major measurable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
RESULTS: The even t  r e l evance  in f luenced  and p a r t l y  changed n a t i o n a l  energy 
p o l i c y  megatrends.  
The v e c t o r  and  d i r e c t i o n  of  t h e  d a i l y  p r e s s  p roduc t ion ,  i n  t h e  t e n s e l y  
debated  s i t u a t i o n  occurred  i n  t h e  a f t e r  - Chernobyl pe r iod ,  has  been analyzed.  
The p r o c e s s  under s t u d y  can  be schemat ized  i n t o  f o u r  s t a g e s :  (1) Source, 
(2 )  Media, (3)  Product ,  ( 4 )  E f f e c t .  
Our i n t e r e s t  i s  focused  e x c l u s i v e l y  on s t a g e s  (2 )  and ( 3 ) .  
MEDIA i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by d a i l y  p r e s s  and connec t ed  s o c i a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s ;  
PRODUCT i s  d e f i n e d  by t h e  a r t i c l e  u n i t .  
T o t a l  r e s u l t s  of i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  c / o  ENEA of Rome ( G .  B o r r e l l i  
e t  a l l  1988 i n  b i b l i o g r a p h y ) .  Here t h e  purpose  i s  t h e  s y n t h e s i s  of major 
outcomes, t h a t  a r e  t h e  fo l lowing  ones:  
a )  One of  t h e  r o l e s  of  media,  and p r e s s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i s  t o  manage 
emergency s i t u a t i o n s ,  a s  it a l lows  t o  l i n k  t o g h e t e r  d i f f e r e n t  s p h e r e s  of  
s o c i a l  l i f e .  
b )  U n c e r t a i n t y  i s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e l e m e n t  of  f i r s t  news. T h i s  
u n c e r t a i n t y  is  imputable t o  Agencies t h a t  must manage t h e  emergency. 
c )  Reduced t h e  weight of t h e  acc iden t  t h e  informat ion  has  p a r t l y  normalized 
and  i n t o  newspapers themes  have p r e v a i l e d  a s  e n e r g y  p i a n i f i c a t i o n  and 
environmental  i u s s e s .  
d )  P o l i t i c a l  t o p i c s  have been p r e v a l e n t  i n  i n f o r m a t i o n .  For  t h i s ,  a l s o  
themes c o n t a i n i n g  a n  i n n o v a t i v e  d i g n i t y ,  i . e .  themes  promoted by "green  
movements", have been sugges ted  i n  conformity with t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i c y .  
e )  P r e s s  h a s  been  mouthpiece  o f  d i f f u s e  m i s t r u s t  abou t  a b i l i t y  of  
Government t o  manage complex soc io - t echn ica l  systems and t o  behave d u r i n g  an  
emergency. 
f )  This  m i s t r u s t  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  by i n s t i t u t e s  t o  t e c h n i c a l  corps ,  i nvo lv ing  
a l s o  s o c i a l  a c t o r s  l i k e  s c i e n t i s t s ,  t h a t  a t  f i r s t  t i m e  was i n  f avour  of 
people .  
2 .  Behaviour of R a d i o D r o t e c t l o n  D o o c t o r s  In the aftermath 
~f 
It has been s a i d  from s e v e r a l  p a r t s  t h a t  t h e  acc iden t  of Chernobyl has 
embodied f o r  t h e  I t a l i a n  people an event of ou t s tand ing  psyco-sociological 
i n t e r e s t .  The aim of t h i s  work i s  t o  evidence some aspec t s  of t h e  psycological 
impact on a c a t e g o r y  of p h y s i c i a n s  who p r o f e s s i o n a l l y ,  b e f o r e  t h a n  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y ,  dea l  with rad io log ica l  r i s k  prevention. 
It  has been , i n  f a c t ,  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  point  out  how t h e s e  physic ians  have 
f e l t  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  people, how they have l i v e d  t h e  events,  how they have 
judged t h e  organizat ion and t h e  in te rven t s  of t h e  pub l ic  Author i t ies .  
The I t a l i a n  Associa t ion of Medical Radioprotection (AIM) has conducted a 
s tudy  by means of ques t ionary  d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  a l l  t h e  author ized p h i s i c i a n s  
with t h e  a u x i l i a r y  goal  t o  v e r i f y  t h e  e f fec t iveness  of t h e  c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t y  
of t h e  assoc ia t ion .  
The former ques t ionary  could g ive  a u s e f u l  index t o  be r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  measure of t h e  impact i n  I t a l y  and t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r a l  and 
formative con tes t  of t h e  ph i s ic ians .  
The main g o a l s  of t h e  i n q u i r y  aimed t o  po in t  ou t  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  of t h e  
"rankn of t h e  author ized p h i s i c i a n s  about: 
- information 
- perception of t h e  r i s k  by population 
- personal r i s k  evaluat ion 
- ef fec t iveness  of t h e  countermeasures and c r e d i b i l i t y  of t h e  Authority.  
results of i n v e s t l a  
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  and r e l e v a n t  r e s u l t s  of t h e  i n q u i r y  a r e  t h e  fo l lowing:  
1 - The mass media a c t e d  i n  a  fundamental ly "alarming" way, inducing  then  
i n  t h e  people t h e  f e e l i n g  of s e r i o u s  "personaln  danger;  
2 - A s  a  consequence t h e  f e a r  of people  seems u n j u s t i f i e d  f o r  54.1% of t h e  
i n t e r v i w i e d  and j u s t i f i e d  f o r  t h e  43.5%; 
3 - The n d i s c u s s i o n n  about  t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  Chernobyl a c c i d e n t  i n  t h e  
mass media h a s  i n v o l v e d ,  ma in ly ,  "not  a lways  r e l i a b l e  and  q u a l i f i e d "  
s c i e n t i s t s  ( m i s l e a d i n g  t h e  p e o p l e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  t h e  con tamina t ion  d a t a ,  and,  by i t s e l f ,  c o r r u p t i n g  t h e  
image of t h e  "sc ience")  ; 
4 - The A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Governments worked wi thou t  a  s t r a t e g i c  p l a n  t h a t  
cou ld  be,  perhaps,  e l a b o r a t e d  a l s o  by means of " r e l i a b l e "  competences; 
5  - It  l ooks  hidden,  beyond t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  ques t iona ry ,  t h e  expe r i ence  
of who, due t o  h i s  " cu l tu re" ,  tries t o  i n t roduce  " r a t i o n a l i t y "  i n  t h e  emotive 
l i v i n g  of impor tant  s o c i a l  e v e n t s .  This  expe r i ence  p u t s  f o r t h  t h e  problem of 
r e l a t i o n  between " i n t e l l e c t u a l s "  and " p o l i t i c i a n s "  i n  managing r i s k  prevent ion  
and h e a l t h  p r o t e c t i o n .  
A s  f a r  a s  i t  is  concerned wi th  t h e  r e l a t i o n  wi th  I n s t i t u t i o n s  r e s p o n s i b l e  
of t h e  p u b b l i c  h e a l t h  it is  p o s s i b l e  on ly  t o  draw i n d i r e c t  impress ions .  From 
t h e  answers  t o  some q u e s t i o n s  concerning  t h e  medica l  expenses  a s  Chernobyl 
consequences ,  t h e  r a d i o p r o t e c t i o n  s t a n d a r d s  and t h e  pe r fo rmances  of t h e  
Emergency Commission, u n s a t i s f a c t i o n  is  i n f e r r e d  and i n  some c a s e s  d i s t r u s t  
toward t h e  O f f i c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s .  
An optimism, often unjustified, about the national capability to supply the 
energetic provision has accompanied a growing care for the pollution. This 
optimism is often due to a poor information on tecnically complex themes: "The 
need of clearness on one side and the need that the messages be appetizing on 
the other side, define an objective "stress field" in which mass media act. 
The difficulties arising from this conflict assume particular remark when the 
object of the message has scientific aspects, and in a more evident way when 
health problems and environmental risks from technological systems are 
involved" (Borrelli et al, 1988). 
Another remarkable point is the growing mistrust of the Italians in the 
capability of the rulers to manage complex technological systems as the 
nuclear are. 
In effect "the growth of the ruling functions and the succeding feeling of 
"burocratization" of the functions push the citizen to consider the government 
as an entity alien from people and, from several points of view, as 
impersonal" (Borrelli, Sartori, 1986) The industrialized societies ask more 
and more the contribution of specialized men and corps as a support to 
political decision; the specialization has created technical elites that give 
rise to suspects and suspicians from the peoplen (Borrelli, Sartori, 1986). 
Moreover in the last few years the evaluation criteria of a project have been 
strongly modified by the people adding new elements, that increase the number 
of factors to be considered and that involve subjects never considered. 
This determined an increasing mistrust of the Italians with respect to the 
Institutions, that has consequences in the nuclear policy too. 
The citizen could be forced to accept the nuclear choice in situation of 
energetic crisis. But this should leave the foundamental political question 
unresolved, that is the relation between people and political power based on a 
d i s t r u s t  i n  t h e  complex s o c i o t e c h n i c a l  system. 
The answers g iven  about  t h e  h i g h e r  l e v e l  of s a f e t y  of t h e  wes tern  power 
c o u n t r i e s  power p l a n t  ve r sus  t h o s e  of t h e  Chernobyl t y p e  a r e  ve ry  i n t e r e s t i n g .  
This  q u e s t i o n  concerned t h e  opin ion  about t h e  judgment of t h e  e x p e r t s .  
- Do engineers overemphasize the technological function ignoring or 
forgetting the duty to substain and enrich our lives? 
- Are engineers merely hired in the service of corporation or other 
sectional interests, working as mercenaries without worring about the 
end they are meant to serve? 
- Has human well-being been narrowly conceived in materialistic terms, 
ignoring others dimensions of human life such as beauty, truth and 
justice? 
- Do engineers regard the service to human as the only form of ethical 
behavior, with no thought for the rest of nature except as a resource? 
W e l l ,  on ly  t h e  19 .3% "agree"  w i th  t h e  e x p e r t s  and  t h e  9 .6% a f f i r m  t h a t  
"probably it i s  t rue"" ,  whi le  t h e  rest of t h e  sample, w i th  d i f f e r e n t  nuances, 
e s p r e s s  a  s e n s e  of d i s t r u s t  peaked wi th  a  30% " a b s o l u t e l y  I d o n ' t  b e l i e v e  
them". 
It d o e s n ' t  seem v e n t u r i n g  t o  deduce from t h e s e  answers " t h e  l e s s e n i n g  of 
t h e  r o l e  of t h e  expe r t "  i n  t h e  emergencies, a s  guessed  by s e v e r a l  p a r t s  (Otway 
e t  a1 .1986) .  The problem is t o  l ook  f o r  t h e  r e a s o n s  of  t h e  " l e s s e n i n g "  
c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  heavy u t i l i z a t i o n  of  s c i e n t i s t s  and t e c h n i c i a n s  by t h e  mass 
media i n  t h e  emergencies o r  about t e c h n i c a l l y  complex themes. 
The e x c e s s i v e  p re sence  of t h e  "exper t"  cou ld  weaken h i s  r o l e ,  i n  t h e  same 
way t h e  e x c e s s i v e  d r i v i n g  c a r e  a d v e r t i s i n g  c o u l d  a t t a i n  r e s u l t s  o p p o s i t e  t o  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  ones .  
Another problem cou ld  be sea rched  i n  t h e  "managing" of t e c h n i c i a n s  and 
s c i e n t i s t s  by t h e  mass media.  Considered  t h a t  many i n f o r m a t i o n s  on t h e  
Chernobyl acc iden t  came from i n s t i t u t i o n a l  sources ,  no t  ready and confus ing i n  
t h e  f i r s t  emergency pe r iod ,  it i s  po in ted  o u t  (from t h e  newspaper) t h a t  t h e  
p r e s e n c e  of t e c h n i c i a n s  and s c i e n t i s t s  h a s  been more q u a n t i t a t i v e  t h a n  
q u a l i t a t i v e .  The " s c i e n t i s t n  d i d  n o t  s u b s t i t u t e  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  he was i n s t e a d  toghe the rn  making himself  drawn i n  t h e  m i s t r u s t  
a g a i n s t  t h e  C e n t r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  r e spons ib l e  of managing t h e  emergency. 
A l a r g e  p a r t  of t h e  I t a l i a n s  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  green movement does no t  conduct 
a  p o s i t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Th i s  c o n t r a d i c t s  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  of t h e  Greens t o  p r e s e n t  themselves  a s  an 
i n n o v a t i v e  group i n  t h e  I t a l i a n  p o l i t i c a l  a r ena .  The image o f  a  movement i s  
determined by s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s ,  no t  l a s t  is  t h e  way t h e y  a r e  p re sen ted  by t h e  
mass media. I n  t h e  t i m e  immediately a f t e r  Chernobyl, t h e  news about Greens 
were presen ted  by t h e  newspapers according t o  two main moda l i t i e s .  
The former  m o d a l i t y  saw them a s  p r o t a g o n i s t  of  "ch ron ic l e" ,  wh i l e  t h e  
l a t t e r  saw them a s  b e a r e r s  of i nnova t ive  r eques t e s .  These two c o n d i t i o n s  go 
o f t e n  t o g e t h e r :  "The c h r o n i c l e  t a l e  of  t h e  green e v e n t s  c a r r i e s  a  symbolic 
con ten t .  The c h r o n i c l e s  of t h e  e n t e r p r i s e s  of Greenpeace a r e  a  c l e a r  example. 
The c o n f l i c t  c o n s i s t s  of  c u l t u r a l  a s p e c t s  t h r o u g h  symbol ic  happenning 
(promotion of new i d e a l s )  and of a  p o l i t i c a l  l e v e l  ( t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  new 
a l l i e d )  " ( B o r r e l l i  e t  a l .  1988) . 
The s imple  c h r o n i c l e  o r i g i n a t e s  a  dimension i n  which s o c i a l  a c t o r s ,  b e a r e r s  
of  d i f f e r e n t  r eques t e s ,  f a c e  each o t h e r .  
I n  d e f i n i n g  t h e  "dimension" t h e  r o l e  of t h e  p r e s s  i s  marginal  s i n c e  it 
r e p r e s e n t s  j u s t  t h e  means bu t  no t  t h e  maker of t h e  d i s p u t e .  The r e s u l t s  of t h e  
p u b l i c  op in ion  p o l l s  show t h a t  t h e  f e e l i n g  of many people  is  t u r n e d  by w e l l  
e s t a b l i s h e d  va lues  ( r u l e s ,  e t h i c s ,  t r a d i t i o n  and t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i c y )  t h a t  do 
no t  permi t  t o  g e t  pe rcep t ion  of t h e  o r i g i n a l i t i e s .  
With r e g a r d  t o  t h e  peop le  who w i l l  t a k e  advantage of an h i g h e r  l e v e l  of  
c a r e  of t h e  environment, from t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  p u b l i c  opin ion p o l l s ,  t h r e e  
d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t i o n s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  
The first one, expressed by "all the men and environment" can be defined 
"holistic"; the second one expressed by "ourselves and our sons" can be 
defined "anthropocentric"; the third one expressed by "nature itself" can be 
defined as "cosmologic". Only the third one denotes an innovation in the 
thinking way of the people with respect to the environmental themes. 
Another index of the sensibility of people towards environmental quality is 
the availability to lessen the use of personal cars. 
Answering to the question "Sub to which conditions are you available to 
give up to use your car?" the Italians gave two main options. The most common 
possibility (-70%) requires for more public transports, and the others require 
that "alln the people give an example. 
I n  t h e s e  t e r m s  t h e  prob lem h a s  no s o l u t i o n .  I n  f a c t ,  one o f  t h e  m a j o r  
s o u r c e s  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  p u b l i c  t r a n s p o r t  i s  t h e  p r i v a t e  t r a f f i c ,  and t o  
a s k  f o r  an example from " a l l "  t h e  o t h e r s  i s  a non s e n s e .  
Nowadays t h e  p e r s o n a l  c a r  h a s  become an " i n t i m a t e  good" more t h a n  a  " s t a t u s  
symbol". 
Our va lues ,  and t h e r e f o r e  our  a c t i o n s ,  a r e  c l o s e l y  t i e d  i n  with our  
percep t ions .  What i n  o r d i n a r y  language is  o f t e n  c a l l e d  a  person ' s  
a t t i t u d e  towards samething may be  descr ibed  a s  a  combination o f  how 
t h e y  perce ive  it and how t h e y  t h i n k  it ought t o  be  t r e a t e d .  The 
language we use is  o f t e n  an i n d i c a t i o n  of our  a t t i t u d e ,  a s  wel l  a s  
a  dev ice  f o r  changing t h e  a t t i t u d e  of o t h e r s .  People who r e f e r  t o  
"nigger"  o r  "hankies" i n d i c a t e  a  percep t ion  of  a  r a c i a l  group a s  
i n f e r i o r ,  and an i n t e n t  o r  d e s i r e  t o  d i sc r imina te .  More s u b t l y ,  t o  
r e f e r  t o  duck o r  deer  a s  "game" i n d i c a t e s  a  view of w i l d l i f e  a s  a  
resource  and approval  of  t h e  k i l l i n g  of s p e c i e s  t h u s  des igna ted .  
W e  w i l l  t r y  t o  p o i n t  o u t  some c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  of p e o p l e  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  b o t h  t o  e n e r g e t i c  and  t o  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  problems.  
1 - The c a r e  o f  I t a l i a n s  o f  t h e  e n e r g e t i c  problem, p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  t h e  
s u p p l y  o f  e n e r g y  s o u r c e s ,  a r e  weakened, a f t e r  t h e  c r i s i s  o f  ' 7 0 i e s .  A c t u a l l y  
p e o p l e  i s  s c e p t i c a l  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  v a r i o u s  h i p o t h e s i s  l i k e  b lack-out  o r  g o i n g  
back t o  A r c a d i a .  
. - 
2 - At t h e  same t ime ,  new a n x i e t i e s  come o u t  f o r  environment  and p o l l u t i o n .  
3 - After the Chernobyl accident, nuclear energy is no more considered a 
valid substitute for oil, just since the new environmental anxieties. On the 
other hand, solar and eolic sources of energy, "alternative" for definitions, 
have been overcome by the more traditional and well established hydroelectric 
and natural gas. 
4 - The attitude with regard to nuclear energy is adverse not only because 
of the Chernobyl event but also because of an apparent distrust in the 
capability of the Autorities to manage a complex technical system. 
5 - The same distrust in the technicians and scientists come forth, since 
they are seen as "accessories" to the Official Technical Institutes. 
6 - The information level about energetic and environmental themes 
increased, at least in quantitative terms. It is doubtful that it increased, 
in qualitative terms too. 
7 - Sociodemographic criteria (i.e. educational level, economic status, 
geographic location) do not permit a sharp cut between in favour and adverse 
to nuclear energy, but at least they permit to divide in more or less well 
informed. In other words the opposition to nuclear energy and the joining 
environmentalist movements crosses all the classes of the Italian society. 
ma- 
8 - The need of partecipation to the choices that before were delegated to 
scientific and technical institutions increased. These Institutions are no 
more felt as instruments of civil and social growth. The actual and future 
decision making will have to take in account this new reality. 
1 - Distrust in the Institutions 
The sentiment of distrust crosses horizontally the society. It emerged both 
from the public opinion polls and from the phisicians inquiry. The daily press 
also expressed several times the same sentiment and assured itself the role of 
"official speaker". It is worth to underline the ambivalence of the relation 
mass media versus reader, whose limits of reciprocal influence are not clearly 
distinguished. 
2 - The care for environmental situation 
This care is one of the foundamental points that emerges from the polls. In 
this case, by considering the specific role of the phisicians, it can be said 
that this care goes beyond detailed sociodemographic characteristics. 
3 - The lessening of the role of the exepert 
This topic emerges strongly from the analysis of the daily press. 
Phisicians express reservations about experts called to manage the Chernobyl 
emergence.The public opinion, on the other hand, expresses a major reliance in 
citizen action as support to technological decision. Notwithstanding this the 
citizen trusts the scientist rather than the Institutions. 
4 - The need of better information 
Although the level of information on complex themes appears increased in 
quantitative terms, both the public opinion, the phisicians and the press 
think that the attained level isn't still enough quanlitative to avoid 
misunderstanding and confusion. 
P.S. Distichs are drawn from A. S. Gunn and P.A. Vesilind cited in 
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ABSTRACT 
Data from opinion polls are used to follow people acceptability and risk perception 
concerning nuclear energy. Impacts of major events, such as Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl are observed on public opinion. Social responses to such events are 
particularly noticed in two domains : those of information and communication in 
emergency situations. 
Keys-words : public opinion ; nuclear energy acceptance ; major event ; social 
response. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1977, major french firms and institutions have supported the AGORAMETRIE 
system [ I ]  which deals with the analysis and the follow up of public opinions about 
controversial matters that agitate French society. This system is based on annual 
surveys of representative samples of the French population ; among other topics, it 
covers nuclear matters ; and it allows to observe the corresponding public opinion 
trends in the long term and sudden shifts related to major events, such as the 
Three Mile Island failure (TMI) in 1979, F. Mitterand's first presidential election in 
1981 and more recently the Chernobyl accident in 1986. After a short presentation 
of the acceptability of the nuclear program during the last decade in France, social 
patterns are shown ; indeed, age, sex and occupation are important differentiation 
factors within opinions. Thereafter, some Chernobyl impacts on opinions will be 
described : knowledge about the accident, nuclear energy acceptance and perception 
of the information delivered. Finally, Chernobyl has provoked social responses, 
mainly in the communication field which will be emphasized. 
NUCLEAR PROGRAhl AND PUBLIC OPINION : AN OVERVIEW 
In France, the Seventies were a period of strong controversy about nuclear matters. 
Opposition emerged in 1973 with the development of the French nuclear energy 
program, demonstrated actively in each power plant site and culminated in 1977 with 
the violent meeting in Creys-Malville, which provoked one death among the 
demonstrators. After this shock, ecologists and various opponents lost some supports 
and they failed to push their ideas on political grounds. In parallel, the spectrum of 
an energy crisis was moving away. Since then, the nuclear program gained a better 
image : opponents were a minority in the public if one considers the results of the 
opinion pools ; and demonstrations in nuclear installations sites decreased. 
In 1981, after F. Mitterand's presidential election, the energy policy remained more 
or less unchanged. Public opinion about nuclear matters kept their previous levels, 
at least globally. Indeed, when we examine the degree of acceptability in various 
social groups, some changes can be detected ; for instance, educated people were 
more inclined to accept nuclear energy than before and retired people gave less 
support. Things remained like this until May 1986. 
The Chernobyl accident showed that it was possible to suffer a major failure in 
civil nuclear power plants and that large scale impacts could occur. A sudden shift 
was observed in public opinion ; for  the first time in the last decade period, 
opinion polls revealed a majority pro the existing nuclear policy but. simultaneously, 
con a further extension of the nuclear energy program. Moreover, these views were 
shared by all social groups. And till now, there is no real change in French public 
opinion. 
The previous comments may be illustrated by looking at percentages successively 
obtained for the following proposition : "We must go on building nuclear power 
plants". This proposition, which has been in our surveys since 1977, is related to 
the overall acceptability of nuclear energy. In the Seventies, i t  was associated with 
clear ideological positions and opponents to the proposition were strongly against 
the nuclear establishment. In recent years, the proposition took a slightly different 
sense ; its cons have joined the previous ones as also people who think that 
electricity needs are satisfied by the existing nuclear power plants and who are less 
preoccupied by the energy crisis (in 1988, 55 % think energy crisis is extremely 
worrying ; they were 80 O/o in 1977). 
FIGURE I 
In Figure I ,  we can see the IS % rise of cons after the Chernobyl accident and 
note the zero impact of TMI in 1979 on French public opinion [2]. This IS % shift 
was also observed after TMI and for  the same question in the surveys performed 
by Cambridge Reports and by Harris Poll (31 in the United States. In each situa- 
tion. supporters of the proposition lost 5 %, interviewees who did not know from 
20% fell to 10 % and as a consequence, cons gained IS %. 
FIGURE 2 
Figure 2 shows a clear difference between women and men for this proposition : 
women are 20 q6 more opposed than men are, but the trend over time is exactly the 
same for  both groups. This sex effect concerning nuclear subjects has been regularly 
stated in our public opinion pools and risk perception surveys [4]. An other huge 
difference, 20 9/0 at least, exists between the left and the conservative political 
positions, as is shown in Figure 3 ; leftists are more inclined to refuse nuclear 
power than rightists ; here again, trends over time are quite parallel. Figure 4 
underlines interesting features about nuclear opinion and social class ; indeed social 
classes react diversely and two examples are given in the Figure. On one hand, 
retired people were pro nuclear energy but they have been impressed severely by 
the Chernobyl accident and now, opponents rise to 60 % among them. On the other 
hand, before 1981 teachers were continuously reluctant towards nuclear energy ; 
but after Mitterand's first presidential election, they partly agreed with the 
socialist new energy policy and their resulting adjustments led them to a fifty- 




CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT PERCEPTION 
If TMI had no effect on French opinion, on the contrary Chernobyl has been 
perceived as a major catastrophic event and it is always considered as such in 
people minds. Figure 5 gives the results, for four replicates in the last two years. 
for  the question : "Among the following catastrophic events : Bhopal, Chernobyl, 
AIDS. Seveso, the Mexico earthquake, .... which is the most frightening for you ?" ; 
and they are 20 % to privilegiate the Chernobyl accident. 
FIGURE 5 
The major catastrophic event 
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Do people have a right knowledge of Chernobyl consequences ? To the question : 
"Up to now, how many deaths were caused in USSR by the Chernobyl accident ?", 
they are less than IS % to say "below 50". i.e.. the right answer ; and 65 % in 
March 1988 overestimated the number of deaths : 40 % assessed the number to be 
between 100 and 1000 and 25 % gave more than 1000 deaths. Such an inaccuracy, 
see Figure 6,  does not seem to reduce but rather to increase. It may have several 
reasons. One is the first announcement by TV and newspapers of a 2000 deaths 
accident ; undoubtfully this high value, easy to remember, has impressed lay people 
memories. An other reason is the quite common association of many deaths with any 
catastrophic event. Moreover, people suspect that truth is largely hidden and this 
suspicion leads to an overestimation. 
FIGURE 6 
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After Chernobyl, changes were observed for many questions dealing with general 
nuclear risks : now, people think that risks are more actual and difficult to reduce. 
But at the same time, individuals do not challenge the economic advantages due to 
the nuclear energy program ; nuclear industry is already several years old and 
public perceive it as an important social sector. 
INFORMATION DEMANDS 
Informations given after Chernobyl have been received by the public with more 
scepticism and suspicion than confidence. Sociologists know that when people are 
interviewed about information with respect to some topic, they always say that 
there is a lack of information and always ask for  more information. Nevertheless in 
the days after Chernobyl, specialists were speaking diversely and medias were 
confusing, either excessive and then inaccurate, or unable to fit  a public demand 
that was both considerable and vague. This explains why, since 1986 more than 60% 
of French have thought that Chernobyl impacts on France were hidden, why most 
people trust physicians, consumers associations and ecologists when they discuss 
Chernobyl impacts and nuclear matters and mistrust politicians and why only 20 to 
40 % of French accept the information given by institutions. 
Two social groups asked actively more information. One is the farmers' group who 
noted how atmospheric radioactive releases could affect large areas and prevent 
usual consumption of agricultural products ; the other one is the corporation of 
physicians who justified their demands by their duties and by the psychological 
assistance they should give to patients and to populations. 
Before Chernobyl, farmers strongly supported the nuclear program. Since May 1986, 
they have reached a new position globally more reticent [5]. Farmers unions and the 
agro-industry were given informations by authorities about feasible counter-measures 
relating to crops and cattle, to  vegetal and animal productions and their trans- 
formed products. A comprehensive booklet is in preparation for  a wide diffusion. 
Physicians in France are in favor of nuclear energy, in their majority. After 
Chernobyl, they had to answer questions from their patients and relatives ; inter- 
viewed in 1987, they judged that their knowledge about the types of risks, 
emergency planning, environmental measurements, and internal contamination was 
not sufficient to give wise advices and to quiet anxious individuals [6]. So, radiation 
protectionists did a tremendous task of training and of information in 1987-1988, 
which was mainly directed towards physicians in small towns and rural areas (71. 
SOCIAL RESPONSES 
Any major catastrophic event, thanks to media coverage, has the potential to 
impress lay people, to raise safety and environmental protection questions and to 
involve assessments, contradictory debates and new policy guidelines. Natural 
disasters, transportation accidents, industrial and nuclear failures provoke such a re- 
examination and critical analysis of the concerned safety system : obviously 
learning from experience leads to technical improvements, but it also yields 
adjustments in the safety organization. The clear impacts of TMI and Chernobyl on 
France appear in Figure 7 where in-plant safety and out-plant nuclear activity 
management are equal1 y concerned. 
FIGURE 7 
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In both cases, the information and communication sector has been developed, 
structured and improved through a dynamic process involving elected representa- 
tives, energy producers and governmental authorities, taking into account CEC 
Directives ( i.e., Seveso Directive, Article 8) or Recommendations, satisfying some 
demands from the public and interested groups. In that sense a social response has 
emerged, which illustrates both the difficulty for society to prevent such extreme 
situations and its ability to react in the short term. 
Indeed the Local Information Commissions, which should be placed at major nuclear 
installations, came from the Premier's Minister's Directive of December 15,1981 ; 
these structures took benefits from the poor communication management demon- 
strated during the TMI crisis. In these local commissions, leaders are the regional 
elected representatives and the operator is the main partner ; subjects under 
consideration are information exchange on normal operations conditions and 
incidents notification ; and an agreement between the operator and the administra- 
tive authority, i.e, the Prefet, concerns the exchange of technical information 
needed for the management of crisis situations at the local level [8]. 
Before Chernobyl, at the national level, information about nuclear issues was 
considered as satisfactory. The Ministry of Industry released on a continuous basis 
general scientific information and safety reports data ; for crisis management, 
propositions were under consideration ; and the CSSN (Council Superior for Nuclear 
Safety) was a consultative institution where 35 experts with nuclear, technical, 
economic and social competences gave advices to the Minister. 
After Chernobyl, more emphasis was put on emergency management and the related 
communication problems [9]. In Figure 8, a short chronology lists actions of 
information and communication and the organizational decisions. 
Concerning information, the main fact was that the Ministry of Industry got a new 
mission : to coordinate and to release nuclear information to the public and to 
medias at the national level [lo]. This task is now performed by a permanent 
information unit. The consultative institution CSSN was replaced by CSSIN (Council 
Superior of Nuclear Safety and Information) ; now, CSSIN includes 6 experts from 
public communication and one among them is the vice-president of the Council. 
Moreover, this new state organization faces a citizens' interest group, the CRIIRAD 
(Commission Regional of Independent Information on Radioactivity) founded in May 
1986. This group joins universitary and independent laboratories which perform 
environmental monitoring ; it is managed by volunteers and financed by Regional 
Administration funds. At the local level, there is a free access to safety data 
through phoned services both in the plant and in the Town-Hall of the Prefecture, 
i.e, the main city of the administrative region where is the plant [I I]. 
Inlormauon h i s  all : 
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In crisis situations, the need for a better communication has been recognized. For 
concerned populations at the local level, a public reIation unit and a press center 
operate at the Prefecture when the Intervention Particular Plan comes into force. 
And simultaneously, a national information crisis unit in the Ministry of Industry 
has the task to give harmonized informations to the public and to the medias. 
CONCLUSION 
Any catastrophic event has numerous diverse impacts. For concerned communities, 
sanitary and economic effects are often immediate and dominant. The initial shock 
is followed by questioning and controversies which develop on a large scale. 
Opinions may change, strong demands are formulated, which require responses and 
new measures from authorities ; lessons must be taken into account. 
Chernobyl is a clear example of these combined effects which affect individuals, 
communities and governments. For France, major impacts have been observed in 
public opinion and in the field of nuclear information and communication. Some 
impacts are negative when they frighten and make suspicious some population 
segments ; but some others can be considered as positive when they lead to a more 
transparent nuclear policy and when they make the access to information easier for 
interested citizens. 
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"The System's Ability to Learn: Some Basic problems in Post-hoc 
Accident Assessment". 
Lyn Aitken and Brian Wynne. 
Centre for Science Studies and Science Policy. 
University of Lancaster. U.K. 
The aims of post hoc accident assessment are to assemble 
information through scientific investigation to discover the 
cause of the accident. This is essentially regarded as a 
learning experience, on the basis of which, measures may be 
taken to avoid the replication of such an accident under 
similar conditions. This assessment of cause cannot be 
separated from the assignment, or release from, blame of 
parties or institutions concerned in the accident or with the 
facility where the accident occurred. This introduces a legal 
dimension, and concepts from legal practice are incorporated 
into scientific investigation, such as "foreseeability", "state 
of the art" and ultimately "negligence". In addition, of 
course, surrounding legal perspectives, are diverse political 
perspectives also concerned with criticizing or defending 
powerful institutions and policy commitments. 
A key question underlying these contending frameworks is 
whether there is a pure, objective scientific framework that 
can be found and used, both to arbitrate between the others, 
and to provide new, organized conceptual knowledge with which 
the system of practices can learn and improve. 
The case study will consider this question, and the problems of 
post hoc accident assessment which are located in the 
collection and dissemination of information. This is 
highlighted where the investigatory body is responsible both 
for disseminating information to avoid accidents, and with 
gathering evidence for the assessment of an accident, with the 
possibility of prosecuting for breaches of safety. These 
responsibilities call for different methods of handling 
information. The proactive role aims to prevent accidents 
through inspection of sites and provision of advice on safe 
practices: information is provided on an informal and 
individual basis. The reactive role aims to identify unsafe 
practices which may have led to the accident, but the 
information gathered and disseminated in this case is public 
and formal. Both involve making judgments, but in the latter 
case, the judgment is made publicly and has wider repercussions 
than judgments made in a proactive capacity. 
Much work has been done in the Sociology of scientific 
knowledge on the role of institutional contexts in the 
construction of scientific knowledge, relative to the specific 
interests of participants. This same social dimension is also 
applicable in scientific investigations of accidents within a 
wider social context, however in this case, interests stem from 
the structural position of the investigatory body. Ultimately, 
the assumed division between technical and legal or political 
problems comes into question. 
To give a simplified example for comparison, after a motoring 
accident, the parties involved file personal reports to their 
insurance companies for assessment. The facts of the accident 
are usually selected and presented by each motorist to ensure 
that least blame is to fall upon him. There is a definite 
personal interest involved in selecting which of a range of 
possible facts are significant: for instance, if the collision 
occurred on a bend in the road, the motorist who was distracted 
and driving too fast on the wrong side may not wish to select 
this as a highly relevent fact, and may instead give greater 
significance to the bad road conditions, or the weather. This 
is a personal, and small scale accident, the main aim of the 
assessment of cause being to assign blame, with the possibility 
that sanctions may follow. 
In large scale accidents, however, such direct personal 
interest is not so easily attributable to the selection of 
significant facts, as it is the investigatory body, in 
consultation with the parties concerned and through independent 
investigation, that gathers and presents the information on the 
basis of which assessment is made. So a further level of social 
negotiation is introduced. Where in the small scale accident, 
personal interest may complicate the direct presentation of 
information for assessment, in the large scale accident, wider 
structural requirements which dictate the interests of 
investigatory bodies brings about this complication. 
A significant complicating factor which highlights basic 
problems of post hoc accident assessment is the structural 
location of an investigatory body that is charged with both 
proactive and reactive response to accidents and whose power is 
unevenly weighted to apply the ultimate sanction, criminal 
prosecution. Thus its investigation proceeds in the selection 
of significant facts not with personal interest in mind, but 
with the unstated, and perhaps unperceived, institutional 
interest of fulfilling its reactive role, and considering 
available information only in the light of possible criminal 
prosecution. As a particular kind of hard evidence is needed 
for criminal prosecution, a broader base of evidence may be 
deemed insignificant, and not publicized. However this 
evidence, if publicized, may contribute to the learning process 
which is the aim of accident assessment. 
This process will be examined through considering the post hoc 
accident assessment of an explosion in the valve house of a 
water transfer scheme in the north of England. 
The Abbevstead disaster 
The Lune-Wyre water transfer scheme in North Western England 
operated through the early eighties until 23rd May, 1984. Prior 
to this date, the villagers downstream from the outfall end 
were concerned that the recent flooding around the village was 
caused by this new water transfer scheme. Keen to deny this, 
the North West Water Authority invited a party of villagers to 
inspect the outfall works. On the evening of 23 May, 1984, a 
group of 44 people including 8 water authority employees, 
assembled in a valve house set into a hillside at the outfall 
end of the Lune Wyre transfer scheme at Abbeystead to view a 
demonstration of water pumping. 
The pumps were switched on and the party waited for some time 
without the water appearing. Unknown to them an explosive 
mixture of methane and air was being pumped into the valve 
house ahead of the water. Suddenly there was an intense flash 
and an explosion. 16 people were killed, and 28 badly injured 
from burns and the collapse of the heavy cement roof. 
Although methane is well known as an explosive gas and as a 
potential problem in underground workings, no measures to 
disperse gases had been taken in the Wyresdale scheme. The 
tunnel had been vented into the enclosed valve-house instead of 
the open air. Almost immediately after the accident, an 
official inquiry got underway with a view to establishing the 
cause, blameworthiness- if any- and future preventative 
measures. 
Moments before the explosion, a father and his eleven year old 
son were standing looking into the water already lying in the 
tunnel end, discussing the possibility of fish living in the 
water. After the explosion, the father, who was badly injured 
and burned, pulled his son's decapitated body out df the 
rubble. In humanitarian terms, the lack of foreseeability of 
that particular accident can not be in doubt. However, the 
foreseeability of an accident relative to the conditions of 
design, construction and operation was in doubt, and it was 
with this question in mind that an understanding of this 
accident was sought for assessment, firstly by the 
investigatory body, and later through years of civil court 
cases brought by the victims for compensation. These latter 
cases.were conducted in the High Court, and the Court of 
Appeal, where in the former the designers, contractors and 
operators were charged with negligence, while in the latter, 
the designers alone were charged with full responsibility for 
negligence. 
The investigatory body was concerned with foreseeability of the 
source and mechanism of ingress of the methane. The significant 
question was whether there was knowledge that methane would be 
produced by a known or detected source and would accumulate in 
the facility, at any time during the design, construction and 
operation of the tunnel, and if so, what measures had been 
taken to apply safety measures. The courts put greater 
significance into the lack of facility for ventilation of 
gases, where external conditions or prior knowledge indicated 
there was even a possibility of the existence of those gases. 
Thus the HSE, for possible criminal prosecution, was concerned 
with certain evidence of foreseeability, hence negligence, 
"beyond all reasonable doubt", rather than with less completely 
certain evidence of a kind which may nevertheless be important. 
The investinatorv - bodv 
The inquiry into the disaster was directed by the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE), the executive arm of the Health and 
Safety Commission, which was set up to carry out the aims of 
the Health and Safety at Work etc Act of 1974. This Act was 
devised to replace existing statutes with new regulations and 
to create conditions for more effective self-regulation by 
restating the common law duties of employers and employees, and 
the duties of employers to persons other than employees on 
their premises. Thus the responsibilities of these bodies under 
the Act are to research, train, inform and advise as well as to 
direct investigations and hold inquiries. The HSE has the power 
to enforce the statutes of the Act, breaches of which may 
result in criminal prosecution. 
These statutes may be breached where a company failed to take 
reasonably practicable steps to meet the statutory duties. An 
assessment of "reasonably practicable steps" is measured 
against the foreseeability of the accident, and the utilization 
of technical solutions at the disposal of the designers, 
contractors, and operators to practice within the "state of the 
art". This is in itself a problematic concept, but may be 
loosely defined as referring to that which is within common 
knowledge and practice. Thus the investigation was closely 
governed by the necessity to assess the foreseeability of the 
accident, and steps that could have been taken to avert the 
accident that were within common practice.(l) 
For the investigation, the Health and Safety Executive brought 
to Abbeystead a team of 10 people including specialists from 
the Factories Inspectorate, Pipelines Inspectorate of the 
Department of Energy, and other fire and gas experts. This team 
was supported by hundreds of experts producing ancillary 
reports on a number of issues 'farmed out' to them by the HSE. 
The investigation of the disaster was carried out by an 
attempted reconstruction of the accident, to the point prior to 
ignition of the methane. The replication was not exact as the 
build up of methane was less than that extrapolated at the 
time of the explosion, but allowed an explanation of the 
mechanism to be devised. It was deduced that methane had 
accumulated in a void along the tunnel roof, and was pushed 
through into the valve house ahead of the pumped water, where a 
source of ignition resulted in an explosion. The questions 
which followed were concerned with the manner in which methane 
entered and accumulated in the tunnel. As the HSE has a 
prosecuting role, the question of whether this accumulation and 
its potential effect was foreseeable at any stage during the 
design, construction and operation of the water transfer scheme 
was also pursued. If sufficient evidence of foreseeability, and 
therefore negligence, were proven, the HSE would bring a 
criminal prosecution for breach of the statutes of the Health 
and Safety at Work Act. Prior evidence for the generation of 
methane in that locality, or evidence of methane in earlier 
similar tunnels, was thus relevent. 
In order to answer the questions of mechanism of ingress and 
accumulation of methane, expert investigations were directed on 
the tunnel, and on samples taken from the tunnel, which were 
sent to outside laboratories for their analyses and reports. 
The first technical reports were produced, but not released, in 
September/October 1984. Results were given on isotopic and 
chemical analyses of gas and associated water(2); the possible 
biological origin of structures found in the Wyresdale 
tunnel(3); the potential for samples of organic sludge taken 
from the tunnel to generate methane, questioning if the methane 
was of biological origin ( 4 ) ;  the measurement of C14 activity, 
to determine the age of the methane in the tunnel, questioning 
if it was of geological origin "ancient" or "modernW(5>; and 
reports were produced by HSE inspectors on electrical aspects, 
fire and explosion aspects, and civil engineering aspects of 
the investigation. 
Evidence based on these reports was presented at the first 
public legal forum, the inquest for the victims of the 
disaster. The mechanism was described such that methane entered 
the tunnel through cracks in the tunnel lining, dissolved in 
groundwater which was known to add to water supplies in the 
tunnel, when it was not full. The tunnel had not been full, and 
water had not been pumped through the tunnel for 19 days before 
the accident. Thus the roof space entrapped the methane which 
was emitted from solution in the ground water in the reduced 
pressure of the tunnel. 
The great weight of evidence at the inquest hinged on the 
source and ingress of the gas. It was given in evidence that it 
was of ancient origin, lying deep underground for thousands of 
years, its presence only apparent and only identifiable when it 
appeared. The judgment Of the inquest, in October 1984 was that 
the disaster was an accident, that the explosion was 
unforeseeable. 
In February 1985, the official HSE inquiry report (6 )  was 
released, though not the background scientific reports on 
specific issues such as carbondating of the methane. It also 
concluded that the disaster was not foreseeable, and that while 
strong recommendations would be made to the water industry to 
check the safety of similar installations, no criminal charges 
would be brought against the designers, contractors or 
operators of the scheme. 
The selection of significant information on which the official 
inquiry report is based begins to become apparent when the 
background technical reports are studied. The analysis was 
broken down into compartmentalized data, as samples from 
separate parts of the site of the disaster were sent to 
separate laboratories for analysis, and these findings were 
returned to the HSE for "harmonization". 
A particular example will be provided to illustrate these 
points. This example relates to the statment at the inquiry 
that the methane was of ancient origin and could have been 
lying in the ground for thousands of years, its presence only 
apparent when it appeared. 
A sample of gas was reduced to a carbonate, and sent to a 
laboratory for carbon dating. The sample emitted C14 at a 
particular rate, indicating ancient geological origin of the 
methane in which the carbon was bonded. However, because of the 
general background increase of C14 in the atmosphere, this 
trace could not be definitively identified with the sample. In 
other words, there was a possibility of contamination. While 
the analysts could conclude that the carbon in the sample was 
mainly of ancient origin, that was all they could say. They 
advised against putting any kind of date on the sample. They 
could not confirm that it was absolutely of ancient or modern 
origin, that is, from deep coal or from recently decayed 
vegetable matter. It has to be remembered that all they were 
dating was the carbon, not the source of the methane, which 
could have been generated recently and biologically, but still 
have taken up some carbon of ancient origin. However in the 
wider interpretation, these became synonomous. 
The sludge samples were sent to another laboratory where a 
different kind of analysis was carried out. This analysis was 
to determine whether the bacteria in the sludge were capable of 
producing methane, and were of the type that had previously 
been found in muds and other organic sludges. They concluded 
that it was unlikely that biological activity alone could have 
produced a sufficient amount of methane, which, they stated, 
fitted in with "what they understood to be the results of the 
carbon-dating: that most of the methane was of geological 
origin". They do point out that conditions in the tunnel being 
as they were, under certain circumstances, large amounts of 
methane could have been produced. However, their conclusions 
are persuaded by the carbon-dating results. It should be noted 
that from the uncertainty stated by the carbon dating 
laboratory, the significant item that was extracted for 
communication to the second laboratory was that the carbon was 
mainly of ancient origin. 
Thus the findings given by the technical reports consist 
overwhelmingly of possibilities and uncertainties, with the 
researchers stating either that they could not give an 
unambiguous answer to the questions posed bcause they did not 
have information on the context, or the researchers discarding 
possibilities because their results did not fit into the 
picture being drawn by the earlier findings. 
However, in the report, these results were harmonized to state 
that the methane was of ancient geological origin, from a deep 
unknown source, and that the tunnel sludge could not have 
produced the same amount of methane. In order to show the 
possibilities of reconstruction, the two tests, if done by the 
same laboratory, with the same focus for analysis could quite 
easily have yielded the results that while the carbon in the 
methane was of ancient origin, its source was in the sludge 
which was being consumed by methanogenic bacteria, possibly 
carried in by groundwater from the coal measures. If both the 
gas and the sludge had been carbondated, i t  may have revealed 
that ancient carbon was in both. Instead, it was only confirmed 
that the sludge carried methanogenic bacteria, which is not 
unusual, and simply confirms what is well known within the 
biological discipline. However, by requesting separate 
analyses, with separate foci, an artifical distinction is drawn 
between the biological and geological origins of the methane. 
Also, by focusing the alternative to ancient, unforeseeable 
methane on organic sludge in the tunnel, and not on methane 
generation from the known coal measures in the immediate 
locality of the tunnel, the inquiry increased the apparent 
credibility of the ancient, deep and unforeseeable methane 
interpretation. 
The complex process of establishment of a technical fact can be 
seen in this example. When i t  is analysed closely in this way, 
the fact is underdetermined by the evidence: yet this 
underdetermination, and the viability of alternative facts, is 
obscured by the official process of reconstruction. The 
particular scientific fact so constructed had wide social 
usage, from providing a definitive statement to the early 
inquest, to its investigative use as the starting point for 
the further assessment of the accident, against which wider 
recommendations to the whole industry for future safe practice 
were constructed. A further important usage was in the defence 
case in the civil court proceedings for negligence against the 
designers, drivers and operators of the tunnel. was founded on 
denying negligence, relative to this fact. 
As grounds for the decision not to criminally prosecute, the 
HSE inquiry report stated that the solubility of methane in 
water was not fully understood by the designers, operators, nor 
tho water industry generally since published references to i t  
in Chemistry had not been widely circulated in the civil 
engineering profession.(8> The HSE report noted that while 
designers and operators believed methane was not emerging from 
the strata during construction, tests which were carried out in 
line with standard contract clauses could neither confirm nor 
deny its absence or presence amongst other factors, because 
other gases were present which confused possible methane 
readings. Existing test rules were inconclusive and thus 
useless. The report recommended widespread publication 
throughout the civil engineering profession of the possibility 
of the solubility of methane in water under pressure. Training 
to alert practitioners to this possibility would be necessary. 
While the example of the methane's origins has been described 
in some detail, there were several other areas of discretion 
and interpretive choice over the establishment of important 
facts, and around the definition and significance of "prior 
knowledge". 
Debate and further assessment of this accident continued long 
after the HSE inquiry report was published; much of it was 
conducted, as is often the case, in the glare of publicity 
around the issue of compensation for the victims of the 
accident. In the engineering journals, other literature 
sources, and throughout the 1987 civil court case, instances of 
apparent prior knowledge were cited, and the argument continued 
around whether this accident was precedented, or was a singular 
"Act of God". It was noted that the problems of methane 
dissolving out of water in underground workings following a 
series of explosions in Hungary were the subject of an 
international civil engineering csnfaranca when t h e  tr-ansfar 
scheme was being designed. Other earlier instances of the 
presence of methane in sumps, aquaducts, pumping stations, 
valve houses, and boreholes, some resulting in explosions, were 
detailed in the engineering press and in the court cases. The 
denial that such events constituted precursors, thus 
negligence, and failure to learn, hinged on the differences 
rather than similarities that could be drawn between such 
installations and the Lune-Wyre transfer scheme. 
The legal dimension overwhelmingly yielded not an addition to 
knowledge, but a denial of knowledge, and a denial of systemic 
similarity, which has implications for the lessons that may be 
learned from the assessment of this disaster. 
The decision not to press criminal charges of responsibility 
for the accident meant that for many, the disaster then almost 
assumed the character of an "Act of God". This compromised the 
capacity of the HSE to perform its proactive role of educating 
the wider industrial system into better practices, although 
fulfillment of that role was one of the reasons cited for not 
pressing criminal charges.(6> That is, if criminal charges were 
brought, all information about the disaster would be subjudice, 
and it would be impossible to publicize recommendations for 
immediate safe practice to the water industry. Yet much 
information about the disaster's parallels and precursors was 
hidden from view by the way the inquiry was constructed that 
justif led the lack of criminal prosecution. 
The publicly unstated conflict of roles embedded within the 
regulatory institution was reflected in the scientific 
analytical knowledge which it generated. Thus in its reactive 
capacity it searched for a narrow range of certain evidence, 
which undermined its performance in its proactive capacity to 
provide a broad public base of knowledge of possibilities. 
The selection and shaping of scientific facts should not be 
interpreted as an intentional "cover-upw, or deliberate 
misrepresentation. The social context within which such 
assessments are made demands investigation and explanation to 
be provided in the glare of publicity, urgently, by a body that 
must fulfil roles which become contradictory. So in the 
interests of fulfilling a proactive role, and disseminating 
information as quickly as possible to avert replictions of this 
disaster, the prosecuting reactive role may be avoided 
particularly where there may be no immediately obvious 
negligence. However, institutional interests dictate that 
justification must be given for not implementing this 
prosecutory role; thus judgments about cause and responsibility 
which may internally be more tentative and informal become 
commitments which shape the marshalling and construction of 
scientific information inot a more definitive and certain 
public form than is ultimately defensible or justifiable. 
As noted in the Abbeystead case study, much of the significant 
information about accidents is uncertain, complex, and indeed, 
non-existent at the time of the accident. It has to be 
constructed by investigation, and construction involves 
building a tissue of assumptions and inferences to frame and 
buttress any facts. The context in which information about 
accidents is constructed contains important assumptions about 
the purpose, scope and social use of that information which are 
not usually explicit, yet which radically shape the information 
created and how it is either used or neglected. An important 
dimension to how information is created so as to give meaning 
to an accident is to define it, for example, as the latest in a 
string of near miss precursors that should have led to 
preemptive measures, or as an unpredictable "Act of God" from 
which we might learn some new technical insights, but not 
anything about the fallibility of social organisations. , 
How these meanings are constructed- the context of unstated 
assumptions and commitments which frame enquiry- is crucial in 
determining what the real and technological system learns from 
such accidents, which can in many respects be treated as a 
negotiable learning process just like that from more "positive" 
experiments. 
Post-accident investigating authorities are often inhibited, 
albeit involuntarily, by the fact that they are partly 
evaluating their own past standards, practices and decisions, 
embodied in the regulated agents' action leading up to the 
accident. It is usually ambiguous whether those actions 
departed from norms or instructions laid down by regulatory 
bodies. The Abbeystead case shows this ambiguity. The defence 
argument could be restated as: we were only doing what every 
commercial civil engineering company does when designing and 
driving a tunnel. That "State of the Art" in the trade was 
accepted by the regulators even though it turned out to be 
dangerous. 
Thus the post accident inquiry was investigating the industrial 
actors to see how far they had complied with existing 
standards; but it was also investigating the adequacy of those 
standards, and the same body that was responsible for those 
standards was conducting the inquiry. The question of the 
adequacy of existing standards is composed of several distinct 
parts: - 
a) were the standards themselves unacceptably weak in the light 
of existing knowledge and practices elsewhere, for example in 
other related industries, or in other countries? 
b) were they lax but only with the benefit of hindsight? That 
is, was i t  the accident itself that showed weaknesses in 
preexisting knowledge, weaknesses which accident analysis could 
help to overcome for the system as a whole? 
c) were the standards precise enough, for example in defining 
precisely what kinds of installation practices and conditions 
they covered? That is, they may have imposed demanding 
regulations, but may have been unduly vague and discretionary 
as to when those demands should be in force. 
It is evident, therefore, that post accident investigation can 
be constructed against implicit standards, or frames of 
reference. In this case, the~nvestigation took the regulatory 
process and pre-existing industrial practices for granted as 
unproblematic, and thus highlighted for examination the 
question of whether practices in this case deviated from those 
"standards". In the post-Chernobyl context, inquiry took the 
form of investigating design and operational aspects of RBMK 
management, and took for granted the political fact that 
different countries operate with diverse reactor designs and 
standards, both technical and operational. There were 
alternative foci of inquiry available: 
a) why were existing nuclear standards so inconsistent, when 
the accident environment is intat-.nstiongl.? 
b) why had nuclear authorities everywhere managed to avoid the 
realization that a nuclear accident could have more than local 
and environmental safety effects? 
c) what does it say about the institutional psychology of 
nuclear power more generally, that precursors to the TMI 
accident and the Chernobyl accident had occurred, apparently 
without helping the authorities in either case to learn and 
avoid later accidents? 
Without pretending to give answers to such quesitons, they 
indicated that post accident learning is shaped and limited by 
management of the inquiry agenda or framework. This is not 
necessarily deliberate. However, whatever the formal 
independence of the accident, investigators- let us say the 
IAEA in the case of Chernobyl- there are shared commitments 
between investigator and the investigated party which 
inevitably limit the framework, ignoring some of the questions 
which could be asked, and thus some of the learning which could 
be achieved. 
Vaughan has described a similar, though in that case more 
formalised institutional structure in the NASA Challenger space 
shuttle case, with safety investigation agencies reporting to 
the agencies they were supposed to be regulating. 
In the Abbeystead case, even where the issues were apparently 
far more confirmed and realised than for a major international 
accident such as Chernobyl, similar factors prevailed. As 
already indicated, the HSE was partly investigating itself when 
it analysed the context of the accident. 
There are thus quite fundamental conflicts in a post accident 
situation between the need to attribute responsibility - in a 
sense learning about our institutions, their behaviour and 
capabilities- and the need to gather and disseminate technical 
information- learning improved technical practice. The second 
is conducted against a stablized institutional background in 
which the first sort of question is at least temporarily, 
suspended. A basic problem is that this suspension may itself 
become institutionalized, and then limit what can be learned by 
the system as a whole. The technical knowledge constructed in 
post accident inquiry depends on the social role that 
assessment is playing, and consequent assumptions about what 
can count as evidence, what rules of legitimate inference 
prevail, etc. As we have shown, science does not simply provide 
one single, definitive set of methodological norms for this 
process. 
Scientific institutions create and deploy knowledge in social 
settings, not a vacuum; and they use such institutional 
signposts to get started and frame coherent investigation. The 
difficulty is not so much that this happens- i t  is inevitable, 
necessary, and legitimate. It is aware that the process is 
unrecognized, and goes undebated. There is a deeper, more 
subtle problem than that when information is impounded and 
controlled after an accident, when an issue becomes sub-judice 
pending legal trial of responsibility. 
In the Abbeystead case indeed, the more fundamental paving 
limitation produced counter initiative results in that the 
limitation on what evidence was identified from prior 
experience was created by the very option- to avoid criminal 
prosecution- which the authorities had chosen in the attempt to 
avoid placing restrictions on post accident learning. This 
perverse effect only demonstrates the two levels at which such 
restriction of learning can take place, and the relative 
invisibility of the level we have tried to highlight. 
A final conclusion perhaps suggesting more general issues is 
connected to the observation above of a more subtle and 
extensive cornmunality of commitments between 
regulator/investigator and regulated/investigated parties, than 
is usually recognized. 
Evaluation of responsibility for an accident, as indicated 
earlier, has to take place against a normative yardstick taken 
to be legitimate. The Herald of Free Enterprise disaster may 
have been caused by failure to close the bow doors before 
leaving port: the implicit yardstick is the formal rule that 
all bow doors should be closed before leaving. But if it is 
discovered that an informal practice had evolved whereby nearly 
all ferries were routinely leaving port with their bow doors 
being closed as they left, the yardstick looks a little less 
"taken for granted" and new questions are suggested, such as: 
why had such an unsafe practice evolved, and who was 
responsible for creating and condoning it? If ferry masters 
were under commercial pressure to sail to a very tight 
timetable, and management rejected private wernings from them, 
is responsibility shifted? And is it shifted yet again if 
shareholders were "forcing" managers to extract a certain rate 
of profit? And if government inspectors knew of complaints 
about lack of warning lights and about crew working hours both 
of which contributed to the eventual accident? 
Post accident inquiries are often conducted, as was, the 
Abbeystead investigation, as if accidents are caused by 
deviation, from an established, properly designed and 
professional "state of the art" in a particular industrial or 
other sector. Normal practice is taken to be natural and 
legitimated, controlled by diligent external regulation and 
professional self-policing via the accepted mechanisms of peer 
review, quali t y control, etc. The legal framework of negligence 
is most strongly developed in this respect, where 
foreseeability of an accident, hence negligence, is defined 
against the existing state of knowledge or practice in the 
field in question. Implicitly, therfore, that "state of the 
art" is assumed to be a fully acceptable and proper standard 
from which to measure lapses. 
In many cases, however, we would suggest the majority, the 
existing "state of the arta8 is not at all problematic. Clearly 
in the Herald of Free Enterprise case, it could have been 
described as very unsafe, informal, and in effect unregulated. 
The same is true of many informally evolved working practices, 
though they have often been created to increase efficience, 
safety or practicality of more theoretical designs and official 
standards. 
In the Abbeystead case, the existing "state of the art" on 
water tunnel design and construction with respect to methane 
was unclear and inconsistent. 
What could be said about it, however, was that it reflected 
commercial evolution and normal competitive opportunism in tho 
civil engineering industry- for example companies looking to 
tnder for water tunnel contracts after experience of other 
hydro-engineering schemes. The question. of whether our 
commercial opportunities required new forms of expertise, and 
of what kinds did not appear to have been controlled. Thus the 
tacit model, of the "state of the art" being controlled 
andconstructed by the more deliberate process of professional 
peer review and consensus, was misleading. The more fundamental 
structural issue raised by the accident was whether the 
existing industrial and technical structure as a whole was 
properly coordinated, controlled and regulated, a question 
which of course included the regulators as part of the problem 
as well as part of the solution. It is a more fundamental 
quesiton about the structure of the technology seen as a 
dispersed organisational system. 
Scientific post accident investigations throw light as if 
accidents and their gestation were the only time of "deviation" 
from what are assumed to be clearcut and proper rules. This 
perhaps reflects the institutional involvemnt in the design of 
that "normal" system. Yet it is increasingly appreciated that 
normal practices are pregnant with accident potential (Perrow, 
1984). Such practical system evolve informally, often according 
to criteria and constraints that are highly localised, say to 
the shopfloor, or to one plant in an interdependent network. At 
that location or level they may be rational practices, perhaps 
even essential to getting the job done at all. (Wynne, 1988). 
If the water tunnel drivers had stopped work every time they 
suspected methane, or that a measurement formally required by 
regulations was inconclusive, they would have delayed the 
project by years. 
Such situations are far from untypical, indeed they can lay 
claim to being normal. yet the wider appreciation of these 
"private" realities of technological practice- paradoxically 
ones well recognized by most ordinary people, who are often 
after all participants in them- are surprisingly resistant to 
more formal systematic appreciation and analysis by experts. 
Although the problems of post accident learning ultimately defy 
complete resolution, wider appreciation of the internal 
processes of normal technological practice would help prepare 
inquiry, public and policy responses to examine a wider agenda 
of questions, about the routine regulation, and regulability of 
normal practices in the field in question. This would naturally 
include questions about institutional arrangments of control 
and regulation of the technology. 
Accident investigating institutions could also advance their 
own and the wider system's learning by adopting methods and 
approaches which explicate and examine the unstated assumptions 
and commitments which shape, from its beginning, the process of 
scientific investigation. Since this is usually the first and 
most authoritative phase in shaping policy attitudes and social 
responses, i t  is particularly important that its practitioners, 
and the policy world, should be aware of the extra-scientific 
considerations which precede and shape it. 
1 .  It also incorporated a need to define what was "common" or 
"standard" engineering knowledge and practice in relation to 
methane in similar schemes. As we shall see, what was or was 
not "methane" and "similar schemes" were open to crucial 
interpretive licence. In effect one had to open up the issue of 
the safety or acceptability of previous taken for granted 
attitudes, knowledge and practice in commercial civil 
engineering- as implicitly licensed by the regulatory body now 
investigating the accident. 
2.The Fluid Process Research Group of the British Geological 
Survey: Isotopic and Chemical Analyses of Gas and Associated 
Water. 
3.The Commonwealth Mycological Institute report. 
4.The Rowett Research Institute report. 
5.The Harwell Low Level Measurements Laboratory report. 
6,Health and Safety Executive: The Abbeystead Explosion: Report 
of an Inquiry. London 1985. 
7. Personal communication. 
8. Implicit in this stance is an interesting ambiguity about 
the responsibility of a profession for not knowing something 
important for the safety of its practices - the solubility of 
methane in water under pressure- that was apparently known in 
other professional circles, and in the public domain. 
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